22: QDDALE'S Deep Pockets for Special Proposals

Two days after learning that Fidel Castro was aware of William Douglas Pawley’s activities, a cable appears in Pawley’s 201 file with a tantalizing, but redacted, glimpse at the strategy to exfiltrate Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla in the spring of 1960. The exfiltration operation involved using Pawley’s boat with a “proposed rendezvous off Sand Key light 16 April between Cuban yacht and KUBARK (cryptonym for CIA) for transfer passengers.”1

The day before the rendezvous, Pawley successfully requested a meeting with FBI Miami Special Agents Leman L. Stafford and George E. Davis, Jr. at his own business office where he had his secret recording equipment. According to a memo that the Special Agent in Charge of the Miami office later sent to Director Hoover, Pawley reiterated his praise of the FBI while revealing negotiations with Trujillo. Pawley also dropped some big names. “During the course of the interview, he disclosed that he is a personal friend of the Director of the FBI, as well as President Eisenhower, former President Truman and many other influential people in the United States and Latin America.”

Pawley told the agents he’s “deeply concerned about the communist trend in Cuba and its effect on other Latin American countries, and that he has been in close contact with the U.S. State Department and the CIA relative to this situation.” Understanding the friction between the FBI and CIA, Pawley “expressed admiration for the SIS program formerly operated by the FBI in Latin America during World War II and expressed the opinion that it had been a great mistake to supplant the FBI’s operation with that of another agency.”

Pawley revealed “that he had attempted unsuccessfully to make tape recordings of the two interviews, involving Merola and Bartone which took place in Pawley’s office; however due to a technical error on the part of one of Mr. Pawley’s employees, this recording failed. Mr. Pawley exhibited to agents his recording equipment, which he keeps in a locked closet in his suite of offices, and he offered his facilities in the event this Office [the FBI] ever desired to make a recording of any conversation held there.”

Pawley shared multiple copies of “a letterhead memorandum” about Anti-Castro activities “for the Bureau, and one copy is being enclosed for the Pittsburgh Office in view of its interest in Joseph R. Merola.” The “communication is classified ‘Confidential’ as the letterhead memorandum contains information relating to a foreign diplomat.”

The anti-Castro activities described by Pawley included a proposition to bomb Cuba by two Americans Dominick Bartone and Mitchell Livingston WerBell III who had arranged to meet with Ambassador De Moya “in the presence of Mr. Pawley. Bartone did 90 percent of the talking and it appeared to Mr. Pawley that WerBell was a contact man for Bartone.” They wanted $300,000.00 “to stage on behalf of the Dominican Government a bombing attack against Cuba” using “an undisclosed number of B-25 bombers, P-51 planes and other airplanes which could be used in an attack against sugar centrals and other installations in Camaguey Province of Cuba.”

Bartone “would also supply trained pilots to stage this operation, which would be launched from a base outside the United States. He implied that the planes are presently in the United States, but that they would be removed to an undesignated location outside the United States prior to the bombing attack.”

Could Bartone be trusted? He had been “convicted in 1959 in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in connection with an attempt to illegally export arms and ammunition by plane to the Dominican Republic. He was given a three-year probationary sentence.” WerBell of Atlanta “has allegedly been involved in gun deals in the past.”

A second anti-Castro activity that Pawley wanted the FBI to know about was Joseph R. Merola’s proposition to counterfeit Cuban Pesos for circulation in Cuba. “On Saturday afternoon, April 9, 1960, Mr. Pawley accompanied Mr. De Moya to the DuPont Plaza Hotel, Miami, where a meeting was held on a porch overlooking the swimming pool, with Joseph R. Merola of Miami Beach, and an individual introduced as Bill Bapst” who “is reportedly employed by the Eden Roc Hotel, Miami Beach.” (William J. Bapst was a longtime friend of De Moya and converted Dominican currency into U.S. dollars for him. An informant in 1961 asserted that Bapst was shipping “boat loads” of sugar from Cuba to another island and then moving the contraband into the U.S.) Merola at the time of the meeting was “out on $50,000 appeal bond in connection with his conviction in U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, February, 1959, in connection with the interstate transportation of firearms stolen from a National Guard Armory at Canton, Ohio, October 14, 1958.” Joseph Raymond Merola was a Pittsburgh mobster associated with Norman Rothman, Samuel and Gabriel Mannarino and John Sebastian LaRocca owners of the San Souci in Havana. He faced a prison term starting in 1961.

Coincidentally, the brazen Merola wanted “$50,000.00 payable in advance” for obtaining the paper and ink needed to “print fifty million dollars worth of counterfeit Cuban pesos in five, ten and twenty peso denominations, for circulation in Cuba.” The “money could be printed in the United States, or if the Dominicans so desired and furnished transportation, the money could be printed in the Dominican Republic with experts supplied by Merola and his associates.”

Merola had no compunction in claiming “he had contact with the best counterfeiters in the United States, and that some of the money, in U.S. currency, counterfeited by these individuals was already in circulation in the United States. He said that he had already shown a sample of this money to Mr. De Moya. At this point, Mr. De Moya in the presence of Mr. Pawley acknowledged that Merola had shown him a U.S. bill which appeared to him to be a genuine piece of U.S. currency. Merola claimed that his counterfeit associates did their work so well that their counterfeit money could not be distinguished from the real thing.” Pawley told the FBI agents that “De Moya told Merola and Bapst that the Dominican Government was not interested in their proposition” but Pawley “was anxious to obtain more information against Merola and Bapst, [so] he arranged a second meeting to be held at his own office on the following Monday, April 11, 1960.” It turned out to be “a repetition of the first meeting and Merola renewed his proposition. It was again turned down by De Moya; however, in the presence of Mr. Pawley, De Moya gave Merola a check in the amount of $1,000.00 explaining that this was compensation for their trouble.”

