28: Cuba Cacophony: Northwoods, Mongoose, JMWAVE and DRE
Nearly a year after the Bay of Pigs disaster, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara received a memo from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Lyman Lemnitzer (pictured left of JFK next to General Curtis LeMay) on the topic of “Justification for U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba (TS).”
The justification memo also noted that the project should be undertaken “in the event that current covert efforts to foster an Internal Cuban rebellion are unsuccessful” and “a credible internal revolt is impossible of attainment during the next 9-10 months ... It is understood that the Department of State also is preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba.”
The JCS members who put their names to it in addition to Lemnitzer were (to the right of JFK) General George Henry Decker (Chief of Staff, U.S. Army); Admiral George Whelan Anderson Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations); and General David Monroe Shoup (Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps).
General Curtis Emerson LeMay (Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force) would become as vociferous a hawk on the issue of Cuba as Pawley, and in October President Kennedy would replace Lemnitzer with General Maxwell Taylor.1
William Bamford, an expert on the National Security Agency who revealed the document in his 2001 book Body of Secrets, stated that Operation Northwoods “may be the most corrupt plan ever created by the U.S. government.” What’s more amazing is that the proposal was made three weeks after Robert Kennedy had told Air Force General Edward G. Lansdale, the Pentagon’s Deputy Director of the Office of Special Operations (OSO), to focus on intelligence gathering instead of proposing wildly outrageous schemes for Operation Mongoose, which was originally developed by the JCS and Lansdale to foment a revolt within Cuba to overthrow Castro.
On April 11, 1962, General Lansdale provided a report on the “Status of Operation Mongoose” at week four of the 19-week Phase 1. “Our Center in Miami processed 1,309 refugees last week ... McCone can provide details” of “debriefing visitors to Cuba, at a number of free world ports.”
Landsdale further reported “the more dramatic sector, the infiltration of teams into Cuba, CIA reports one team in place, a second team on the way, and two more ready next week ... this is only one sector of the collection effort inside Cuba.” Landsdale’s update also advised the “list of pretext or provocations which might be grounds for intervention has been prepared. Defense assets for psychological operations are being developed in detail.” These aggressive activities were occurring at the same time “State reports that the Cuban government was made aware that a deal for prisoners could be made through the Italian UN mission.”2
When Bundy, Johnson, Nitze, Lemnitzer, Landsdale, Carter, Donald Wilson and Robert Kennedy met as the Special Group on September 14, 1962, they “approved in principle General Lansdale’s paper of 31 August, with the amendments that had been agreed upon ... Bundy “made it clear that this did not constitute blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis.”3
When it looked as if that would never happen, Lansdale began proposing ways to make Castro’s beard fall out so he would lose his charisma or poison him. According to Bamford, the Joint Chiefs and Lansdale had even explored the concept of shooting down John Glenn’s rocket as it took off from Cape Canaveral in February 1962 and blaming it on Castro. But Castro would not be blamed for such an inflammatory action until November 22, 1963, when it was asserted by the DRE (cryptonym AMSPELL) and those around Pawley that Lee Harvey Oswald was pro- Castro.4
While concepts for Northwoods were being considered, Sheffield Edwards, CIA Director of the Office of Security, was also overseeing Castro assassination plots using the Mafia. During this time, he wrote on March 16, 1962 a memorandum to the agency’s Deputy Director regarding William Douglas Pawley. The memo spanned the time from his birth through Pawley’s engagement “in extensive business activities in the Far East, particularly China and India” and his membership on “the Doolittle Committee which conducted a survey of CIA.”
Sheffield Edwards then noted that Pawley in 1952 had been “approved for contact by CIA as a potential source of foreign intelligence information. A Covert Security Approval was also granted in October 1959 to enable the use of the Subject by WH [Western Hemisphere] Division in connection with his extensive contacts with individuals of Latin American countries.”
