18: Controlling Cuban-Exile Chaos

Publicly Vice President Richard Nixon was asserting that the U.S. should take a hands-off approach to Cuba and hope for the best.1 But in fact, Nixon had been dealing with the issue of Castro since at least April 19, 1959, when he met with Castro and then “prepared a 4-page secret memorandum and sent out copies to President Eisenhower, Secretary Herter and to Allen Dulles.” Herter was serving as Secretary of State in place of an ailing John Foster Dulles who coincidentally was hospitalized at the same time as former Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Dulles died May 24, 1959, while Marshall passed October 16, 19592 leaving a hole in William and Edna Pawley’s personal lives and William’s sphere of influence.

In the 12 months since Castro ascended to power, the Cuban government had expropriated 70,000 acres of property owned by U.S. sugar companies and United Fruit. Once again, the company would call for U.S. action to overthrow a government.3 

The tsunami of Cuban exiles arriving in the U.S. made that mission seem easy if someone could vet them to determine the best future political leaders and organize an effective fighting force.

On January 3, 1960, President Eisenhower announced that the U.S. was severing diplomatic relations with Cuba. On January 13th a Special Group meeting attended by CIA Director Allen Dulles and Livingston Merchant from the State Department discussed “Anti- Castro Activities.” With these actions and Eisenhower's March 17th approval of a plan to invade Cuba, he was in essence establishing an undeclared war that would hang like an albatross around Uncle Sam’s neck.

The CIA began dealing with Fidel on a formal basis on January 8, 1960, when Director Allen Dulles asked Deputy Director of Plans Richard “Dick” Bissell to organize a special task force. Ten days later the Western Hemisphere Division “organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban Operations” manned “with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and 2 at Santiago Base.”

Heading WH/4 was Jacob “Jake” D. Esterline (aka Jacob Engler) who had gained “extensive guerilla warfare experience in World War II with the OSS” and was “one of the principals in Project PBSUCCESS” in Guatemala in 1954. “Esterline was the choice of J.C. King, Chief, WH Division.” As head of the WH/4 Cuban unit during the fifteen-month run up to the Bay of Pigs invasion, Esterline took his orders from the Deputy Director Plans Richard Bissell but frequently had direct contact with J.C. King and the Miami-based Cuban expert, William Pawley. Both were to be reckoned with because they “had known Republican Party affiliations.”4

King’s full role during the period and many interactions with Pawley will never be known. His papers that once filled eight safes—then only two—disappeared, according to an official history of the period.5

In his autobiography, Pawley asserts that President Eisenhower stated, “‘I want you to assist the CIA in getting the job done right—in the recruitment, supply and organization of this operation. You can function from your office in Miami.’”6 Around this time, a name check was run on “Wm. D. Pawley” and “William Pawley” by various agencies including the FBI.7

Pawley took on Ike’s mission without hesitation, believing that the infrastructure of the CIA’s Cuban operations was fatally flawed because CIA Director Dulles “already had his hands full” and would probably rely on “Richard Bissell or Frank Wisner” who were “in charge of directing global, covert operations. These overburdened individuals would, in turn, delegate the job to someone still lower in the hierarchy.” Pawley believed lower-level officials “would lack the muscle to get needed action from the powerful heads of other agencies, let alone reach the President.” Nonetheless, Pawley “was willing to go along with what I considered a defective organizational setup rather than press for drastic changes at the last moment.”

Pawley also decided that the man the CIA put in charge in Miami, “was not senior enough for direct access to Dulles or the President” so in his own business office Pawley established a “group of top Cubans” to recruit a force to invade Cuba and overthrow Castro. “They were Dr. Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Fabio Freyre, Dr. Antonio Maceo, Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla and General Martin Diaz Tamayo.” He met with this “fine caliber” group “several times a week for all-day sessions.” Theirs was “an exhausting schedule for more than a year” tasked with “recruitment, security screening and preparation of the force that was being sent to Guatemala for intensive pre-invasion training.”8

On January 13, 1960, Pawley alerted the CIA about his upbraiding by phone of Dr. Nunez Portuondo who was spreading negative comments about Pawley in the nation’s center of power. Weeks earlier at the Mayflower Hotel, Pawley had shared with Portuondo and Dr. Marquez Sterling, the “typewritten list of names” of individuals whom General Pedraza would install to replace the Castro regime. But instead of approving or refining the list, Portuondo asserted “that he alone” should be “the next President of Cuba ... because he had served “as a Minister and as Ambassador to the United Nations for the Batista Administration for seven years.” Pawley not only felt Portuondo “could not be the next President but that his name should not be part of the junta” and informed him he was withdrawing his support of Portuondo’s efforts. Portuondo shot back that Pawley was late to the cause of fighting Castro which Pawley rebutted by saying “I first started to work on this in November prior to Batista’s fall and that I had been working on the Castro problem since 1948.”9

Portuondo’s associate Carlos Marquez Sterling was the man who drafted Cuba’s 1940 Constitution “which recognized all Cubans equal, called for the breakup of large land holdings, granted citizens the right to work and established alimony and child support.” He was Cuba’s Speaker of the House of Representatives, Minister of State and Minister of Education who ran unsuccessfully against Batista in 1958. After Castro placed him under house arrest, Sterling fled to the US in 1959, and eventually taught at Columbia University and C.W. Post College. (Sterling passed away in 1991 at age 92.)10

Pawley’s contact with Portuondo and Sterling brought a flurry of activity within the FBI. On January 15, 1960, the Miami office of the FBI “opened a New 105 Case on William D. Pawley who lives at 2555 Lake Ave., Miami Beach, Fla. Sunset Island #2.” The highly redacted AirTel included “information from the Bureau, Washington Field Office, Jacksonville, New York, Atlanta, and Miami” and referenced Rolando Masferrer and Fulgencio Batista.

An informant code-named MM T-1 is referred to in an attached memorandum “Re: Anti-Fidel Castro Activities” which indicated Pawley was playing a significant role. “MM T-1, a former Cuban official who claims to have numerous contacts among Cubans,” revealed many of the details of the Pawley, Portuondo, Sterling meeting at the Mayflower in what appeared at the time to be the formation of “a new anti-Fidel Castro revolutionary group spark-pluged [sic] by Mr. William D. Pawley, President of the Miami Transit Company, Miami, Florida.” Pawley “disclosed that he is in close contact with Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and that he had just recently arrived from the Dominican Republic.”

MM T-1 provided the names of a group of anti-Castro Cubans that included two from the sugar industry including Fabio Freyre and Jorge Bethart “one of the associates of Mr. Pawley in this new enterprise, who is scheduled to be Chief of operations in the Pawley group.” Others included three from the Batista government, and an attorney “believed by MM T-1 to be identical to Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro, who has reportedly been active in the past in anti- Castro organization known as the Revolutionary Crusade Against Communism (CRAC).” However, some Cubans believed he was spying for Castro.

The informant “said that Nunez Portuondo received the impression that Mr. Pawley intended to unite his new group with the anti-Castro movement of which General Jose Pedraza is the military leader in the Dominican Republic, and of which Nunez Portuondo is the alleged political leader in the United States. Nunez Portuondo received the impression that Mr. Pawley intended to “run the show.”

MM T-1 noted that Pawley would be unacceptable to Portuondo’s Batista backers and “Pawley’s Cuban associates do not have contact with Batista, who is now living in exile in the Madeira Islands of Portugal.” Portuondo “had sent a note to Generalissimo Trujillo telling him that if Mr. Pawley is accepted, that Nunez Portuondo will retire from the movement, as he did not approve of Mr. Pawley.” Nonetheless, the informant “said that a unity meeting of anti-Castro organizations in the Miami area is scheduled to be held in the immediate future for the purpose of reaffirming approval of Pedraza as a military leader, and of Nunez Portuondo as political leader.

In the opinion of MM T-1 the infighting had delayed the overthrow of Castro by months. “MM T-1 said that Mr. Pawley is recognized as being a daring and very able man with influential contacts in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and other Latin American countries.” In addition, “Nunez Portuondo told MM T-1 upon leaving the meeting at the Mayflower Hotel, Pawley remarked to those present that he had to go to an appointment which he had with Vice- President Richard Nixon and with Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of CIA.” MM T-1 was concerned “that should Fidel Castro learn about Mr. Pawley’s alleged efforts to ‘spark plug’ the anti-Castro movement, that Castro would use this information for propaganda purposes against the United States.”11

The Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Atlanta office advised Director Hoover that the informer’s “name is being concealed inasmuch as he does not desire his identity revealed to the State Department.”12

On January 21, 1960, a memorandum was circulated in the FBI about activities in Cuba. The first topic mentioned is a “Conference with Vice President Nixon” while the second covers “William Pawley ... who reportedly is promoting a new counterrevolutionary group aimed at Castro regime.” Other topics included a “Recent Report of Plane Dropping Fire Bombs over Cuban Sugar Fields” and “Prospects of Coordinating Exiled Groups” plus the recommended “Action: The Liaison Agent will continue to report developments as received.”13

A second memo that day notes “Pawley is taking an increasingly active part in Caribbean affairs which has prompted us to take a look at what his role is” but concludes “Pawley is obviously moving in top-level circles in this Cuban situation and apparently has some semiofficial backing. Our files show he has great respect for FBI and the Director and he vigorously objected to withdrawal of FBI intelligence work abroad when SIS was discontinued.” A handwritten note on the document says: “Pawley has been in touch with V.P.14

At the CIA that day Rudy Fernandez, a close friend and confidant of Francisco Cajigas” who “resides in Atlanta, Georgia, where he presumably has a successful waste cotton business” and “has a reputation for integrity” reported “that Cajigas is quickly coming to a parting of ways with Nunez Portuondo” who “seems to subordinate all considerations to his personal interest.” This includes obtaining $50,000 “from Trujillo/Pedraza for the purchase of aircraft which Nunez allegedly turned to his own personal use.” Portuondo “appears to have washed his hands of Trujillo/Pedraza.”