A few days later Pawley furnished the information about the counterfeiting offer to “John Marshall, U.S. Secret Service, Miami, who stated that he had received rumors that Merola had made similar propositions on previous occasions. Mr. Marshall stated that the above facts are typical of the so called ‘green goods’ swindle, a ‘bunco’ type of operation by which the intended victim is induced into paying money to a swindler under circumstance which prohibit the victim from ever taking legal recourse to recover his loss.”2

In his diary entry for April 25, 1960, President Eisenhower, recalled a conversation he had with Pawley. “He believes as does Harry Guggenheim, that our relationship with the whole of Latin America would be much improved if we should appoint an Under Secretary with duties confined to this hemisphere. I brought up this idea to the State Department many times over the past few years—the staffs there are always so bitterly opposed that I am becoming quite sure that I am right. This morning I told Secretary Herter that if I was to be put off in this matter again, I wanted some very convincing reason.”3

Pawley in his autobiography, stated that Lloyd A. Free, a former United States Information Agency official, visited Cuba to assess public opinion and provided President Eisenhower his report, The Cuban Situation, at a meeting on April 25th. One of his conclusions is that “‘Most Cubans remain personally friendly toward individual Americans. However, as a result of Castro’s psychotic anti-American campaign, they are becoming afraid to show evidences of pro-American feelings.’”4

On April 28th, The New York Times reported that Frank Fiorini (Frank Sturgis) had been stripped of his U.S. citizenship after it was learned that the Norfolk, Virginia native had fought in Castro’s army. His lawyer said he would appeal.5

There were significant differences within the CIA regarding who should lead the Cuban exiles. While some favored the old Batista faction, others opposed any association with it. E. Howard “Hunt’s protégé, who was selected by Colonel King, was Dr. Antonio Rubio Padilla, minister of the government under Carlos Prio in the 1940s, founder of the Radical Liberty Party together with Jose Ignacio Rasco, and backed by the powerful Cuban bishops. He was friendly with many U.S. businessmen, among them Ambassador William Pawley.” But Hunt was now a subordinate of “Frank Bender” (aka Gerry/Jerry Droller) who opposed Dr. Rubio; thus their agency superior Tracy Barnes selected Manuel Antonio de Varona Loredo (aka Tony de Varona, Tony Varona, and Manuel Antonio) who had fled to Florida following a failed coup against Batista in 1952.6

In May of 1960, Pawley was in discussions with his team members, Dr. Rubio Padilla and Fabio Freyre,7 whose wealthy family had abandoned large land holdings in Cuba when Castro began nationalizing assets.

During May 1960 the CIA’s JMASH operation opened in the Coral Gables section of Miami as the CIA’s second Forward Operations Base (FOB). The first FOB was set up for the Arbenz overthrow in Guatemala in 1954. “In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief, WH Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4.” The base was behind the veil of “Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover for an organization engaged in classified research.”8

Exiles such as Garcia Montes issued rallying cries against Fidelism and “the Communism which conceals itself in the Government as Fidelism.” Montes called for “a Lawful regime which is based on the principles of Equality and Liberty and is capable of returning peace and order to Cuba.” Elections as soon possible were part of his vision as well as “the United States should substantially assist with Cuba’s economic reconstruction after the elimination of Castro’s regime” so that Cuba would not “fall again into communist hands through desperation resulting from economic factors.”9

But reality quickly set in. As soon as formal organization was brought to the anti-Castro operation, it began to unravel. Pawley and Hunt’s highly valued Rubio Padilla was not happy with the people he dealt with in North America. In a letter he eventually wrote, Rubio Padilla stated that he “refused to be part of F.R.D. My objections stemmed from a fundamental criteria maintained by me all along: The necessary aid from the United States to Cuba in the struggle against Communism was not an act of generosity or charity that has to be unilaterally imposed upon the Cubans by the United States. The need to defeat Communism in Cuba is equally important to Cuba and the United States.”10

A cable bearing the names of G. Droller, J.C. King, Rudy Gomez and Jake Esterline appears in Pawley’s 201 CIA file on Padilla’s change of heart. They hope to “take steam out of Rubio’s sails if necessary.”11

Pawley’s organization was facing logistics problems as well. “Pepin and Oscar Rivero will have to go to Peru first before they can go on to the States. Hope leave here on 23 May.” Also “Aureliano Sanchez Arango is reported to have entered Ecuadorian Embassy” and “Silvio again complained about long delay in receiving any mesgs from Rubio.”12

The allegations that had been made earlier in the year that Pawley was perhaps pro- Castro were put to rest finally in a late May memorandum to FBI Director Hoover by the Miami Special Agent in Charge. “At no time has Miami ever received any information reflecting that he is pro-Fidel Castro or in any way sympathetic with Castro’s program.” In fact, “Pawley expressed the opinion that Fidel Castro and his regime are a very serious threat to the United States security. He condemned the Castro regime for being pro-Communist and anti-United States.” Moreover, “during the interview, Mr. Pawley confided that he himself was responsible for the removal of Spruille Braden as Assistant Secretary of State several years ago. Mr. Pawley indicated that he and Braden were at odds with RUC [FBI shorthand for Referred Upon Completion to office of origin].” In conclusion, the FBI’s Miami Special Agent in Charge found that the pro-Castro charge against Pawley “appears to be without any foundation whatsoever.”13

In the CIA’s Bay of Pigs history, it is revealed that the FBI had its own plans for dealing with Cuba. “Technically the FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief, WH/4 [Esterline] revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for installing a stay-behind network—using Mexicans and Cubans—to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Cuba were broken. Chief WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the bureau’s plan.” No one in the CIA “registered a formal protest against the FBI’s activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami.” There were so many Cuban exiles under suspicion of “working for Castro, or were trying desperately to get support from one or another U.S. Agency” that the FBI would be hard pressed to “bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles.”14

On June 6, Pawley learned that Rubio’s group was “joined by Pepin Rivero” and that “Rubio apparently has taken position also that should Sanchez Arango become part of FRD [Frente Revolucionario Democratico] this would eliminate for all time any possibility his group even marginally supporting FRD.” Rubio’s stance was such a problem “that a number of people had gone to considerable lengths to try to induce Rubio to come into FRD without success and that perhaps now it would be unreasonable to expect that Rubio would ever in fact be willing to compromise, and if taken into FRD might therefore present an interminable source dissension which would paralyze FRD.” A suggestion was made regarding the “possibility that on Bender’s next trip (did not say when this would be) might be worthwhile review Rubio’s position and potential in light current situation.”15

According to the CIA history of the Bay of Pigs, Pawley threatened to bow out of the CIA’s anti-Castro operations as a result of the agency’s failure to fully back Rubio Padilla, and Jake Esterline would have been happy to see him go. “Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency’s anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon.” In mid-May, Pawley had met with President Eisenhower on Caribbean matters. “In view of Pawley’s recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and others discussed the pros and cons of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba—a channel which was provided by the Agency’s communications facility.” However, Chief, WHD convinced the group that it was best to keep the communications channel open because “it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group. Moreover the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been restricted by denial of the Agency channel.”

The decision was made to restrict “transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba; but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.” The decision should be brought to the attention of CIA Director Allen Dulles so he could be aware before Pawley complained to Eisenhower and Nixon.