Edwards noted that as recently as 1960, Pawley was scrutinized by various national agencies “including the FBI and State Department. Results of these investigations were substantially favorable and contained no derogatory information concerning subject’s loyalty. The only unfavorable information consists of certain allegations regarding sharp dealings and questionable ethics in connection with his private business activities.”5
A memo written about another individual clarifies the role of those with Pawley’s special clearance: “Subjects of Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.”6
Specific to Pawley, “JMWAVE has maintained an operational contact with QDDALE since 28 August 1962 ... JMWAVE has established that QDDALE is a well-informed businessman with excellent connections throughout the Miami business community. As a result, QDDALE has been used as a special contact for the development of certain background data, operational intelligence, and/or the conduct of selected operational support tasks. QDDALE is a special contact and not an agent ... The JMWAVE contact with QDDALE does not preclude his being contacted by KUJUMP or WHD.”7
KUJUMP was the cryptonym during the 1960s for the CIA’s Domestic Contact Division, which was also known as the Domestic Contact Service and as the Office of Operations (OO). It “was responsible for soliciting domestic sources for foreign intelligence information.”8
On May 1, 1962, Pawley attended the Eisenhower Memorial Library dedication along with numerous other dignitaries and supporters, who rode into Abilene, Kansas aboard a special train with Ike and Mamie.9
A significant change occurred in September 1962 at JMWAVE after “AMSPELL attracted world attention and concern when, in an independent action, they shelled Havana. It was an agit/prop operation calculated to impress upon the U.S. and Latin America the reality of Soviet fortification of Cuba.”
The report from the Chief of Station at JMWAVE to William Harvey at Task Force W examined the DRE-CIA relationship and the direction ODYOKE (U.S. Government] was taking with regard to PBPRUMEN (Cuba). Shackley’s report noted that the CIA provided $50,053 in August to support DRE efforts under AMSPELL (DRE general activities related to undermining Castro), AMBARB (propaganda in Latin American universities) and AMHINT (paramilitary activities). The report summed “up the JMWAVE-AMSPELL control relationship, there is no panacea ... there is not JMWAVE control because of conflict between AMSPELL objectives (PBPRUMEN liberation soonest) and continued ODYOKE lack of PBPRUMEN (Cuba) policy.”
In September 1962, DRE salaries were as high as $275 a month for Secretary General Luis Fernandez Rocha and Secretary of Propaganda Jose M. Lasa--the equivalent of $2,720.00 monthly in 2024. At the same time, the DRE expressed disdain for the Kennedy administration. "AMSPELL feels that ODYOKE policy on PBRUMEN cannot be influenced by the rising tide of public opinion and congressional action, partly because GPIDEAL (President Kennedy) is surrounded by a group of advisors who are 'one step from being parlor pinks or worse.' The list began with Chester Bowles." Bowles believed financial aid was more powerful than military combat in winning hearts and minds.
Ted Shackley at JMWAVE frequently butted heads with Rocky Farnsworth who headed covert operations and resented Shackley’s lack of covert experience. When Farnsworth threatened to quit if Shackley didn’t stop micromanaging the paramilitary operations, Shackley sent him packing and put hardline anti-communist David Morales in his place. Morales, like Pawley and E. Howard Hunt, was a veteran of the Guatemala coup.10
Morales (aka Stanley R. Zamka) using the name “‘Dr. Meza’” met regularly on paramilitary operations with DRE’s Juan Manuel Salvat Roque (AMHINT-2) or his associate Bernabe Pena. “Zamka has also met with Jose Maria Lasa U[rrutibeascoa] upon occasion concerning Lasa’s direct liaison with Headquarters through Fletcher Y. Knight [CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Helms].” CIA’s “Harold R. Noemayr [Ross Crozier] as ‘Roger Fox’ meets: Pedro Ynterian Garcia as regular PW operational Coordinator. AMHINT-2 as regular overall AMSPELL control. A still secret CIA contact known by the pseudonym Robert Q. Nelander (aka Jesse Davega) met with AMBARB’s DRE students for infiltrating universities.11
On December 4, 1962, Nelander introduced Walter D. Newby (George E. Joannides) to AMHINT-53 (Luis Fernandez-Rocha, DRE’s Secretary General) as the new CIA representative handling DRE affairs.12 Fernandez-Rocha [AMHINT 53], who was receiving CIA funding, on November 22,1963 would identify Oswald as a Marxist who had debated an AMSPELL member in New Orleans.13
In Pawley’s autobiography, he writes that his Miami-based team and an “efficient underground” network helped unearth a crisis of nuclear proportions that would grab more press attention than Wieland’s role at the State Department. “As the months passed, we began to receive circumstantial and disturbing reports which convinced us that missile bases were indeed being built in Cuba by the Soviets. We duly passed on our findings in Washington, where our information, some of it garnered at the risk of men’s lives, was given the brush.”