Cajigas “had asked Reed Whittle to make inquiries in our government to see if it would be possible for Pedraza to make a visit to the U.S. to discuss what might be salvaged from his deteriorating forces.” Moreover, “Cajigas is seeking through Whittle to obtain the backing of such people as Kleberg, Lykes, and Standard Oil” for help “not only in the field of anti-Castro propaganda but for the development of a military force” to invade Cuba if Somoza of Nicaragua can be persuaded to “to cooperate and to provide the necessary facilities for marshalling and staging of the military expedition. All of this is to be done completely independently of Nunez Portuondo.”15

A few weeks later Esterline suggested Col. King contact Pawley to discuss Portuondo’s future role.16

On January 29, 1960, Pawley called the CIA’s attention to a month-old announcement in the Gazeta Nacional of Cuba that Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla was named by the government as Commercial Attaché for work overseas. Pawley sent a second note that day regarding two others, Dr. Raul de Cardenas and Cuervo Rubio.17

Shortly thereafter, an eleven-page note from one of Pawley’s team members raised a variety of concerns about the ideology of the CIA’s favored leader, Manual Antonio de Varona, noting he is locked into old “political demagoguery when the labor movement is concerned and has no faith in the ways of Free Enterprise to solve the Cuban problem.”18

Pawley’s desire to control matters relating to Cuba would become an obstacle in Jake Esterline’s ability to efficiently organize CIA action against Castro. Esterline heard on February 8, 1960 about the Pawley-Rubio Padilla group’s knowledge of escape routes in Cuba and General Pedraza’s shortcomings as a leader. “While the connection of Mr. Pawley detracts somewhat from the value of the group for our purposes,” Esterline stated, “Rubio Padillo and Rivero are believed to be very acceptable to most anti-Castro Cuban groups. Also, the original plan (1 Dec.) of having Gen. Pedraza as military leader of the group, may have changed, since Pedraza is now considered to have very little to offer in the way of troops, funds, etc.”19

Following Pawley’s February 18th conversation with Rudolph E. Gomez, CIA Deputy Chief, WHD concerning Freyre’s claim of an impending invasion backed by Miami lawyer Slepin,20 Pawley wrote to J.C. King. “I did not know that Trujillo had started broadcasting again regarding invasion by Pedraza. He had agreed to discontinue this, but both Trujillo and Pedraza feel so discouraged that no help will be received from anywhere and that they are on their own that they are likely to make errors in judgment that can be costly in the long run.” To prevent this Pawley suggested maintaining contact with Pedraza to “convince both him and Trujillo that Pedraza’s efforts will not be completely wasted.”

Well-known for sending newspaper clippings to people, Pawley held true to form. “I gave Mr. Dulles a copy of the statement presented by the two Cuban priests to OAS referred to in today’s Miami Herald. I am sending a copy to you for your records.” Pawley then laid out what he considered an important step in raising funds for the invasion.

In Washington, DC, hawks were growing impatient. The CIA history of the period it states that Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke “had become extremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power in Cuba.” On February 26, 1960, the Admiral “forwarded a paper on U.S. action in Cuba to both” Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Talmadge “Merchant and also to Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Irwin, in which the Navy’s senior officer took it upon himself to examine various options.” Among the options were “multilateral action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by the U.S., or covert unilateral action by the U.S.” Merchant responded that what was being planned had “a marked degree of similarity” with Burke’s proposal.21

Two CIA figures from PBSUCCESS were now also involved in the Cuba project planning. They were David Philips, in propaganda, and Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WHD.22 Oberst suggested cautiously that paramilitary actions should not be initiated if they could rouse support for Castro.23 But Admiral Burke, the principal hawk, indicated “willingness to move fleet units into Port-au-Prince, Haiti” if Castro entered the Dominican Republic following the feared collapse of the Trujillo government.24

Propaganda not only included anti-Castro pamphlets, publications, articles, and books, but also radio broadcasts that were transmitted from Swan Island off Honduras to Cuba’s general population. “The island was manned by 24 people, all but nine of whom were CIA personnel. The nine were unwitting technicians of the Philco Corporation.” One declassified memo states “Permission Granted” after it was “requested by WAVE to pay William D. Pawley $7,140 which was used to pay personnel who worked for Diario de la Marina Swan Radio program.”25 CIA Deputy Director General Cabell called Jake Esterline, Chief Project JMATE to say he received a suggestion that part of the broadcasts should be the repeated airing of Castro’s speeches not only to show his inconsistencies but “‘to bore the people horribly.” Esterline passed the suggestion to Dave Phillips.

On February 27th a cable was sent to CIA Director Allen Dulles detailing “the following points of interest submitted for attention HQs and QDDALE [Pawley].” Topics included Trujillo’s renewal of broadcasts relating to Cuba, questions concerning Maceo, and “a U.S. Congressman named King” who sent an unnamed assistant to Cuba to do a little “investigation of the situation.”26

On leap year day, FBI Director Hoover let it be known that he had gotten wind of some questionable information about Pawley’s activities. An individual whose name was redacted stated that “Pawley is the man who is attempting to sell 30 to 40 million dollars worth of ‘bonds’ to the U.S. investors in Cuba as insurance that their property would not be seized by Fidel Castro and that Pawley is in the employ of Castro. It also appears that former Ambassador [Spruille] Braden is the author of this letter which is in the nature of a warning to former Cuba Ambassador Emilio Portuondo that these bonds are being so offered.”

Hoover wanted the Miami office “to furnish any additional data available concerning the activities of Pawley in light of the information supplied.”27

Braden and Pawley had long been at odds with each other. Additional opposition to Pawley among agency personnel may have grown out of Pawley’s hardline attitude about communism and union movements. It also could have been based upon Pawley’s earlier work on the Doolittle Committee which had been critical of CIA Director Allen Dulles and the PBSUCCESS team. But Pawley’s vantage point on covert CIA operations as well as his knowledge of Cuba and his friendship with Eisenhower made his guidance on the Bay of Pigs project essential. 

Years later, it would be recorded as part of the CIA history that Richard D. Drain, Chief of Operations for Western Hemisphere/Branch 4 (COPS WH/4) believed that PBSUCCESS had been a success “through dumb luck more than anything else.” Even some major CIA figures found reasons to distance themselves from the project, such as Richard Helms who was Chief of Operations (COPS) overseeing Drain. The CIA’s history noted “Dick Helms completely divorced himself from this thing.” Helms was occupied as “a member of an inter-Agency committee that met with periodic regularity to discuss air matters of any sensitivity” following the downing of U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. The Soviet Union had shot down and captured Powers on May 1, 1960, nearly a year before the Bay of Pigs invasion.28 

The Lockheed U-2 spy plane was developed in 1954 under the guidance of CIA officer Richard Bissell who had previously helped administer the Marshall Plan in Germany, headed the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), and expedited funding of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) which evolved into the CIA where Bissell became Deputy Director of Plans in 1959 after Frank Wisner had a mental breakdown.29

During the early months of 1960 there were serious discussions about destroying Castro economically by sabotaging the Cuban sugar industry. Deputy Director of Plans Bissell held a review session on February 11, 1960 “attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline, Al Cox, Dave Phillips and Jim Flannery. The focus was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry, propaganda broadcasts, and funding.”30

Alberto Casimir Fowler Perillait was among the sugar executives whose careers were thrown into turmoil by Castro’s rise to power. “Fowler was President of the North American Sugar Company, Havana, from 1951 until he returned to the U.S. in November 1960 and enlisted in Brigade 2506” to invade Cuba. “At the time of his enlistment he gave Mark Foster, Cuban Refugee Center White House Representative, and former U.S. Ambassador William D. Pauley, [sic] as references.”31 Captured by Castro forces, Fowler was defiant—“bravely talking back to his captors, undaunted by his dangerous position,” according to Antonio Navarro.32

In Washington, on February 15, 1960, President Eisenhower met with Pawley twice. Ike described him as “a most knowledgeable man as regards Latin American affairs, particularly the Caribbean area. He had, for example, gone to Cuba as an emissary from civilians having interest

there, but with the knowledge of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Rubottom, to get Batista to abdicate in favor of a junta.” Batista would have done this had the U.S. guaranteed to keep the junta in power, but this could not be done. After two still classified sentences, President Eisenhower “added to Mr. Herter that it has crossed his mind that we should make some further use of Mr. Pawley in a Latin America assignment.” Herter felt that Pawley’s business interests may “interfere” with the assignment. “The President said Mr. Pawley had told him he had disposed of all his holdings in Cuba, Santa Domingo, Mexico and Haiti.” Herter worried “that the situation in Santo Domingo is very bad in that the Trujillo Government is acting against the moderates and may soon create a situation like in Cuba where the opposition is taken over by wild radicals.”33

President Eisenhower voiced doubts about the effectiveness of toppling Castro by “sugar sabotage activity.” Nonetheless, “J. C. King charged ahead almost immediately following the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960.” The next day “King and Milo Perkins had a detailed discussion concerning the disruptive effects which might result from interference with the Cuban sugar operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Ambassador Hill and Thomas Corcoran” who had provided “valuable assistance to the Agency in the past.” Other concepts for hurting Castro came from Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Thomas Mann who supported cutbacks in U.S. tourism to Cuba and a reduction of deliveries of fuel to the island by US oil companies.