“By the first week of June 1960, however, Jake Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether” and wrote a Memorandum to the Deputy Director Plans which stated “our firm conviction, based on months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley’s views on the Cuban situation are highly personal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of government. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security has already been damaged severely.” (Bold emphasis by D.P. Cannon.)

The falsehood that was circulating in “anti-Castro circles in Cuba” that maddened Esterline was the assertion that the “U.S. Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep [Nixon]. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted [to] back another junta, but after Pawley offered [to] withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance that his group only would be backed, [and this] resulted resignation person backing other group.”16

At CIA Headquarters a priority cable was drafted to be sent to Havana and the Forward Operations Base, which had heard the disinformation being spread by the anti-FRD group.17

The cable from headquarters “authoritatively advised that the U.S. Government is not (repeat not) backing Rubio group and ... has no intention ever doing so.” The message went on to express that it is a “complete fabrication that Pawley was given U.S. government assurance that only his group would be backed. No resignations of any kind occurred, nor are any foreseen. Mention Veep in such context and on this particular level sheer foolhardiness.”

Despite Esterline’s strong concerns about Pawley having a “flagrant disregard for security,” being recalcitrant and “inimical to the best interest of the United States,” Pawley won the war of wills. The cable was never sent to Havana or Miami because Col. King “did not concur” with Jake Esterline’s recommendation “that all contact with Rubio-Pawley group be ‘immediately and finally severed.’”

Shortly thereafter and through to the Bay of Pigs invasion “the relationship between Pawley and Jake Esterline appears to become mutually supportive” according to the CIA’s post- mortem review.18 But after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, Esterline would complain about the ephemeral political figures that tamper with the work of professionals.19

Pawley had argued the first week of June that he had information “that AMBIDDY feels he in dominant position FRD by reason his control over MRR, without which FRD helpless, and fact that he personally is looked upon as ‘favored son’ by ODYOKE.” Pawley asserted that “AMBIDDY and MRR clearly have ambitions for ultimate takeover govt in Cuba post-Castro and AMBIDDY already plotting double cross FRD to achieve his and MRR aims. When asked if any details available on these allegations QDDALE said he thought he could come up with some specifics.”20

Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, a key advisor to Eisenhower, wrote on June 10, 1960 about his conversation with the President, Herter, Persons and Dillon in which “Herter next mentioned that William Pawley has been working with a rightwing group of Cubans, including former Batista police.” The next four lines are classified. “The President asked Mr. Herter to call up Mr. Pawley and tell him to get out of this operation, [less than 1 line not declassified].21

On June 20, 1960, General Cushman lunched with Esterline. Cushman needed information for Nixon who was about to become the senior official at an upcoming National Security Council meeting. He was deeply concerned about the progress of the anti-Castro program since the previous planning meeting at Pawley’s house on the first day of spring. Of particular concern was the impact of Rubio Padilla’s decision not to join the FRD, but General Cushman was assured that the Frente’s headquarters were about to be established in Mexico. The CIA history notes that “it was on this occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with the Frente.” This may not be the first time Richard Nixon heard the name of future Watergate burglar Hunt22—Pawley was a strong Rubio Padilla backer like Hunt; and Hunt and Pawley were well-versed in coup activities from the days of the Arbenz overthrow.23

Hunt, a one-time writer for Luce’s Time-Life publications and a former OSS member in the Far East, had spent time in Mexico before. In December 1950, after a stint in Europe with the Economic Cooperation Administration, he “was assigned as Chief of Station, Mexico City, and then served as Chief of Mission there until 1953.” Hunt’s wife, Dorothy, became fluent enough in Spanish to eventually work for the Argentine Ambassador and as a translator for the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

Hunt’s talents then took him to an assignment in Japan, where U-2 planes departed for flights over the Soviet Union and where China activities were monitored. His knowledge of Pawley’s old stomping grounds, China, was of such significance that Hunt would be hired in 1971 “as a Consultant to President Nixon preparatory to the President’s visit to the Peoples Republic of China.”24 Something Pawley would not be asked to do because of his opposition to détente with China.

After February 1957, Hunt served as Chief of Station in Montevideo, Uruguay. Upon returning to the U.S. in June 1960, he “was assigned to Mexico City on Project JMARC”— the Cuba project—until November 1961 when he was re-assigned to CIA headquarters.” Hunt was a propaganda expert, and Esterline’s briefing included details about radio programs to be broadcast from Swan Island as well as “on the preparation being made for training paramilitary types, base communications, planned paramilitary activities, the choice of Third Country’s staging area, and that the operation was still scheduled to begin during the month of November 1960.”

Cushman also learned of Esterline’s concerns about the “political differences among the exiles” and “that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMAC [sic] would have adequate support at the eleventh hour.” In the end, the coalition of nations providing support for an invasion against Castro would only include Guatemala and Nicaragua. Mexico, where Hunt ran operations, did not join them.

Two days after the lunch, Vice President Nixon presided at the NSC briefing by Acting Director of Central Intelligence, General Charles Cabell, with support provided by Bissell, King, Esterline and McMahan who was on the Staff of the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Those being briefed included the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, the Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobilization, the Acting Attorney General, and a representative of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Much of the briefing was devoted to the FRD leadership, policies, background, and its “internal difficulties and bickering.” The briefing also covered the “propaganda picture” using “radio broadcasts from Swan Island.”25

On June 28, 1960, Pawley’s name surfaced in the CIA’s grapevine in Cuba. AMCLATTER-8 informed AMCLATTER-4 that an informant in the Cuban Prime Minister’s office had revealed “that the police are investigating the activities of a North American known as ‘Pauli.’ This appears to be an obvious reference to William Pauley [sic] of Miami.”26

Also inside Cuba, three helicopter pilots were becoming disenchanted with Castro and considered him a menace to Cuba and Latin America “which must be physically eliminated.” Pawley learned that they could not bring themselves to do it but would help others accomplish it. However, Castro was already taking countermeasures. “Castro’s flights are on highly irregular basis and pilots are not informed of destination until arrive at hanger. However, Castro most frequently is only passenger and once airborne presumably completely in pilot’s hands.”27

On July 1, 1960, Jake Esterline received a call from General Cushman, telling him that Vice President Nixon would help remove “any obstacles that the Agency was encountering vis- a-vis other agencies in support of JMATE” and Cushman stated that “the Vice President has commissioned him to keep Mr. Pawley happy and ... briefed on how things are moving.” The CIA’s post-mortem of the Bay of Pigs noted that “General Cushman said he realized that this is much against our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but the big fact remains that he [Pawley] is a ‘big fat political cat’ and, as such, the Vice President cannot completely ignore him.”