Pawley once again found President Kennedy as his nemesis. He drew “the conclusion that Kennedy did in fact know about the Soviet missiles and was waiting for a politically opportune moment to announce his discovery.” It took place on October 22, 1962, “just two weeks before the Congressional elections on November 6th. The Democrats, and the Administration, won.”14
Most Americans were not aware of Pawley’s role in the revelation. They instead read that American spy planes had detected the missiles in October. But Pawley asserts that on “March 24, 1961, as astute an observer of Cuban affairs ‘Pepin’ Bosch [of Bacardi rum] had warned in an open letter, published and paid for by him, in The New York Times, of heavy concrete emplacements in Pinar del Rio which appeared to be missile sites.” Kennedy’s failure to act decisively, once and for all, against the communist threat in Cuba again would eat at Pawley for a decade. He would write that Kennedy “posed as a hero” of the Cuban Missile Crisis while knuckling under to the communists by agreeing to “no on-site inspection.” His network of exiles “since that time have certified that whereas a few missiles were carried away, many were simply dismantled and removed to storage in caves, ready for future use when needed.”15
On the 60th anniversary of the nearly apocalyptic event, the National Security Archive released a collection of declassified documents showing that the Cuban Missile Crisis lasted over four times longer than most Americans were led to believe. “Soviet nuclear warheads arrived in Cuba on October 4, 1962 and did not leave until December 1.” CIA analysts were slow to pick up on the real threat because they had been flooded with thousands of false reports from anti- Castro exiles and agents—"including 211 false reports even before January 1, 1962.”
On September 21st the CIA disseminated a report that “a convoy in Havana with large trucks and long canvas-covered objects the size of medium range ballistic missiles” had been detected nine days earlier. Weeks later, on October 15th, interpreters of U-2 spy plane photography would determine Soviet missiles indeed were present starting the thirteen day “‘October Crisis’” as Castro loyalists called it because JMWAVE and exile groups were constantly plotting to eliminate him.
As the U.S. and Soviet Union stood toe-to-toe on the brink of nuclear war, and Americans focused on stockpiling rations in their basements for post-war consumption in the event Castro used the stockpile of Russian missiles in Cuba, the Director of the CIA learned from JMWAVE that a group of Cuban-exile pilots were being “given additional training to attain proficiency to meet FAA flying standards. This activity was funded using Mr. William Pawley and niece Anita Pawley as sponsors. Program administered by HQs Air Support Branch.”16
On November 8, 1962, at FBI Headquarters, Clyde Tolson, A.H. Belmont, Cartha DeLoach, and Sullivan were made aware that Pawley “has sent a telegram to President Kennedy protesting the Cuban Missile agreement with Soviet Nikita Khrushchev as ‘a devastating blow’ to U.S. prestige.” He “urged Kennedy to nullify the agreement with Khrushchev and work with other hemisphere governments to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime.” Pawley viewed the agreement as a Cold War setback because “‘Cuba will continue to be a Communist base and will permit the subversion of other Latin American countries to communism.’” As a former envoy to two Latin American countries, Pawley warned JFK, “‘The Alliance for Progress program will be destroyed as well as the Organization of American States.’” Dealing with Khrushchev on Cuba was the equivalent of “abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty and accepting the Khrushchev Doctrine in exchange for violation of the various treaties entered into by the United States.’”
Pawley wasn’t satisfied with venting to the President, he “read the text of his telegram on the NBC [national radio] program, ‘Three Star Extra,’ with commentator Ray Henle.” Calling “‘for the overthrow of the Castro regime in Cuba,’” Pawley predicted that $4 billion in business investments would return to Latin America once Castro is gone. “‘I pray that you will not dissipate this partial victory and will go forward in carrying out your promise that a communist base would not be permitted to remain in this hemisphere.’”17
Another teletype the same day carried additional criticism for the young President by Pawley who implored him not to rely “on aerial photographs to determine if Russia is dismantling its Cuban Missile bases.” Pawley raised the specter of what happens at night and all the places in Cuba where arms can be stashed away. He also “did not consider the International Red Cross competent to supervise the dismantling of Russian missile aimed at the U.S.”18
If America’s military-intelligence strategists had known that over 40,000 Soviet troops— not 16,000 as they believed—were in Cuba, they may have felt the potential threat was justification enough to attack.19
As the deal between Kennedy and Krushchev was being completed, Pawley’s friend from the days of the Bogotázo when he was working with the Secretary of State, CIA Deputy Director Marshall S. “Pat” Carter, reminded the Kennedy-appointed CIA Director John McCone that he believed any U.S. action against Cuba “must surely be the total destruction of the Castro regime and the installation of a government in Cuba favorable to Western ideology.” Carter further stated that his opinion of the resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis through a deal was not a win for JFK, but “I personally view as a bitter defeat, if in fact the United States gets sucked into establishing a sanctuary in the Western Hemisphere for Castro, for communism, or for the Soviet Union.” Carter contended “we have sold ourselves down the river.”20
On December 6, 1962, a tag team, including Pawley, again slammed the President. The headline above the masthead of Missouri’s Jefferson City Post-Tribune screamed: “Two National Figures Declare Cuban Threat Not Ended; Democratic Sen. Russell, William Pawley Flay ‘Victory’ Theme.”