On other fronts, Col. King asked Pawley to make arrangements for publication of Diaro de La Marina in Miami as well as for raising a portion of the money needed for the Cuban operation. “King also contacted Henry Holland in New York City, suggesting Holland raise money, through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL.”34

Col. J. C. King had discussions with Vice President Nixon’s military aide, General Robert Cushman, on January 27 and February 23, 1960. “Cushman made it clear that the Vice President was interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within and outside Cuba, including goon squads or other direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro groups in Cuba.”35

During early discussions between Col. King and Vice President Nixon’s office it was pointed out that CIA operations were not shared openly with the State Department. Even the U.S. Ambassador to Cuba would only be informed on a need-to-know basis. “Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory information that the FBI had provided the Vice President about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of the Bureau of American Republic Affairs.” It accused both “of being too tolerant of Castro and communists.”36 In all likelihood the origin of the information was Pawley.

General Cushman also advised the CIA official “that the Vice President had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to consult with, or acquire the services of Col. Edward Landsdale, a member of Gen. Erskine’s Special Operations Staff in the Department of Defense.” Nixon was apparently impressed with Landsdale’s reputation for “helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the Philippines.”37

In mid-February, Pawley was contacted by the CIA regarding the arrival of Manual Antonio de Varona (Tony Varona), who had emerged from Cuba as a leading anti-Communist but not conservative enough that Pawley would approve of him. Varona was a loyal supporter of former Cuban President Carlos Prio and an ally of Manuel Artime, Huber Matos and future Frank Fiorini (aka Frank Sturgis). Varona and Artime established the Movement for the Recovery of the Revolution (MRR Party; cryptonym AMYUM). Following Pawley’s meeting with Varona, Pawley contacted Vice President Nixon.38

Artime was exfiltrated from Cuba in November 1959 with the help of CIA’s David “Morales (true) in Habana disguised as a Cuban priest.” In Miami, Artime “was given one or more LCFLUTTER tests” (polygraphs) and was found to be trustworthy, given the cryptonym AMBIDDY-1 and put “in charge of a Cuban underground organization, managing and directing its political and paramilitary effectives.” In that role he was part of “‘AMWORLD’, a paramilitary program, vesting him with important and independent responsibilities.” He was permitted to “correspond with C.I.A. in code (one-time pad)” and was “provided a radio link and has been given two sterile phone numbers (one attended 24 hours). He has a letter base in Miami and a P.O. Box address at which to contact C.I.A. He was given a torn banknote for emergency purpose.”

A March 1960 memo to CIA Director Dulles noted that Castroites “accused Artime of being a deserter, having stolen $7,000, traveling on funds from Batista and being a Trujillo agent.” Artime and another Cuban, Hernandez, were accused “of being traitors, bad Cubans, Masferristas, Trujillistas” as well.39

AMBIDDY-1’s Personal Record Questionnaire completed by Henry Hechsher, Special Affairs Staff, Senior Officer considered Artime to be “a political analyst and propagandist of notable talent” who appeared “to stay clear of female entanglements” and had many other attributes. “Strongwilled, wily, adaptable, prepossessing, vain but not excessively so, extroverted, physically brave, undaunted by setbacks and adversity, tenacious, deliberate, charismatic, ambitious, ruthlessly necessary, badly organized, prone to dabble in abstract thought intellectually, shallow but potential growth potential, fanatic streak, single-minded, task oriented, basic impulses decent and honorable.” 

Other case officers involved with Artime included “David Morales as ‘Dr. Gonzalez’ ... Howard Hunt as ‘Eduardo’” and “Gerald Droller as ‘Frank Bender’ and numerous other CIA representatives involved in JMATE” (anti-Castro operations previously known as JMARC). Those familiar with Artime’s association with AMWORLD activities were “Rafael Quintero and Dr. Casar Baro (also spelled Cesar; cryptonym AYUM-19.) Artime’s program was subsidized by the CIA and he interacted with “Desmond FitzGerald, REDACTED (Chief OC/AD), REDACTED (SA), Raul Hernandez (SAS), Henry Hechsher (SAS).”40

Just as Varona knew Frank Sturgis, Artime would count among his early CIA contacts two other future Watergate burglars, Bernard Barker and E. Howard Hunt. Hunt and Artime formed a personal relationship so deep that Artime became the godfather of Hunt’s youngest son, David, who even lived with Artime after David’s mother died in a Watergate-era plane crash.41

The Varona-Artime team would lobby their cause with Republicans, and Artime eventually met with John F. Kennedy at the July 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles to get his backing.42

On March 2, 1960, “the Director of Central Intelligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed [7-page] briefing on ‘What We are Doing in Cuba.’ Among the items mentioned in this briefing was one that dealt with the Agency’s newly developed “drug, which if placed in Castro’s food, would make him behave in such an irrational manner that a public appearance could have very damaging results to him.”43

On March 9, 1960, Esterline briefed a diverse group of CIA executives on the Cuba situation, and “Col. King told the group that the DCI is presenting a special policy paper to the NSC 5412 representatives.” He voiced concern that Castro forces may attack the U.S. Navy’s

Guantanamo Bay installation and stated there was need “to reach the mass of Cubans with the truth.” King said that unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package—which is highly unlikely—this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force.” A new Sisyphus was about to learn how hard it is to roll a boulder up San Juan Hill in Cuba.

CIA Director Allen Dulles had “approved the training of the instructor cadre at a U.S. military installation ... Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone which is under the control of the U.S. Army’s Jungle Warfare Training Center” and “training of Cuban action groups, in non-U.S. territory.” It was hoped by King that during the minimum of six-to-seven-months training “opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile.” King warned that Castro’s forces had more arms than Batista, and that “Castro has more than 122 agents in the Miami area alone.” King advised that projects were underway “to cover extensive radio operations” including “a ‘gray’ radio transmitter” and “for the development of air and maritime capabilities for the in-exfiltration of men and material.” David Phillips, Radio Operations; Phillip Toomey, PP; Adolf Lium; Esterline’s aide E.A. Stanulis, WH/4/PM, Plans and PM Operations and two redacted names would be meeting regularly.44

On March 10, 1960, J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere, informed Esterline that “Mr. Pawley called from the Mayflower where he is staying. He is going out to his farm tonight but expects to return to the Mayflower by about 1100 tonight. He would like to have lunch with him at the Mayflower tomorrow, 11 March. He has a group of friends with him, and they are all having cocktails with Mr. Nixon Saturday and part of Sunday will be devoted to shooting. I told him that we had heard from Tony Varona and that it was encouraging. He wanted to know if there was anything new he should tell the Vice President, and I said I thought not.”45

Within days Pawley and probably Esterline had another discussion at Pawley’s office to discuss Varona. Pawley voiced his concerns about Varona being a “big government advocate” with “’socialist’ ideas at time” which rubbed the entrepreneur Pawley the wrong way. Following a redacted paragraph, Esterline noted that Pawley intended to buy $100,000 of the bonds when issued “in order to get the ball rolling with any Cubans who might be holding back. Pawley leaves this afternoon for the DR for about a week.”46

Upon returning from the Dominican Republic, a noon meeting was held on March 21st at Pawley’s office with Chief, Branch 4 Esterline. It took a week for Esterline’s dictated Memorandum to be typed and inserted in Pawley’s 201 file and the WH4/Memo file. Esterline’s memo noted that Pawley gave him “some very sensitive information concerning the Dominican Republic. He requested this information not be passed beyond CIA until he had the opportunity to give this information directly to Vice President Nixon. In point of fact, he initially said he didn’t want the information passed on to Chief, WHD [Col. King].” Esterline “replied that he could not agree to this arrangement since he was obligated to pass the information on ... however, in view of the fact he was not returning to Washington until 22 March, he could not pass the information on prior to that time. Mr. Pawley said he would relay the information himself before that date, so the question was settled amicably.” As it turned out, King received the information via another source before Esterline returned to Washington.47

According to the CIA’s history of the Bay of Pigs, Pawley apparently had his own ambitious goal for wanting to control information so he would be the one to deliver it personally to Vice President Nixon. “Pawley was a principal contributor to the Republican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon’s cause. Apparently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs—assuming a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential election.”