Esterline promised cooperation with security regulations that applied to Pawley’s level of clearance. He then related the request to Bissell and Barnes. One of the interagency cooperation obstacles Nixon was asked by Esterline to smooth out was “to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took exception and recommended that the U.S. Government should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broadcasts” which was rejected.28

In July 1960, Nixon “indicated an interest in the activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga.” This Cuban exile “claimed to have extensive backing both within the Cuban community in Miami and among dissidents inside Cuba.” He also bragged of having “large stores of military equipment in Spain” plus “promises of assistance from General Franco.” In Washington, DC, he had the sponsorship of former Senator Owen Brewster and Marshall Diggs, a Washington lawyer who had been FDR’s Deputy Comptroller of the US Treasury. When Esterline heard “Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as Communists ... Diggs was informed that the Agency had no interest in supporting Mr. Garcia.”

Garcia’s backers—Brewster, Diggs, and Cameron Pulley—claimed that failure to back Mario Garcia Kohly would hurt Nixon’s chances of election and there was a threat to expose theCIA’s anti-Castro efforts. After failure of the Bay of Pigs, Kohly attempted to take part in the ransom effort.29

At the White House, a Special Group meeting was held July 21, 1960 to discuss sabotage and other Cuban matters. It was attended by CIA Director Allen Dulles, Under Secretary of State Livingston T. Merchant, Gordon Gray, Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, and General Edward Lansdale.30

Two days later, a detailed Cuban briefing, prepared by Esterline, was delivered by CIA Director Allen Dulles to the Democratic nominee for president, John F. Kennedy.31

On August 3rd, Wallace Parlett met with QDDALE (Pawley) and then prepared a contact report which was forwarded to Chief, QHD from the Chief of Base, JMASH, under the signature Wilma B. Goudeaux.32 (QHD probably was a typing error of WHD.) In his memo for the record, Parlett (CIA officer Gerard Droller aka Frank Bender) stated that following a “conversation concerning QDDALE's experiences at the Republican Convention in Chicago and his plans to sell the Miami Transit Company to Dade County,” he explained that the FRD was planning to move to Mexico in mid-August. Bender complained about the “lack of dynamism on the part of FRD” and its need to “open its doors to all decent Cubans willing to join them.” 

At this point “QDDALE then explained that Rubio Padilla was definitely out of the picture and should not be considered any longer as a member of the group. Cuervo Rubio had, on 2 August, voiced to QDDALE the belief that a bloodbath may ensue in Cuba once the FRD had started its invasion.” Cuervo wanted assurances that a solid plan was in place. QDDALE “thought it might be well to call Ascham or Galbond on this.” Robert A. Ascham was a pseudonym used by CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Oliver Galbond was Colonel J.C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, Directorate of Operations. Bender reiterated “our current working policy of not bringing FRD members in contact with high-level ODACID [State Department] officials.”

Pawley then told Bender about his meeting the previous evening in the home of AMBIDDY-1 (Artime) who complained about “Bender’s stinginess in terms of dollars and about the lack of full support in connection with his disciplinary action against the AMYUM dissidents.” 

In response, Pawley “told AMBIDDY-1 that he, QDDALE, had a considerable sum of money in the bank for purposes such as this and that he never wrote checks to organizations but only to individuals who were able to give him detailed proposals as to what they intended to do with the contributions.” (Bold emphasis added by D.P. Cannon.)

After discussing “the AMYUM dissident problem,” QDDALE indicated that he felt AMHAWK (Varona) “could be a rather balancing figure in this picture.”33

Allen Dulles learned on August 4, 1960 from Pawley that there was a desire to use Pepin Rivero for publishing Diario La Marina in exile and wondered if he was involved in some “HQs op” that would preempt him from working on the newspaper. At the same time, it was mentioned that “Carbos and Medrano talking about publishing ‘Prensa Libre Miami.’ To this end have contacted Vargas Gomez. Vargas Gomez attempting get Bender group assist Carbos travel [to] Canada” to get financial aid for the paper.34

The following week, Harold Geneen of ITT reported that Castro’s seizure of the Cuban Telephone Company would have "no effect on 1960 net income.”35

On September 8th, Walter C. Twicker (cover name for E. Howard Hunt) sent a priority message from Mexico for the Director that stated he had an “hour meeting with AMBIDDY-1” (Manuel Artime Buesa) in which “Twicker briefed him new AMCIGAR/AMRASP organizational concept and obtained his enthusiastic concurrence.” Hunt also used the conflict between AMEER (Sanchez Arango), the current council leader, and “Col. Martin as justification keeping consejo (council) members from direct contact department heads.” He also sold the idea that if consejo members were free of “trivial day-to-day responsibilities” they could “become immediately active long-delayed personal trips through southern hemisphere and commence planning nature of future gov’t.”36 The AM prefix is a reference to Cuban matters.

Over the next month, E. Howard Hunt in Mexico would continue to have discussions about the pre- and post-Cuban invasion leadership similar to ones Pawley was having in Miami. Infighting among exiles would continue through the Bay of Pigs invasion. Following the failure of the invasion in 1961, a conversation was recalled in which AMBUD-1 complained that AMOT is controlled by the CIA “and AMOT-2 [Jose Joaquin Sanjenis Perdomo] brags about its support and protection ... AMOT-2 is most disloyal to AMIRON, AMDIP-1 and AMBUD-1 ... AMOT-2 alledged [sic] to be in charge of ‘Operation Forty’ designed to eliminate AMBUD provisional govt had it come into being ... Recommendation: AMOT-2 out of WAVE and have KUBARK assign other tasks.”37

Eliminating the provisional government meant assassination by Operation 40 team members—Sanjenis Perdomo, Frank Sturgis, Felix Rodriguez, Rolando Masferrer and Bernard Barker to name a few. In 1983, Barker’s daughter, Maria Elena Barker, was stunned that I was aware of Operation 40 when I queried her about it in a casual conversation at a nightclub in New York City. After discussing the failure of Operation 40, Maria Elena asserted that only a female Cuban exile would be brave enough to kill Fidel Castro.38

FOOTNOTES:

1 4/14/1960 Cable Message. To: Miami. From: Director. Releasing Officer: J. D. Esterline. File #201-7738. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 251 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

4/14/1960 CIA Cable “re Briefing William Pawley on operational instructions.” To: Station. From: [CIA] Director. 

4/14/1960 CIA Cable “Use of Pawley’s boat.” To [None]. From: [CIA] Director.

2 NARA 124-10221-10094 ~ 4/29/1960 FBI Memorandum “Subject Anti-Fidel Castro Activities IS-Cuba.” To: FBI Director. From: SAC Miami.