Georgia’s Senator Russell of the Armed Services Committee “in a separate statement” stated that the United States “‘will eventually have to rid this hemisphere of Castro and all that he stands for.’” Russell favored “‘invading Cuba now, if the Latin American countries would go along with us.’”
Pawley accused the President of having abandoned his own insistence for U.S. inspection of the sites. “Now, with neither inspection nor guarantee, and with only a promise of IL-28 (bombers withdrawal), the administration has abandoned its naval quarantine, is dispersing the military forces it had wisely mobilized in the southeastern United States and is implying that the Cuban questioned is settled,’” Pawley asserted.21
Pawley’s propaganda warfare campaign against President Kennedy also included a “rose colored glasses” letter to The Washington Post that appeared December 12, 1962.22
In his autobiography, Pawley expressed that rather than averting a nuclear holocaust, “Kennedy was guilty of the gross error of agreeing to the dismantlement of all American Intermediate range missiles in England, Greece and Turkey, on the ostensible grounds that they were ‘obsolescent,’ which General Curtis E. LeMay, who commanded those forces has stated was false; they had just become operational.”
In 2022, on the 60th anniversary of the missile crisis, JFK’s political considerations became clear. The National Security Archive at George Washington University’s released the transcript of the secretly recorded telephone call between Kennedy and former President Eisenhower. “‘The true resolution of the missile crisis was for years kept secret in one of the most consequential cover-ups in the history of U.S. foreign policy,’ observed Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive’s Cuba Documentation Project.” To avoid appearing to voters as if he had weakened the U.S., JFK on October 28, 1962 “falsely tells Eisenhower that ‘we couldn’t get into that deal’ on the Turkish missiles.” He doubled down on the lie by telling former President Truman “‘we rejected’ trading the Jupiter missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba.”23
Pawley’s manuscript notes that Kennedy pledged “that America would never permit an invasion of Communist Cuba from this country or from any Latin country ... While continuing to speak with characteristic eloquence about the defense of freedom, Kennedy was engaged in the demolition of the Monroe Doctrine and of the intricate collective security arrangements so carefully pieced together [by Pawley, General George C. Marshall and others] at the Rio, Bogotá and other Western Hemispheric conferences.”
On December 20, 1962 Dr. George S. Benson, a columnist and President of the National Education Program, Searcy, Arkansas, asked in his Looking Ahead column, “Did Khrushchev Win Cuba?” Benson called for an end to President Kennedy’s “backpedaling and concessions” and a “no-win policy” and urged taking action such as that proposed by Pawley. “His suggestion was that Russian statements made in New York early in November by their Mr. Mikoyan supporting Castro's demand for withdrawal from Guantanamo has already justified cancellation of any implied agreement with the Soviets regarding Cuba.”
Dr. Benson, who had been a missionary in China in the 1930s, concluded that Kennedy and his advisors deserted “the Cuban Patriots at the Bay of Pigs.” Benson wanted “leadership that will not bring us to defeat through disastrous policy recommendations; we need men who understand what the Cold War is all about and who will not fear to place America on the line against Communist aggression.”24
Three days after the critical article, and two months after JFK’s resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, a plane containing the first group of freed Cuban Brigade prisoners landed in the U.S.—some 20 months after being captured at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion had turned into a windfall for Castro who received $53 million worth of baby food and drugs for his compatriots.25
As the three billion people in the world mentally came to grips with the fact that a nuclear war had almost been triggered because Castro had gained control of an island with a population of just 7 million Cubans, the CIA’s Richard Helms met on November 13, 1962 in his office with the DRE’s team of Luis Fernandez Rocha, Jose Maria Lasa, and Nestor Sanchez (aka Nicholas Sylva) to discuss the agency’s future relationship with the Cuban exile students organization.