On March 21, 1960, “four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a meeting to be held in Pawley’s Miami residence which would include the DCI, Col. King, Gen. Cushman, and Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as Mr. Pawley.” The CIA “carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that any action involving exiles now should be most carefully coordinated with King and Esterline to avoid any flaps.48

“It was agreed that the group would convene the second or third of April at Mr. Pawley’s Miami home. The primary purpose was “reviewing what work could be done throughout the hemisphere and public opinion on the pending operation against Castro.” Ike’s administration had granted permission “for an all out operation; a government in exile will be formed post haste; that the acceptable non-Batista groups will be put into contact with each other almost immediately; and that Mr. Pawley’s contact, Rubio Padilla, will figure prominently in this effort. Mr. Pawley suggested, and it was agreed, that immediate plans should be made for the exfiltration of Rubio from Habana.”49 As a young man in the 1930s, Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla had been a Cuban revolutionary who helped overthrow Cuban dictator Gerardo Machado y Morales and obtain autonomy for Cuba from the United States. Later he was named Commercial attaché by Castro.50

At the April Fools’ Day meeting in Pawley’s Miami home, CIA Director Allen Dulles addressed King, Esterline, Cushman, Donnelly [cryptonym CITASTE], “and Mr. William Pawley, Industrialist.” Director Dulles “opened the meeting by stating that everybody present should be aware of the fact that Fidel Castro and his Communist-oriented regime be removed from power in Cuba. He said the necessary approval had been given for an operation and that the chosen instrument will be a ‘government in exile’. The DCI went on to say that CIA has been in contact with several non-BATISTA groups which will form the nucleus of this government. These groups were identified as the Montechristi group, the Varona group, the Catholic Action Front and private Cuban citizens; such as, Dr. Rubio Padilla.” The seat of government would not be in the U.S. or Puerto Rico; “consideration was being given to Venezuela, Costa Rica ... and Mexico.” Donnelly suggested Canada but the DCI ruled it out along with Colombia and Haiti “because of its proximity to the Dominican Republic and the unsettled political situation.” King, Donnelly and Pawley “agreed that Costa Rica, for many reasons, would be the best choice.”

Pawley brought the group up to date on how General Pedraza and Francisco Cajigas have used the U.S. Pawley pushed for Dr. Rubio Padilla as one of the “nominal leaders of this government in exile” while the Agency’s representatives were backing Dr. Antonio Varona, whom Pawley feared was a leftist. There was also discussion of the bond issue Pawley would float to provide financial support of the exiles and “that confidential arrangements have already been made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to permit individuals or corporate entities making donations as contributions to the U.S. Government for tax purposes. He cautioned that this arrangement was being limited to a very small group.”

Varona and Padilla as possible signers of the bond issue brought about discussion of exfiltrating them from Cuba. “Mr. Pawley said that if CIA desired to expand this capability beyond present planning, the Chalk Air Line, operating out of Miami, could be purchased for a reasonable price” and “operates five ‘widgins’ in the Caribbean area. C/WHD expressed immediate interest ... and indicated he would have a representative of WHD in Miami early the week of 4 April to look at the company.”51

Pawley, whose expertise in Latin American affairs was being heavily relied upon provided advice on the question regarding “the relationship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of American States.” He “suggested that rather than lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the U.S. Military Mission in the Latin American countries, especially having them pass the word on about the dangers of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were discussed by the group were the planned propaganda program and ‘the present pathetic effort on the part of the Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in Cuba.’”

The CIA history notes that Vice President Nixon was “being fully informed of the plans that were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and that certain private American citizens were closely involved in the planning.” But not everyone was enthusiastic about Pawley’s role. 

Shortly after the April meeting at Pawley’s residence, C. Tracy Barnes “began to question the Agency’s relationship with Mr. Pawley, particularly as Pawley’s support for Rubio Padilla” who ardently opposed the Frente Revolucionario Democratico leadership. The FRD was the exile group which the CIA’s Frank Bender, posing as a steel baron, had helped establish between March and May based on a “Gentlemen’s Unwritten Agreement” with: “Dr. Manuel A. de Varona, Justo Carrillo, Jose I. Rasco, Manuel Artime, Andreas Vargas Gomez, Pedro Martinez Fraga and with Ricardo Lorie.” Respect for Bender within the halls of the CIA was based on him being a veteran of the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala (like Pawley and Barnes) and having spent time in talking to Castro about his motivation and intentions (unlike Pawley). The FRD/Bender Group united:

• Organizacion Autentica (OA)—Antonio "Tony" de Varona;

• Movimiento de Revolucionario Recuperacion (MRR)—Manuel Artime;

• Organizacion Triple A (AAA)—Aureliano Sanchez Arango;

• Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC)—Jose Ignacio Rasco;

• Agrupacion Montecristi (AM)—Justo Carillos.

FRD’s subcommittees focused on planning, financial, propaganda, military, and other activities to overthrow Castro.52

Shortly after the strategic meeting at Pawley’s home, he learned that Castro was aware of the U.S. “now undertaking firm measures utilizing following: Pazos, Carrillo, Varona, Sanchez Arango, Rodriguez Casero, Miro Cardona, Barquin, Borbonet, Martin Gelena, N. Matos, Garcia Tumon, Gutierrez Menoya.” Castro planned to take action, but CIA headquarters “believes QDDALE report could be provocation by Castro or propaganda put out by the Dominican rumor mill” and planned to await confirmation.53

Pawley offered to use his boat to rendezvous off Sand Key to pick up Cubans being exfiltrated on April 14 or 15. “Campbell to be introduced to QDDALE under alias.”54

On the 15th, two FBI agents interviewed Pawley at his request in his office. He told them “he is a personal friend of the Director of the FBI, as well as of President Eisenhower, former President Truman and many other influential people in the United States and Latin America.” He made it clear “that he is deeply concerned about the communist trend in Cuba and its effect on other Latin American Countries, and that he has been in close contact with the U.S. State Department and the CIA relative to this situation.” Two weeks later, FBI Director Hoover received the information.55

In early June, Bender informed the Latin American division in Miami that Tony Varona (AMHAWK) and a member of Agrupacion Montecristi (AMWAIL) had “advised that Vargas Gomez had long session with QDDALE during which the latter was alleged to have said the following” during an FRD Executive Committee: “Veep [Richard Nixon], [Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy] Rubottom, Admiral Burke, and Cardinal Spellman were backing Rubio Group and could not agree [to] policies of FRD.” Some 20-25 prominent Americans would sign a “letter depicting FRD members as promoting Fidelista policies without Fidel communism. Letter to be transmitted to State Department via Cardinal Spellman.” The FRD Executive Committee considered this action as an “irritating interlude of politics which, in their own minds, necessitated the earliest possible surfacing of Frente.” Moreover, Varona “has appointment with [State Department’s William] Wieland since latter wanted to discuss Rubio Padilla personality and policies.”56

Tracy Barnes’s concern was that if the U.S. continued to support the extremely conservative element represented by Pawley’s group, it would be charged that any anti-Castro action undertaken by the U.S. would be ‘on the basis of protecting economic royalists.’” Barnes may have conveyed his point of view to CIA Director Allen Dulles who at a Special Group meeting a month later referred to Pawley’s Cuban-exile leadership candidates to be “unconstructed reactionaries.”57 A decade later when the CIA prepared its history of the Bay of Pigs Invasion, a footnote mentioned that Barnes was “one of the most voluminous correspondents” and his memorandums were “repetitious ad nauseam, and that Barnes belabored issues which were common knowledge to principals in WH/4.”58

According to the State Department’s history of n relationsgn Relations with Cuba, the FRD “was made up of five organizations with headquarters in Miami and presumably with coordinated cadres throughout the island of Cuba.”

Internal strife led to a split in the MRR. The dissidents included “Ricardo Lorie, ‘Nino’ Diaz, Lucas Moran, Pedro Luis Diaz Lanz, Michel Yabur and Conte Aguero.” Sanchez Arango eventually pulled AAA out of the FRD because of differences over leadership.59

On April 7, Pawley called Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester D. Mallory, who then dictated his “Informal Notes of Telephone Conversation” for J.C. King which misspelled Pawley’s name as Pauley. The notes also went to J.C. Hill and W.A. Wieland, who became Pawley’s frequent whipping boy. Mallory reported that the evening before Pawley “attended a party at Palm Beach which was attended by former U.S. Ambassador Earl Smith, the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba, the Panamanian Ambassador to Cuba and his wife, the Dominican Ambassador to Belgium Porfirio Rubirosa, and some American couples.” At one point Pawley speculated “that Fidel Castro probably has two or three hundred other agents in Dade County” and “‘we are trying very hard to watch them.”60

Five days later, CIA Director Allen Dulles issued a cable saying Castro was aware of anti-Castro activities in Cuba being run by Pawley.61 This cognizance of potential hostility coming from Miami was a full year before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A compilation of documents relating to Pawley includes one from April 27, 1960. “Masferrer and Diaz Lanz are encouraging groups of young men and former soldiers with the promise of using them in an offensive. They have bought uniforms, equipment, and arms in small quantity ... they believe more in these demagogues and business men than in us; yet we are the ones who have never deceived them even once. This is the result of desperation.” This group’s “Diaz Lanz and Fiurini [probably Frank Fiorini] will be leaders in the landings. His brother Marcos will be in charge of supplies from here. They believe they will have some 500 men, between the exiles and a group that President Ydoras of Guatemala will provide them with.”