On April 15, 1960, pursuant to a prior telephonic request by Mr. William D. Pawley, Mr. Pawley was interviewed at his office in Miami by Special Agents Leman L. Stafford and George E. Davis, Jr.

It is noted that Mr. Pawley is a prominent Miami businessman, financier, and a former US Ambassador to Brazil. He is also organizer of the Flying Tigers.

During the course of the interview, he disclosed that he is a personal friend of the Director of the FBI, as well as President Eisenhower, former President Truman and many other influential people in the United States and Latin America.

Mr. Pawley said he is deeply concerned about the communist trend in Cuba and its effect on other Latin American countries, and that he has been in close contact with the US State Department and the CIA relative to this situation.

Mr. Pawley expressed admiration for the SIS program formerly operated by the FBI in Latin America during World War II, and expressed the opinion that it had been a great mistake to supplant the FBI’s operation with that of another agency.

Mr. Pawley said that he had been a personal friend of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo for many years, that he has had considerable financial interest in the Dominican Republic in the past, but that he has recently liquidated and withdrawn all of his investments in the Dominican Republic. He explained that he has done this because he and Senator George Smathers of Florida, have been working out a plan with Trujillo to democratize the Dominican Republic by an orderly procedure. He said that he feels that he has sold Trujillo on the idea of being the first dictator to successfully step down and turn his country over to a democratic type of government, without bloodshed or disorder. Mr. Pawley said he is keeping the State Department and CIA closely advised concerning his efforts in this field.

The above observations by Mr. Pawley have not been included in a letterhead memorandum for dissemination for reasons of discretion; however, Mr. Pawley has offered his cooperation in any way possible. He has expressed great confidence in the FBI and it is felt that if the Bureau desires more detailed information concerning the plan that Mr. Pawley and Senator Smathers are attempting to work out with Trujillo, that such information can be obtained from Mr. Pawley.

Mr. Pawley advised that he had attempted unsuccessfully to make tape recordings of the two interviews, involving Merola and Bartone which took place in Pawley’s office; however due to a technical error on the part of one of Mr. Pawley’s employees, this recording failed. Mr. Pawley exhibited to agents his recording equipment, which he keeps in a locked closet in his suite of offices, and he offered his facilities in the event this Office ever desired to make a recording of any conversation held there.

Nine copies of a letterhead memorandum entitled ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVIES, dated as above, are being enclosed for the Bureau, and one copy is being enclosed for the Pittsburgh Office in view of its interest in Joseph R. Merola.

The letterhead memorandum enclosed with this communication is classified “Confidential” as the letterhead memorandum contains information relating to a foreign diplomat.

RE: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES

On April 15, 1960 Mr. William D. Pawley, President of the Miami Transit Company, former US Ambassador to Brazil, and financier with interests in the Caribbean area as well as elsewhere, furnished the following information.

Mr. Pawley said that on Friday, April 8, 1960, Mr. Manuel De Moya, former Dominican Ambassador to the United States, and present Secretary of State Without Portfolio in the Dominican Republic, and personal friend of Mr. Pawley, came to Mr. Pawley and requested that Mr. Pawley be present at two meetings with Americans, considered suspicious by DeMoya. Mr. Pawley agreed, and on the following day, two meetings were held.

Proposition by Dominick Bartone to Bomb Cuba

At about 11:30 AM, on Saturday, an American, Dominick Bartone, accompanied by another American introduced as Warbell [sic: Mitchell Livingston WerBell], came to Mr. Pawley’s office, where they met with Mr. De Moya in the presence of Mr. Pawley. Bartone did 90 percent of the talking and it appeared to Mr. Pawley that Warbell was a contact man for Bartone.

Bartone then proposed that [for] the sum of $300,000.00 he was prepared to stage on behalf of the Dominican Government a bombing attack against Cuba.

He claimed to have possession of an undisclosed number of B-25 bombers, P-51 planes and other airplanes which could be used in an attack against sugar centrals and other installations in Camaguey Province of Cuba.

He stated that he would also supply trained pilots to stage this operation, which would be launched from a base outside the United States. He implied that the planes are presently in the United States, but that they would be removed to an undesignated location outside the United States prior to the bombing attack.

Dominick Bartone was convicted in 1959 in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, in connection with an attempt to illegally export arms and ammunition by plane to the Dominican Republic. He was given a three-year probationary sentence.

It appears that his associate, Warbell probably identical to Mitchell Warbell [sic] of Atlanta, Georgia, who has allegedly been involved in gun deals in the past.

Proposition by Joseph R. Merola to Counterfeit Cuban Pesos for Circulation in Cuba

On Saturday afternoon, April 9, 1960, Mr. Pawley accompanied Mr. De Moya to the DuPont Plaza Hotel, Miami, where a meeting was held on a porch overlooking the swimming pool, with Joseph R. Merola of Miami Beach, and an individual introduced as Bill Bapst.

Mr. Pawley said that Merola, who served as spokesman, brazenly made a proposition to De Moya concerning a Cuban counterfeit peso deal.

Merola said that for the sum of $50,000.00 payable in advance, with which paper and ink would be purchased, that he and his associates would print fifty million dollars worth of counterfeit Cuban pesos in five, ten and twenty peso denominations, for circulation in Cuba.

Merola stated that this money could be printed in the United States, or if the Dominicans so desired and furnished transportation, the money could be printed in the Dominican Republic with experts supplied by Merola and his associates.

Merola claimed he had contact with the best counterfeiters in the United States, and that some of the money, in US currency, counterfeited by these individuals was already in circulation in the United States. He said that he had already shown a sample of this money to Mr. De Moya. At this point, Mr. De Moya in the presence of Mr. Pawley acknowledged that Merola had shown him a US bill which appeared to him to be a genuine piece of US currency. Merola claimed that his counterfeit associates did their work so well that their counterfeit money could not be distinguished from the real thing.

Mr. Pawley said that De Moya told Merola and Bapst that the Dominican Government was not interested in their proposition.

Mr. Pawley said, however, that as he was anxious to obtain more information against Merola and Bapst, he arranged a second meeting to be held at his own office on the following Monday, April 11, 1960.

This second meeting with Merola and Bapst took place between approximately 11:15 AM and noon time. It was a repetition of the first meeting and Merola renewed his proposition. It was again turned down by De Moya; however, in the presence of Mr. Pawley, De Moya gave Merola a check in the amount of $1,000.00 explaining that this was compensation for their trouble.

Mr. Pawley said that De Moya considered Merola’s proposition a closed incident.