Point “7. To say something more about Masferrer—this is a good Cuban also has his followers; his demagogia has interested many military personnel (even those with as much prestige as Sanchez Mosquera) ... Masferrer is an atheist ... These men are not capable of achieving anything, but many men think of them as the best solution for getting to Cuba in time.”62

FOOTNOTES

1Hampton Chronicle, February 18, 1960

2 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Page 247 and 454.

Marshall source: nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1953/marshall-bio.html.

1/13/1960 Memorandum for the Record. “Minutes of Special Group Meeting” Subject: Anti-Castro Activities; Cuba; Dulles Allen; Merchant, Livingston.

3 Facts on File 1959. Page 443 E2-F3. http://www.uscubacommission.org/history3.html.

United Fruit developed a reputation of being an imperialistic power to be feared in the “banana republics” where it operated and caused instability. United Fruit’s blemished skin was shed by morphing in the future into United Brands and, then in 1984, into Chiquita Brands International.

4 “Diary of Colonel L. K. White, Deputy Director for Support, reporting on the DCI’s morning meeting of 8 January 1960.” CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 32-35.

NARA 104-10133-10167 ~ 1/12/1960 Memo: “Extracts Pertaining to Pawley, William D. Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley, William.

Pawley, William D.         78435 CSA IB/3

The following attached extracts pertain to subject:

Foreign Service Despatch Ciudad Trujillo #165, 10 October 1955, LOU. Foreign Service Despatch Ciudad Trujillo #251, 14 December 1955, OUO. NYT 36L6, 19 November 1950.

LAPNY 1:1 8 December 1950.

Foreign Service Despatch Ciudad Trujillo #171, 17 October 1955, LOU. LAPNY 8:2, 6 March 1950.

LAPNY 1:4, 11 March 1950.

Letter to MIS Careless transmittal of Secret Documents 23 Sept 1942. CMI CRA 127, 15 January 1945, New Delhi, Confidential.

Wash Post, 14 July 1945, Confidential.

[Signed] K  

12 January 1960

5 CIA Historian Jack B. Pfeiffer, Official History of the Bay of Pigs Invasion: Draft Volume V, CIA’s Internal Investigation of the Bay of Pigs (unpublished). Submitted to the Center for the Study of the Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency April 18, 1984. Page 119 of 181. https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/C01254908.pdf

6 Pawley, Russia Is Winning. Chapter 21

7 NARA 104-10139-10037 ~ 2/03/1960 “Name Check Report - WM. D. Pawley.” From: Kane, Charles W. Subjects: Pawley.

>> Agencies reporting FBI, ONI, ACSI, State, Passport, CSC, HCUA, OSI.

NARA 1993.07.31.11:55:16:030034 ~ 1/26/1960 “W.D.P.— #78435—Summary of Info Contained in File Is At Passport Office.” From: [None]. To: [None].

8 Russia Is Winning, Chapter 21

9 NARA 104-10265-10123 ~ 1/15/1960 Memo “Anti-Fidel Castro Activities. Subjects: Pawley.” From: FBI, Miami. To: CIA

I called Dr. Nunez Portuondo at 12:00 noon in Washington to discuss with him the various rumors that have been reaching me regarding statements credited to him.

I first told him that [American Government displeasure caused by my offering of $3,000,000 to Generalissimo Trujillo to delay the Pedraza invasion] was a statement far from true. First, because the US Government would under no circumstance be involved, even as an innocent bystander, in an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic.

...When General Pedraza gave me the typewritten list of names, it was given me in confidence and it was treated by me in confidence, and I felt that there was nothing to be lost by showing that paper to Dr. Nunez Portuondo and Dr. Marquez Sterling, who visited me in my room at the Mayflower Hotel, some weeks ago.

I told Dr. Nunez Portuondo that his statement to me that he alone could be selected as the next President of Cuba was a mistake; that having been connected with the Batista Government, both as a Minister and as Ambassador to the United Nations for the Batista Administration for seven years, that in my judgment he not only could not be the next President but that his name should not be part of the junta...

I told him that I was withdrawing from any effort to be of assistance in the Cuban cause because his many attacks upon me and statements made regarding me that were not true had destroyed my usefulness; that it seemed a shame that those who had the same objectives of soon finding a way to get rid of a communist regime should be devoting their time finding fault and fighting among themselves and destroying each other, instead of the common enemy. I told him I would have no further conversations regarding this problem and that I wished him every success, but on behalf of the interest of my country, Cuba, and the hemisphere...if he continued to labor under the opinion that an ex-Batista official such as himself could be the next President of Cuba, the movement would never succeed and Castro would remain in power for a long time to come.

He said that I represented a small group, including myself, that had only started to work on this Castro problem a few weeks ago...I stated that I first started to work on this in November prior to Batista’s fall and that I had been working on the Castro problem since 1948 ...

I told him ... I was grateful for his cooperation with the U.S. during his seven years at the U.N. and that I admired the work that he had done for his country.

10 Obituary for Carlos Marquez Sterling, The New York Times, May 8, 1991.

11 1/15/1960 AirTel. “Re Anti-Castro Activities IS-Cuba.” To FBI Director. From SAC, WFO, 

>> Highly redacted mentioning an informer and an AirTel dated 12/17/1959 in Pawley’s file.

On December 28, 1959, MM T-1, a former Cuban official who claims to have numerous contacts among Cubans, furnished the following information which he said related to the formation of a new anti-Fidel Castro revolutionary group spark-pluged [sic] by Mr. William D. Pawley, President of the Miami Transit Company, Miami, Florida.

MM T-1 explained that on Saturday, December 26, 1959, Dr. Emilion Nunez Portuondo, who is generally conceded to be the political leader of the anti-Castro movement, disclosed that about 20 days previously, Mr. Pawley went to Washington, D.C. upon invitation of former United States Ambassador to Cuba, Mr. Arthur Gardner, and met with Nunez Portuondo and Marquez Sterling at the Mayflower Hotel.

It is noted that Marquez Sterling was formerly the leader of the political party in Cuba which openly opposed the political party of Fulgencio Batista.

During this meeting, Mr. Pawley disclosed to Nunez Portuondo and the others in attendance that he intended to promote a new counter-revolutionary group aimed against the Castro regime.

Mr. Pawley made a comment to effect that, “What I am doing, I am being backed up on,” giving Nunez Portuondo the impression that he had some authority from the United States State Department.

He disclosed that he is in close contact with Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and that he had just recently arrived from the Dominican Republic. He stated to Nunez Portuondo, according to MM T-1, that he is in contact with the following Cubans relative to this new group:

• Jorge Garcia Montes, a former Senator and Prime Minister of the Batista Government.

• Justo Garcia Rayneri, a former Minister of Treasury in the Batista Government.

• Raul Menocal, a former Senator and Minister of Commerce.

• (First name unknown) Couseiro, an attorney.

• Fabio Freyre, a Cuban with contacts in the sugar industry.

• Jorge Bethart, who owns a sugar plantation in Cuba.

  It is noted that Cousiero is believed by MM T-1 to be identical to Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro, who has reportedly been active in the past in anti-Castro organization known as the Revolutionary Crusade Against Communism (CRAC).

  MM T-1 said that Nunez Portuondo received the impression that Mr. Pawley intended to unite his new group with the anti-Castro movement of which General Jose Pedraza is the military leader in the Dominican Republic, and of which Nunez Portuondo is the alleged political leader in the United States. Nunez Portuondo received the impression that Mr. Pawley intended to “run the show”, according to MM T-1. [Bold emphasis added by David Cannon]

  Nunez Portuondo confided to MM T-1 that Pawley’s associates would be unacceptable to the anti-Castro movement led by Nunez Portuondo because of their intimate connections with the former regime of Batista. MM-1 said so far as he knows, however, Pawley’s Cuban associates do not have contact with Batista, who is now living in exile in the Madeira Islands of Portugal.

  Nunez Portuondo expressed disgust that Mr. Pawley was trying to inject himself into the anti-Castro movement, and Nunez Portuondo disclosed that he himself had sent a note to Generalissimo Trujillo telling him that if Mr. Pawley is accepted, that Nunez Portuondo will retire from the movement, as he did not approve of Mr. Pawley.

MM T-1 said that a unity meeting of anti-Castro organizations in the Miami area is scheduled to be held in the immediate future for the purpose of reaffirming approval of Pedraza as a military leader, and of Nunez Portuondo as political leader.