On April 15, 1960, the above information relating to Merola and Bapst was furnished Mr. John Marshall, US Secret Service, Miami, who stated that he had received rumors that Merola had made similar propositions on previous occasions. Mr. Marshall stated that the above facts are typical of the so called “green goods” swindle, a “bunco” type of operation by which the intended victim is induced into paying money to a swindler under circumstance which prohibit the victim from ever taking legal recourse to recover his loss.

It is to be noted that Joseph R. Merola is presently out on $50,000 appeal bond in connection with his conviction in US District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, February, 1959, in connection with the interstate transportation of firearms stolen from a National Guard Armory at Canton, Ohio, October 14, 1958. His companion Bill Bapst, is reportedly employed by the Eden Roc Hotel, Miami Beach.

Mercenary Soldiers in the Dominican Republic

Mr. Pawley stated that he is a personal friend of Generalissimo Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, and is consequently well informed concerning activities, within the Dominican Republic. He said that there are presently about three thousand mercenary soldiers in the Dominican Republic of whom approximately 130 are Cubans exiled from Castro Government of Cuba.

Mr. Pawley said that Trujillo is now in the process of closing out this operation, and that within thirty days most of these mercenaries, who are from European countries, will be shipped back to Europe by boat.

NARA 124-10277-10327 ~ 8/14/1961 FBI Airtel. To: Director, FBI. From Stafford, Leman L. Jr. Subjects: Deb, Telcal, B/F Int, Income Tax, Assoc, Tra, Affil.

>> Bapst, a longtime friend of DeMoya, exchanged $50,000 in currency six times. Bapst also associated with James Hoffa.

NARA 124-10215-10330 ~ 1/10/1961 FBI Airtel “re Dominick Edward Bartone, aka. IS-Cuba; RA-Cuba; OO: Miami.” To: Director, FBI (105-80291. From: SAC, Cleveland (105-3877). Page 5.

>> Bapst Cuban sugar scheme.

4/29/1960 FBI Airtel. [No Title] To: Director, FBI. From: SAC, MM. Subjects: Deb, Assoc, INTV, Pawley, William D., B/F INT, ACA, Meetings, Plane Sale, Dominican Government.

NARA 1993.08.04.18:16:39:120006 “Miamian Pawley Had a Part in Trujillo’s ‘Free Vote’ Vow - Smathers at Conference.” By Leo Adde and David Kraslow. Miami Herald, 1960.

William D. Pawley...played a major part in the apparent agreement between Dominican Republic Dictator Rafael Trujillo and Florida Sen. George Smathers on a “transition to democracy” for the Caribbean nation.

Strongly disclaiming credit for the idea, Pawley admits, however, that he sold both Trujillo and Smathers on the idea before the two met in Ciudad Trujillo on Tuesday....

“...Each recognized that the Caribbean is entering a new period. A revision of regimes unacceptable to democratic nations has to be made,” Pawley added.

Smathers urged Trujillo, now 68 and his 30th year as Dominican Boss to make certain he succeeded by democratically chosen, freely elected government....

Pawley has had substantial investments in the Dominican Republic. He was president or major stockholder in mining and an oil company there.

“I do not now have a nickel invested in the Dominican Republic, nor in Cuba, nor in Mexico,” Pawley stated. “I have sold my Dominican interests recently, within weeks.”

Pawley’s appearance...did not surprise officials in Washington.

Pawley has long been Dictator Trujillo’s friend and adviser.

And Pawley is also close to Smathers.

Pawley attended Smathers’ press-conference in Ciudad Trujillo and told reporters that recent press reports of Trujillo’s difficulties were not true.

Pawley’s brother, Edward lives in Ciudad Trujillo and managed the Pawley business interests. Their drilling for oil brought in only one small well.

Pawley was described in Washington as an economic adviser to Trujillo – “on an informal basis.”

....There is only one political party in the Dominican Republic and Trujillo has had – and exercised – dictatorial control for 30 years....

Trujillo recently broke up a plot to overthrow his regime by arresting many [123 to 137 individuals] of the alleged participants, including members of some of the country’s leading families ...

But Washington sources put the figure between 1,000 and 2,000.

3 Diary Entry, President Eisenhower, April 25, 1960. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Page 901.

A little later [9:14 a.m.-9:34 a.m.] Mr. Pawley came in to see me about our relationships with Cuba. He is very knowledgeable in this area and since he has divested himself of his commercial interests in the Latin American area, I find it profitable to talk with him. He seems to think that a modicum of sense is now characterizing some of Castro’s grandiose programs and plans. He believes as does Harry Guggenheim, that our relationship with the whole of Latin America would be much improved if we should appoint an Under Secretary with duties confined to this hemisphere. I brought up this idea to the State Department many times over the past few years – the staffs there are always so bitterly opposed that I am becoming quite sure that I am right. This morning I told Secretary Herter that if I was to be put off in this matter again, I wanted some very convincing reason.

4 Pawley, Russia is Winning. Page 891.

5 “American Loses Citizenship, The New York Times, April 28, 1960.

6 Fabian Escalante, The Cuba Project: Covert Operations, 1959-1962. Page 47.

NARA 1994.03.02.14:04:48:530028 ~ July 7/26/1960 Memorandum “Meeting with MRR, [REDACTED].” 19 July 1960.

>> Bender/Droller identity.

7 “Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Padilla” Obituary. By David Hancock, Herald Staff Writer. Miami Herald, September 25, 1989, Page 6B. 

>> Following his exfiltration, Rubio remained in the U.S. for nearly thirty years and died in Miami.7

8 CIA Bay of Pigs History, Page 101.

9 5/6/1960 4-page “Statement by Garcia Montes.” Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 242-245 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

1. Eliminate Fidelism from the Government; eliminate, as well, the Communism which conceals itself in the Government as Fidelism.

2. Re-establish a Lawful regime which is based on the principles of Equality and Liberty and is capable of returning peace and order to Cuba.

3. Hold elections within the shortest possible time that is materially possible.

... Besides correcting these deficiencies, the United States should substantially assist with Cuba’s economic reconstruction after the elimination of Castro’s regime...North America cannot take the risk of having ... Cuba fall again into communist hands through desperation resulting from economic factors.

10 “Garcia Montes Statement.” Amigospais-guaracabuya.org (Website may be defunct).

In May of 1960 after long discussions with the Northamerican (sic) persons involved in these matters, I refused to be part of F.R.D. My objections stemmed from a fundamental criteria maintained by me all along: The necessary aid from the United States to Cuba in the struggle against Communism was not an act of generosity or charity that has to be unilaterally imposed upon the Cubans by the United States. The need to defeat Communism in Cuba is equally important to Cuba and the United States.