MM T-1 expressed the opinion that Pawley’s entry into the anti-Castro movement has caused a delay in plans which MM T-1 had previously reported would go into operation between November 25, 1959, and January 25, 1960 for the purpose of overthrowing Castro.

MM T-1 said that according to Nunez Portuondo, Jorge Bethart, named as one of the associates of Mr. Pawley in this new enterprise, is scheduled to be Chief of operations in the Pawley group.

MM T-1 said that Mr. Pawley is recognized as being a daring and very able man with influential contacts in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and other Latin American countries.

Nunez Portuondo told MM T-1 upon leaving the meeting at the Mayflower Hotel, Pawley remarked to those present that he had to go to an appointment which he had with Vice-President Richard Nixon and with Mr. Allen Dulles, Chief of CIA.

MM T-1 said he himself, has received rumors among Cuban exiles who suspect that Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro may be in actuality an under-cover informant for Fidel Castro. He explained his concern that should Fidel Castro learn about Mr. Pawley’s alleged efforts to “spark plug” the anti-Castro movement, that Castro would use this information for propaganda purposes against the United States.

MM T-1 said that about four days previously, four Cuban representatives of Aureliano Sanchez Arango, a former Minister of Education during the Prio regime in Cuba arrived in Miami to obtain the cooperation of General Manuel Benitez Valdez as their Miami representative.

It is also noted that General Manuel Benitez Valdez was a former Chief of Police during a portion of the Batista regime, and is now living in exile in Miami.

MM T-1 said that these representatives, (first name unknown) Jimenez; (first name unknown) Rodriguez Gonzalez, and Carlos (last name unknown) and one other, proposed that Benitez cease contact with other anti-Castro groups and devote all of his time to the underground anti-Castro movement by Sanchez Arango in Cuba. They proposed that General Benitez, through contacts with appropriate United States officials, obtain aid for Sanchez Arango, obtain recognition for his movement, promote friendship between his group and the United States, expose the Communist threat of the Castro regime, and take the necessary steps through news media to avoid the movement of Sanchez Arango becoming confused with the revolutionary movement of Fidel Castro.

MM T-1 said that Sanchez Arango’s underground movement also proposes to establish certain revolutionary laws of a “watered-down type” in the event they are successful.

These representatives of Sanchez Arango disclosed that they were expecting a revolutionary expedition led by Jose Pedraza to arrive in Cuba some time in the immediate future; they were not a part of this expedition, and that they were neither for or against it.

MM T-1 said Sanchez Arango is a member of the Autentico Party and is presently a professor at the University of Havana where he is under close observation by the Castro regime, which suspects that he may be engaged in counter-revolutionary activities.

It is to be recalled that Sanchez Arango was formerly the leader of an underground anti-Batista organization known as the “Triple A”, which was reportedly active in Cuba, Mexico and the United States during a portion of the Batista regime. Sanchez Arango also reportedly split with Carlos Prio Socarras, his former chief.

1/15/1960 AirTel “Re Anti-Castro Activities IS-Cuba.” 

>> Highly redacted correspondence referencing an AirTel dated 12/17/1959 and enclosed information from the Bureau, Washington Field Office, Jacksonville, New York, Atlanta, and Miami and:

(1-105-1880 Batista)
(1-2-156 Masferrer) [REDACTED] 

(2-105-New William D. Pawley)

NARA 1993.07.21.15:39:42:400280 ~ 1/15/1960 FBI Memorandum from Miami, Florida. “Re: Anti-Fidel Castro Activities.” Summaries of Activities of Werbell and Others. Page 4.

>> An investigation summary document indicates that Mitchell Livingston WerBell was providing information to the CIA on the activities of Jorge Bethart in late September 1959 and General Pedraza and Rolando Masferrer prior to that.

Pawley, Russia Is Winning. Chapter 21

>> Pawley was not only whipping the Miami operations into shape, but also the Eisenhower Administration:

He [Eisenhower] called in the three top officials concerned, Herter, Secretary of Defense Thomas S. Gates and Allen Dulles and asked them what was wrong. My good friend Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, who had no responsibility for the operation, usually attended also, because of Ike’s high regard for his judgment. Anderson was distressed by my repeated accusations of delay, as he had been assured that the necessary orders were being given to expedite matters. On one occasion, Bob telephoned me at the Mayflower Hotel to complain rather severely that, because of my criticism of delays, Ike had just Subjected his three close friends to a tongue-lashing.

12 1/16/1960 AirTel “Re Anti-Castro Activities IS-Cuba.” To: FBI Director. From: SAC, Atlanta.

>> Highly redacted mentioning the informer “name is being concealed inasmuch as he does not desire his identity revealed to the State Department.”

A few years later General Manuel Benitez Valdez would be mentioned in Agency documents as being involved with “Marco (Perez) Jiminez former Venezuelan Dictator” and “also involved in sale of narcotics to Latin and American society.”

11/18/1963 CIA Message. To: The Director. From: JMWAVE.

One Manuel (Benitez) Valdes 201-106192 Cuban exile working in Miami with Marco (Perez) Jiminez former Venezuelan Dictator...Subj[ect] also involved in sale of narcotics to Latin and American society. Subj[ect] mbr exec comm Alliance for Liberty of Cuba a pro-Batista org in exile and was Chief of Police during Batista’s regime (1940-1944), he later became a Senator during the Grau govt. Subj[ect] also rpt[reported] as Sec[retary] of War of Legion Cubana Anticommunista.

1/3/1963 CIA Message. To: San Salvador WAVE. From: the Director.

1. One Manuel (Benitez) Valdes 201-106192 is longtime KUBARK contact. Recently contacted Guat Station and requested financial support. HDQS decision at that time was not to use him. He left Guat 12 November 1963 for Mana[gua], allegedly at invitation General Somoza.

2. Benitez has long and checkered background. Repeatedly characterized as indiscreet, unscrupulous and unreliable. He was considered one of the worst gangsters around Batista in Cuba.

End of Message

WH Comment: Ref A requested traces on Benitez who approached client of Eggplant in Salv with proposal invest 200,000 dollars in hotel owned by client. Source of funds allegedly wealthy Cuban exiles ...

J.C. King C/WHD        SAS/MOB Darling (by phone)  WH/COPS

“Old Havana Is Revived Briefly as ‘Batistianos’ Recall 1933.” Miami Herald, September 5, 1983.

Manuel Benitez Valdez, who was a 21-year-old soldier during the 1933 coup, delivered a long, passionate speech that seemed to include a little of everything.

13 1/20/1960 FBI Memorandum “Re Cuban Political Activities IS-Cuba” To: A. H. Belmont. From F. A. Frohbose (with distribution to Donahoe, Parsons, Nasca and Papich).

14 1/20/1960 FBI Memorandum “Subject: William D. Pawley, Miscellaneous—Information Concerning (Nationalities—Intelligence). To: A. H. Belmont. From S. B. Donahoe (with distribution to Parsons, Nasca and DeLoach plus Mohr and Tolson

15 1/20/1960 CIA Dispatch. “Subject: Report of Contact with Rudy Fernandez, 16 Jan 60.” To Miami WHD Representative. From Chief, WH Division.

1. The following information was obtained from Rudy Fernandez ... a close friend and confidant of Francisco Cajigas ... also well known to and friendly with Jack Gillespie and resides in Atlanta, Georgia, where he presumably has a successful waste cotton business ... Apparently he obtained my name and telephone number from Gillespie and I am a little concerned about the number of people who are being given my name and phone numbers and the manner in which they obtain them ...

2. Fernandez said that Cajigas is quickly coming to a parting of ways with Nunez Portuondo ... [who] seems to subordinate all considerations to his personal interest. The incident involving US$50 thousand which Nunez is said to have obtained from Trujillo/Pedraza for the purchase of aircraft which Nunez allegedly turned to his own personal use has greatly disenchanted Cajigas ... who has a reputation for integrity ...

3. ... Nunez and [REDACTED] had specifically agreed to terms of alliance ... Fernandez passed a copy of this memo to ODENVY [FBI] in Atlanta.

4. While Nunez appears to have washed his hands of Trujillo/Pedraza ... Cajigas had asked Reed Whittle to make inquiries in our government to see if it would be possible for Pedraza to make a visit to the U.S. to discuss what might be salvaged from his deteriorating forces.

According to Fernandez, Cajigas is seeking through Whittle to obtain the backing of such people as Kleberg, Lykes, and Standard Oil ... to be used not only in the field of anti-Castro propaganda but for the development of a military force ... if he [Cajigas] is able to obtain this sort of backing, plans to visit Nicaragua for the purpose of trying to persuade Somoza to cooperate and to provide the necessary facilities for marshalling and staging of the military expedition. All of this is to be done completely independently of Nunez Portuondo.