11 NARA 104-10265-10321 ~ May 17, 1960 Cable Message Originating G. Droller WH/4/PA Releasing Officers J.C. King, C WHD (signed by Gomez) and J.D. Esterline, C/WH4 File 201-77378. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 240 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

Following list of names Rubio intends incorporate his org, if indeed it will be formed: Outside Cuba: [previously REDACTED until 1998: AMHAWK] Emilio Ochoa, Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Antonio Maceo Mackle, Luis Casero Guillen, Jose Alvarez Diaz, Arturo Aballi; in Cuba: Enrique Fernandez Silva, Jose Miguel Morales Gomez, Manuel Marti, Antonio Medina, Dr. Seigle, Carlos Atalay, Miguel Uria, Leopoldo Aguilera St., Juan de la Camara, Enrique Carillo Mendoza, Octavio Valdes, Ernesto Freyre de Varona, Jorge Echarte, Ruben de Leon, Jose Antonio Cubenas, DBA.PINA Tomey.

In its unredacted entirety:

1. FYI only, Rubio Padilla did not join FRD [Frente Revolucionario Democratico] since he considers its composition incompatible with his own political moves. He also bears great personal animosity to [previously REDACTED: AMBIDDY/1], has no trust in [previously REDACTED: AMWAIL] and despises Sanchez Arango. Unhappily [previously REDACTED: QDDALE] and Rubio are collaborating on this and it appears now that Rubio may...form his own org in which he hopes to use [previously REDACTED: AMHAWK] We attempting handle matter from here and in view number other groups already in existence, for example Marquez Sterling, and our rapport with FRD, we confident of being able take steam out of Rubio’s sails if necessary. 

2. Following list of names Rubio intends incorporate his org, if indeed it will be formed: Outside Cuba: [REDACTED] Emilio Ochoa, Gustavo Cuervo Rubio, Antonio Maceo Mackle, [and a over a dozen others]. 

3. Pls inform HQ any info these personalities coming your attention 

4. In view of above no HQs interest Cuervo Rubio.

WH Comments:

*Concerned desire of Cuervo Rubio, cousin of Rubio Padilla to go U.S. and join exile groups & suggested Hqs query [REDACTED]...re his possible use...

“A successfully incognito visitor to Washington these last few days was Dr. Gustave Cuervo Rubio, Vice President- elect of Cuba.” Washington Post, September 27, 1940 (ProQuest Archiver).

5/11/1960 Cable “FYI conversation with William Pawley re Rubio’s final decision re Participation junta.” To: [CIA]. Director. From: Station. Subject: Rubio.

5/17/1960 Cable “FYI only re Rubio Padilla and his views.” From: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley, W.; Padilla, R.

12 5/18/1960 Cable Message from Director, Originating J.D. Esterline WH4 to [REDACTED]. Coordinating Officers Richard M. Bissell, Jr., DDP and J.C. King, C/WHD File #201-77378 [PAWLEY]. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 237 & 238 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

13 5/27/1960 Memorandum “Subject: [REDACTED] Internal Security—Cuba (OO: Jacksonville). Re: New York letter February 29, 1960.” To: FBI Director Hoover. From: SAC Miami.

Information in possession of the Miami Office reflects that Mr. William D. Pawley ... is a close personal friend of Rafael Trujillo. At no time has Miami ever received any information reflecting that he is pro-Fidel Castro or in any way sympathetic with Castro’s program.

On the contrary, incidental to an interview of Mr. Pawley relative to another matter conducted ... April 15, 1960 [the day he revealed the Bartone and Merola schemes] Mr. Pawley expressed the opinion that Fidel Castro and his regime are a very serious threat to the United States security. He condemned the Castro regime for being pro-Communist and anti-United States.

Also during the interview, Mr. Pawley confided that he himself was responsible for the removal of Spruille Braden as Assistant Secretary of State several years ago. Mr. Pawley indicated that he and Braden were at odds with RUC.

... Miami agrees that the information offered by [REDACTED] regarding Pawley’s attitude toward the present Castro regime is certainly inconsistent with all previous information and appears to be without any foundation whatsoever.

14 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Pages 98 & 100.

Although it was not included on the list of Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and contacts at this time, mention should be made of the CIA-FBI connections. Technically the FBI was prohibited from engaging in intelligence operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief, WH/4 [Esterline] revealed that the FBI reportedly had plans for installing a stay-behind network—using Mexicans and Cubans—to be activated in case diplomatic relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an explanation of the bureau’s plan.

Neither Col. King nor anyone else involved in the Anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal protest against the FBI’s activities in the Havana area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became even closer, particularly as the agency expanded activities at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH (later JMWAVE) in Miami. [There were so many Cuban exiles under suspicion of] “working for Castro, or were trying desperately to get support from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent” [predicted] “that it would be virtually impossible, to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime using Cuban exiles.”

15 6/7/1960 Message. To: Director. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 234 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

6/06/1960 Cable “re Conversation with Pawley stating that his meetings with Rubio’s group have continued and have now been joined by Rivero.” To: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley, W.; Rivero, P.

6/07/1960 Cable “Pawley’s meetings with Rubio now include Pepin Rivero.” Subjects: FRD. From [None]. To [CIA] Director.

16 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 249-254. Primarily an Esterline memorandum of meeting notes.

When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere Division that he was withdrawing from support of the Agency’s anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told Col. King that he intended to make his views regarding the FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition, Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley’s recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and others discussed the pros and cons of cutting off the communications channel between Pawley and the Rubio groups into Cuba—a channel which was provided by the Agency’s communications facility.

Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that the communications channel should be continued because it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley group. Moreover the Pawley group had a duplicate channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restriction was placed on the transmittal of communications which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba; but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.

Because of Pawley’s close ties to the Eisenhower administration, the Deputy Director of Plans agreed that the discussion regarding Pawley should be brought to the attention of the Director of Central Intelligence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring this matter before President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. By the first week of June 1960, however, Jake Esterline apparently had reached the end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP, he wrote:

It is our firm conviction, based on months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley’s views on the Cuban situation are highly personal and rigid. These views in our opinion are inimical to the best interest of the United States. Mr. Pawley has refused to budge from his position and has continued to seek official endorsement of his views at the high levels of government. The flagrant disregard for security reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated 4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to recommend that all contact with the Rubio Pawley group be immediately and finally severed. If such action is not taken, no guarantee can be made for security of the JMARC operation. In point of fact, the information in the foregoing message indicates that security has already been damaged severely.

Among other things, the Havana cable which had aroused Chief, WH/4 [Esterline] stated that the following information was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in Cuba:

U.S. Government now backing Rubio group and no other group. Group has entre to Veep [Nixon]. For a time Pawley was having trouble with an Agency or Agencies who wanted [to] back another junta, but after Pawley offered [to] withdraw completely, he was talked out of doing so, and given assurance that his group only would be backed, [and this] resulted resignation person backing other group.

17 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 254 & 255.

18 CIA History of Bay of Pigs. Page 257 & 258.
>> The history is incomplete because, according to page 269 “J.C. King’s files, which have disappeared from the sight of God and man.”

19 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Robert Kennedy and His Times (1978). Pages 454-458.

Intelligence agencies, sealed off by walls of secrecy from the rest of the community, tend to form societies of their own. Prolonged immersion in the self-contained, self-justifying, ultimately hallucinatory world of clandestinity and deception erodes the reality principle. So intelligence operatives, in the CIA as well as the FBI, had begun to see themselves as the appointed guardians of the Republic, infinitely more devoted and knowledgeable than transient elected officials, morally authorized to do on their own whatever they believed the nation's security demanded. Let others interfere at their peril. J. D. Esterline, the CIA's supervisor of planning the Bay of Pigs, bitterly told the board of inquiry, "As long as decisions by professionals can be set aside by people who know not of what they speak, you won't succeed."

20 NARA 104-10162-10233 ~ 06/07/60 CIA Cable. “Objections to FRD.” To: Director. From: JMMASH.

21 “Memorandum of a Conversation with President Eisenhower, June 10, 1960.” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Volume VI: Cuba. Page 945.
>> Other participants Herter, Persons, Dillon; and Goodpaster who prepared the memo.

Mr. Herter next mentioned that William Pawley has been working with a rightwing group of Cubans, including former Batista police. [2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] The President asked Mr. Herter to call up Mr. Pawley and tell him to get out of this operation, [less than 1 line not declassified].

22 CIA History of Bay of Pigs. Page 258

23 Hunt, E. Howard, Give Us This Day (Arlington Press, 1973). Pages 23, 77, and 85.

Hunt, E. Howard, Under-cover: Memoirs of an American Agent (Berkley Publishing Corporation, 1974). Pages 97.

24 NARA 104-10119-10317 ~ 8/30/1971 “CIA Profile of Everette Howard Hunt Jr.” To: AC/CB. From: PES. 

>> Hunt’s background check noted that prior to joining the ECA and CIA he had been a writer for publisher Henry Luce’s Time, Incorporated and then member of the Office of Strategic Services in the Far East.

25 CIA History of Bay of Pigs. Page 259

26 7/2/1960 Message. To: Director. From: [REDACTED] WH7. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 233of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

7/01/1960 Cable re Obvious reference to William Pawley of Miami. Subjects : Pawley, W. From [None]. To: [CIA] Director.

7/02/1960 Cable – Police investigating activities of Pawley. Subjects: Pawley, William. From [None]. To [CIA] Director.

27 7/13/1960 Cable Message. To: Director. From [REDACTED], Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Pages 231 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

7/13/1960 Cable “re Cuban contact.” To: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley, W.

7/14/1960 Cable “Disenchanted Castro helicopter pilot.” To: [CIA] Director. Subjects: Pawley. 28 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 263-265.

29 CIA History of the Bay of Pigs. Pages 263-265.

NARA 104-10310-10036 ~ 10/14/1966 Memorandum “Subject: Mario Garcia Kohly.”
Kohly died in August 1975.

30 NARA 157-10007-10302 ~ 7/21/1960 Memorandum for the Record “Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 21 July 1960; Re: Cuba—Sabotage; Includes ‘Gordon Gray: Short Summary.’” Present: Merchant; Irwin; Lansdale; Gray; Dulles.

31 CIA Bay of Pigs History. Page 102.

32 NARA 104-10160-10194 ~ “Contact Report of Meeting with QDDALE from Wallace D. Parrlett.” To: Chief QHD (probably a typo of WHD). From Chief of Base, JMASH, Wilma B. Goudeaux.

34 8/4/1960 Cable Message to Director. From [REDACTED]. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 227 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

8/03/1960 Memo “Contact with Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley.

8/04/1960 Cable “Pawley’s effort to Contact Pepin Rivero. Subjects: Pepin Rivero.” To [CIA] Director.

11/7/1960 Memorandum. For: Fabio. From Alligator. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 116 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

>> Media was important to the propaganda function and another paper was mentioned.

The newspaper Contrarevolucion will come out on Friday or Saturday, 4 or 5 November 1960. We will send you a copy.

The following groups have been united by Dr. Tito—BOAC, MIR, Accion Cubana, and MAR. All of these groups are in favor of the Doctor Juan A. Rubio Padilla as Provisional President. In addition, the past has been signed by all except two of the group leaders (MRR and BOAC) who were arrested.

[The above message is from Alligator.]

NARA 104-10265-10310 ~ 9/15/2009 “QDDALE Notes Contained with Letter Dated 15 September 1960.” Subjects: Fabio, Alligator

Letter to Fabio dated 11 September signed Alligator

...[our branches] now extend from Habana...to other important cities in the interior...cattlemen, merchants, ranchers...who in turn reach soldiers and members of the old army, foreman and employees etc.

33 NARA 104-10160-10195 ~ Memorandum For The Record “Subject: Contact Of Wallace D. Parlett with QDDALE, at the offices of the latter in Miami, 3 August 1960.”

>> The same QDDALE note also contains a statement: “...there is an officer of experience who is willing to go to Cuba at any time to organize within the country a group of men under him...providing he can get the following materials [a list of weapons].

35 I.T.T. Sees No '60 Loss in Cuban Phone Seizure, The New York Times, August 12, 1960, Business Financial, Page 23

36 NARA 104-10240-10199 ~ 9/8/1960 Priority Message. To Director. From JMASH

NARA 104-10061-10115 “List of Names Re Kennedy Assassination Investigation.”
>> AMWAIL-1 was Justo Carillo Hernandez, a founding member of the Frente Civico Revolucionario (FRD), forerunner of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) which bore the cryptonym AMBUD.

37 NARA 104-10260-10104 ~ 6/15/1961 Cable “Subject: Cable: AMBUD-1 Complaints Against AMOT-2 Come As Surprise.” To: Bell. From: JMWAVE. 

38 David Cannon's conversation with Maria Elena Barker 1983 at a nightclub in New York City. She was a guest of the head of entertainment promotion of the Playboy Club in Vernon, NJ, Jack Prather. Prather had hired me to videotape singer Fred Battle who had just signed with Prather to be his agent.