16 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 2/12/1960 CIA Memorandum “Subject: Material for possible use in discussion with Mr. Pawley. To: Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. From Jacob D. Esterline C/WH/4. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 192 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website: MaryFerrell.org

17 NARA 1993.08.09.16:49:38:870007 ~ 1/29/1960 Note “Subjects: Pawley, W.; Padilla, J.” From: W.D.P. To: CIA Employee. CIA File of William Pawley re Argentina, Cuba and Dominican Republic. Page 121 of 145.

>> Note refers to announcement in the December 28, 1959 Gazeta Nacional of Cuba that Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla was named by the Castro Government as Commercial Attache for work overseas.

18 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 2/2/1960 [perhaps] “Handwritten 11 Page Translation of Note from Rubio” Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 262-267 of 267.

Silvio Cardenas Arenal also had concerns about Varona:

NARA 104-10049-10340 ~ 2/16/1960 Cable “AMULAR Contact.” To: Director. From: WH 5 (Mr. Reynolds, WH Div. Notified 1850, 16 Feb 60). Subjects: AMULAR Varona.

1. AMULAR contacted Cardenas evening 15 February. Cardenas asked following message be sent to QDDALE:

   Conference held with Tony Varona. He will arrive Miami Wednesday or Thursday 17 or 18 February. He interested in joining junta but has certain conditions which Cardenas’ boss here does not think should be accepted. Thinks may be premature to admit Varona to junta now. Cardenas group extremely concerned over recent revival of Trujillo broadcasts particularly referring to Pedraza as head of invasion forces as this in violation of understanding. All O.K. here. Working hard to meet planned schedule. This report already sent to QDDALE via diplomatic pouch to Fabre [sic] in Miami.

2. Next contact with AMULAR set for 11 hours 17 February.

CS Comment: Silvio Cardenas Arenal sent word 13 Feb QDDALE he urgently needed contact our rep per arrangement discussed with OLIEN at Hqs. Hqs. requests contact be made and results cabled.

The document referenced in the above is:

NARA 104-10265-10091 ~ 2/14/1960 Cable “Silvio Cardenas Arenal Sent Word 13 February [to QDDALE].” To: Havana. From: Director.

19 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 2/8/1960 [1960?] CIA Official Routing Slip. To: WH/PM [REDACTED] and WH/4 [REDACTED].

1/29/1960 Note “re Dr. Raul D. Cardenas and Cuervo Rubio. Subjects: Pawley, W.; Cardenas, R.; Rubio, C.” To: CIA employee. From W.D.P.

20 NARA 104-10049-10337 ~ 2/18/1960 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Telephone Conversation with William B. [sic] Pawley 11:10 a.m., 18 February 1960.” From: Rudolph E. Gomez, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division.

1. Pawley called from New York and said that he had received a telephone call from [Fabio] Freyre in Florida, who told him that the FBI had interviewed him, and he gathered from the tone of the interview that Mr. Hoover was mad at Pawley. Pawley asked me if I knew any reason why Hoover should hold a grievance against him. I told Pawley I did not know any reason, and if it were true that Hoover was mad at him, he would not hear about it in this manner.

2. Freyre told Pawley that the Batista group in exile in Florida is planning a large-scale invasion of Cuba within the next week) that Matthew Steppin [sic: actually Slepin], a Miami lawyer who claims to represent the No 1 Republican figure in Florida, is involved in this plan to invade Cuba and is “throwing names around.” (Pawley was much more cautious than usual over the phone and did not wish to elucidate on this. I gathered that the inference was that Steppin was claiming that he had the support of top US Government officials.)

3. Pawley asked me if we knew anything about Steppin. I said not to my knowledge. Pawley said this was only the second time he had heard his name and would appreciate any information we could gather on him.

N.B. It is recommended that the information contained in paragraphs 2 and 3 above be passed to Reichhardt and that he advise what he knows or can find out about Steppin, also the alleged invasion.

Comment by JCK: Pawley reported on 21 February that Fabio Freyre (a reliable Cuban contact) had obtained independent confirmation of Diaz Tomayo’s report from his friend Lieutenant Colonel Sanchez Mosquiera.

21 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 76; Appendix C, Page 311/

22 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 85.

>> Dave Phillips emphasized interagency cooperation, “that without the close cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters which were going to be installed on Swan Island ... Because the activities then established on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal Aviation Administration, C. Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A) was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were involved ...” [A/DDP/A means Assistant Deputy Director of Plans/Actions]

23 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 86/ 24 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 91.

25 NARA 104-10220-10119 ~ 5/23/1961 Memo. “Permission Granted.” To: WAVE. From: Bell WH/4/Finance. May 23, 1961.

26 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007 ~ 2/26/1960 Cable Message. From [REDACTED]. To: Director. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 23 of 267}

27 2/29/1960 Memorandum. To: FBI Director. From: SAC New York. “Subject [REDACTED] IS-Cuba re WFOlet 2/17/1960.”

Reference is made to paragraph one, page two, of this letter particularly as it concerns William D. Pawley and Spruille Braden.

It appears the information supplied [REDACTED] that Pawley is the man who is attempting to sell 30 to 40 million dollars worth of “bonds” to the US investors in Cuba as insurance that their property would not be seized by Fidel Castro and that Pawley is in the employ of Castro. It also appears that former Ambassador Braden is the author of this letter which is in the nature of a warning to former Cuba Ambassador Emilio Portuondo that these bonds are being so offered.

Attention is directed to a memorandum dated 1/15/60 at Miami in the case entitled “ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA.”

This memorandum states in part that [REDACTED PARAGRAPHS]

In view of the above, UACB, it is not felt that Spruille Braden should be interviewed until such time as the information supplied by [REDACTED] is further clarified by WFO through [REDACTED]

Miami is requested to furnish any additional data available concerning the activities of Pawley in light of the information supplied by [REDACTED].

28 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 35, 37, 40, 41.

29 John Prados, Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA (Ivan R. Dee, 2009). Page 93.

30 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 7.

31 NARA 1993:06.29.13:27:43:180410 ~ Undated. Memorandum “Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination.” Page 8 of 18.

32 “Alberto Fowler (1929-1987)” Remembrance by Antonio Navarro, Palm Beach, Florida, December 31, 1987. Organización Auténtica. http://www.autentico.org/oa09271.php

33 Memorandum of Conference [by Goodpaster] with the President, White House, Washington, February 15, 1960, 10:05-10:55 a.m. President met with Pawley 9:45-10:05 and 11:39 to 12:15 p.m.” U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Page 788.

[President Eisenhower] said he had been talking to Mr. Pawley. He is a most knowledgeable man as regards Latin American affairs, particularly the Caribbean area. He had, for example, gone to Cuba as an emissary from civilians having interest there, but with the knowledge of Mr. Dulles and Mr. Rubottom, to get Batista to abdicate in favor of a junta. Batista would have done this had the US guaranteed to keep the junta in power, but this could not be done.

[2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified]

The President added to Mr. Herter that it has crossed his mind that we should make some further use of Mr. Pawley in a Latin America assignment. Mr. Herter said that Mr. Pawley had had large interests in Santo Domingo which would interfere but that he has disposed of them. The President said Mr. Pawley had told him he had disposed of all his holdings in Cuba, Santa Domingo, Mexico and Haiti. Mr. Herter said that the situation in Santo Domingo is very bad in that the Trujillo Government is acting against the moderates and may soon create a situation like in Cuba where the opposition is taken over by wild radicals.”

34 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Pages 51 & 52.
>> Col. J.C. King, Chief WH, should not be confused with WH/4 Finance Officer Michael King mentioned on page 83.

Undated Memorandum “Conversation with J.C. King re Telephone calls to high-level contacts. Subjects: Anticastro plot; Holland, Henry; Pawley, William.” To: The record. From: Esterline C/WH/4.

2/16/1960 CIA Official Routing Slip. To Chief, WH – 1317 Barton (initialed by J.C. King), WH/3 and WH/4. From: EO/DCI/JS Earman.
>> Remarks from Esterline to J.C.: “The attached was handed to the Directors yesterday by Ambassador Pawley.” It is a letter in Spanish.

35 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Page 243.

36 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Page 244.

37 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Page 245.

38 2/23/1960 Memo: Pawley report on Slepin approach to Cuban Revolutionary group with offer from VP Nixon. Subjects: AntiCastro plot; Pawley, William. To: Earman. Asst. to DCI. From: Gomez. Dep. Chief, WH Division. 

39 NARA 104-10162-10047 ~ 3/10/1960 Message. From: Redacted. To CIA Director.

40 NARA 104-10162-10195 ~ “Personal Record Questionnaire Part II – Operational Information for AMBIDDY-1.” Prepared by Henry Hechsher SAS/SO.

41 “Manuel Artime Dies; Led Invasion of Cuba.” George Volsky, The New York Times, November 19, 1977. Page 24.

“Watergate plotter may have a last tale” by Carol J. Williams. Los Angeles Times, March 20, 2007.
After Dorothy Hunt died in an airplane crash while carrying hush money, William F. Buckley took David Hunt to Manuel Artime’s home to live.

42 NARA104-10049-10297~2/16/1960Cable“Re[REDACTED]” From:[REDACTED]. To:Director.

Asked following message be sent to ... Conference held with Tony Varona. He will arrive Miami Wednesday or Thursday 17 or 18 February.

NARA 104-10049-10295 ~ 2/19/1960 Memorandum “Conversation with.” From: [REDACTED]. To [REDACTED]. Subjects: Pawley, William Cuba.

2/16/1960 Routing Slip and letter written in Spanish. Subjects: Cuba; Pawley, William. From: [None]. To: [None].

2/16/1960 Official Routing Slip with typed note: “The attached was handed to the Director yesterday by Ambassador Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley. From: CIA employee. To: Chief, WH.

2/16/1960 Cable “Message to Pawley about arrival of Tony Varona.” To: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Junta. Robert Kennedy and His Times, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 1978, Pages 454-458.

43 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Page 245 and 246.

44 NARA 178-1000-210158 ~ 3/9/1960 Memorandum for the Record “Subject: First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 March, 1960.”

Participants: Col. J.C. King, CWH; J.D. Esterline, C/WE/4; Jack Baumann, Office of Security; Col. B.H. Vandervort, OTR; George Geyer, Office of Communications; Mike Ting, Comptroller; Scudder Georgia, DDS; Mr. Robert Macre, PP Staff; Col. Charles Cocke, OF/MPD; Edward Donohue, TSD; Casimoro Barquin, DPD; Mr. E.A. Stanulis, WH/4/PM.

45 3/10/1960 Memo: “Pawley activities/Meeting with VP Nixon.” To: Mr. Esterline. From: King, J.C. Chief, WH Division. Subjects: Pawley, William; Anti-Castro Plot.

46 NARA 1994.05.18.13:23:17:130005 ~ 3/14/1960 Memorandum for the Record. “Subject: Meeting with William D. Pawley.” Reel 55, Folder L – William D. Pawley. Page 58 of 220. (Pawley’s 201 File was reviewed at CIA Headquarters by the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff.)

5.We talked about Varona. Pawley agrees that he should come out but has some reservations about Varona. He describes him as a “big government advocate” who would not promote private enterprise and who has “socialist” ideas at times. I took the occasion to suggest that Varona and all others will have to find some common denominators among their divergent beliefs, and this will require compromises if they are to work effectively and in harmony.

6. [REDACTED]

7. Pawley said that he would be one of the first purchasers of bonds—$100,000 worth, to be exact—in order to get the ball rolling with any Cubans who might be holding back. Pawley leaves this afternoon for the DR for about a week.

47 NARA 1994.05.18.13:23:17:130005 ~ 3/30/1960 Memorandum for the Record. “Subject: Contact with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 March 1960 Time, 1200 hours; Mr. Pawley’s Office.” From: J. D. Esterline, C/WH/4 Reel 55, Folder L—William D. Pawley. Page 45 of 220.

2. Mr. Pawley passed to Chief, Branch 4 some very sensitive information concerning the Dominican Republic. He requested this information not be passed beyond CIA until he had the opportunity to give this information directly to Vice President Nixon. In point of fact, he initially said he didn’t want the information passed on to Chief, WHD [Col. King]. Chief, Branch 4 replied that he could not agree to this arrangement since he was obligated to pass the information on. Chief, Branch 4 said, however, in view of the fact he was not returning to Washington until 22 March, he could not pass the information on prior to that time. Mr. Pawley said he would relay the information himself before that date, so the question was settled amicably. As it turned out, Chief, WHD had already received the information via another channel by the time Chief, Branch 4 had returned to Washington.

48 CIA Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume III: Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies 1959- January 1961.Internet Archive. https://archive.org/details/BayOfPigsV olumeIIIEvolutionOfCIAsAntiCastroPolicies1959-January1961/mode/2up

>> Donnelly had been Counselor to Peru, Ambassador to Venezuela and a delegate to the conference in Bogota.

49 3/30/1960 Memorandum for the Record “Contact with Mr. William D. Pawley in Miami, 21 March 1960 Subjects: Pawley, William; Castro; Batista. From: J. D. Esterline, C/WH/4.” To: The record.

3/30/1960: Memorandum for the Record “Contact with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 March 1960. Subjects: Pawley, W.; Rubio.

3/30/1960 Memorandum “Contact with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 March 1960.” Subjects: Pawley, William; Anti-Castro plan.” From: Esterline. C/WH/4.

3/30/1960 Note from Cardena [perhaps transcribed by Anita Pawley]. Probably to: Pawley. Page 257 of 267. We are waiting for the answer on the verbal [?] question that we made about Dr. Maceo.

From now on we are going to try to type our letters so that they will be easier to read. Cardena, (Pages 258-61 handwritten by Rubio.)

50 “Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla.” The Miami Herald, September 25, 1989, Page 6B

51 NARA 104-10315-10037 ~ 8 April 1960 CIA Memorandum for the Record. “Review of the Cuban Operation and Examination of Possibilities for Hemispheric Support from Liberal Governments. QDDALE’s Home; 2245 Hours, 1 April 1960.” From: J.D. Esterline, C/WH/4.

Participants: DCI [Dulles], Chief, WHD [King], Chief, WH/4 [Esterline], General Robert Cushman, Vice Presidential Military Aide; Mr. Walter Donnelly, Vice President of U.S. Steel; and Mr. William Pawley, Industrialist.

NARA 104-10265-10074 ~ 3/30/1960 Memorandum for the Record “Subject: Contact with Mr. Pawley in Miami. 21 March 1960, Time 1200 hours; Mr. Pawley’s Office.” From: J.D. Esterline, C/WH/4.

>> CITASTE is Donnelly.

52 NARA 104-10227-10156 ~ 12/19/1961Dispatch “Subject—Transmittal of PASSAVOY Memo 120, a translation of the Dr. Pedro Martinez Fraga Document (‘The Recognition of the Revolutionary Council of Cuba’).” To: Chief, WHD. From: CIA Chief of Station JMWAVE. Subjects: Martinez, Pedro.

PASSAVOY was the cryptonym of retired Army Col. Wendell C. Johnson, who was hired in 1961 as a contract agent. He was the liaison between the CRC and several agencies including the CIA.

12/6/60 Dispatch. To: Department of State. From: The Embassy in Cuba. U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Section: 617. Page 1154.

53 NARA 104-10049-10322 ~ 4/11/1960 Cable “Three recent visitors to Havana and what they reported.” To: Havana Station. From: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley, W.

54 NARA 104-10220-10114 ~ 4/14/1960 Cable “Operational/Correspondence between QDDALE and Contacts in Cuba.” To: Chief of Station, Habana. From Chief, WHD. Page 2 of 3.

55 NARA 124-90124-10082 ~ 04/29/1960 Memorandum “Anti-Fidel Castro Activities IS- Cuba. To Director, FBI. From: SAC, Miami.

56 NARA 104-10167-10007 ~6/1960 “Letter To Be Transmitted To State Department Via Cardinal Spellman” To: JMNET (which may be CIA Latin America Division in Miami). From: Wallace Parlett (pseudonym for Frank Bender).

JMMET (FROM PARLETT)

1. During 8 June FRD Executive committee meeting, AMHAWK and AMWAIL advised that Vargas Gomez had long session with QDDALE during which the latter was alleged to have said the following:

A. Veep, Rubottom, Admiral Burke, and Cardinal Spellman were backing Rubio Group and could not agree policies of FRD. Thus 20-25 signatures of prominent American signatures now being collected for letter depicting FRD members as promoting Fidelista policies without Fidel communism. Letter to be transmitted to State Department via Cardinal Spellman.

2. FRD Executive Committee ... not in any way concerned ... consider such action ... as an irritating interlude of politics which, in their own minds, necessitated the earliest possible surfacing of Frente.

3. In this connection please note that AMHAWK has appointment with Wieland since latter wanted to discuss Rubio Padilla personality and policies.

57 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 249-254. Primarily an Esterline memorandum of meeting notes.

58 CIA Official History of the Bay of Pigs Operation, Volume III: Evolution of CIA’s Anti-Castro Policies 1959- January 1961. Page 198.

59 12/6/60 Dispatch. To: Department of State. From: The Embassy in Cuba. U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Section: 617. Page 1154. 

60 NARA 104-10165-10283 ~ 4/7/1960 Informal Notes “Telephone Conversation. Subject: Mr. Pauley Calling from Miami, Florida (Franklin 9-0193).” To: J. C. King. From: L.D. Mallory—ARA.

Mr. Pauley [sic] said that yesterday evening he attended a party at Palm Beach which was attended by former US Ambassador Earl Smith, the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba, the Panamanian Ambassador to Cuba and his wife, the Dominican Ambassador to Belgium Perferio Rubirosa, and some American couples ...

[Pawley] said that Fidel Castro probably has two or three hundred other agents in Dade County ... “we” are trying very hard to watch them.

61 4/12/1960 Cable “Castro aware of activities of Anti-Castro Cubans.” From: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley. 62 4/27/1960 Miami, Florida Notes. Reel 55, Folder L—William D. Pawley. Source AARC. Pages 7 & 8 of 22.