Helms “realized there have been ups and downs in the relationship and that the Agency was not lily white in abiding by many of the commitments, but that many of the changes were due to factors beyond the agency’s control.”26
Helms had a pivotal role at the CIA, discussing directly with Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy Operation Mongoose anti-Castro raids. He was not only involved in General Lansdale’s run Operation Mongoose but also in discussions with Task Force W’s William Harvey (who despised the Kennedys) about the CIA’s Castro poisoning project involving Robert Maheu and Mafia members Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli.27
Recognizing that the negotiating decisions regarding removal of the Soviet missiles and bombers would “not be acceptable to the DRE,” Helms wanted to make it clear that “‘the DRE should be frank and honest’” with the CIA about their intentions rather than develop their own secret plans. Helms “wanted to develop the relationship ‘as a reasonable collaboration.’” Moreover, “Helms informed Rocha he was changing the Agency contact for DRE in Miami” to an officer who “would be able to come to Mr. Helms for any clarification” of matters. Helms let the DRE members know that the new U.S. policy of “co-existence” might be at odds with the DRE’s “duty to their country” in overthrowing Castro.
Rocha “stated that 80 to 90 per cent of their activity would cease if Agency funds were discontinued. This would be suicide” which Rocha considered unacceptable. As for contact with DRE, Rocha wanted it to be to himself, “and in his absence either Manuel Salvat or Jose Lasa.” Rocha made it clear that as heads of the DRE, he and Salvat were not available for dangerous Cuba infiltration missions and Rocha “did not feel he could send his men to their death on such a vaguely defined mission” but expressed that “they were free to go if they desired to go on their own.”
Helms offered to expedite TV coverage for the DRE messages, admitted to not reading the DRE’s weekly newsletter (The Cuban Report) and learned from Rocha that the newsletter was where Senator Keating was obtaining his data. Helms indicated a willingness to share the CIA’s developing strategy toward Cuba, but “reiterated that regarding this type of information they must keep ‘zipped up.’ According to Mr. Helms the way things get around in the Cuban exile community was, needless to say, a matter of some concern to him.”
Helms implored Rocha to keep the Agency informed of DRE plans and warned Rocha that “he did not want the DRE running end runs on their [new Miami station] contact ... Rocha understood.”28 The new contact was George Joannides (aka Walter D. Newby).29 Sixty years later, the CIA continued to fight reporter/author/podcaster Jefferson Morley’s request for the release of 44 Joannides documents.
Coincidentally, during 1962 when DRE was getting Joannides as its new CIA Miami contact, a change occurred for Pawley which came to light in a 1998 memo regarding “Status of Outstanding JFK Issues” which addressed topics regarding JFK assassination document declassification. The question raised: “Why did the [CIA’s] Pawley 201 file abruptly stop in 1962?” The answer given by the Chief, Information Staff: “There is an associated OPS file that contains the continuing information. The record system design was based upon the notion that operational activity would be recorded in files separate from 201. Many officers over the years have included the operational information in the 201 to simplify their record-keeping. When the next officer is assigned the case may return to using the OPS file. It is common to find 201 files that have the same situation.” Thus, one can wonder if the new DRE contact was also taking over contact with Pawley.30
On December 29, 1962, President Kennedy, who would never again meet with Pawley, met with the Cuban exiles whose freedom Pawley had helped ransom. Pawley lamented that the “leaders gave Kennedy their Brigade flag at a ceremony in the Orange Bowl” and Kennedy promised to return it to them in Cuba. But the situation did not change; not in the President’s lifetime, nor Pawley’s, who bitterly wrote a decade later about Kennedy’s promises, “Hopeful Cuban exiles interpreted this rhetoric, literally, as a pledge of liberation by the United States.”31
Enrique Llaca, director of the Cuban Families Committee who had announced Pawley’s ransom of Nestor Fitzgerald Williams, shared Pawley’s cynicism. He “charged that Manuel Artime and Miro Cardona are using the Brigade for their personal benefit.” And the “visit to Miami was for the good of President Kennedy’s internal policy in the United States, and for the personal advantage of Cuban politicians.” He declared “that Brigade members were degraded by being given $250 Christmas bonus” which he asserted “came from the Miami Beach home of Miro Cardona.” Llaca was not alone in his distain, “about 100 members of the Brigade protested President Kennedy’s visit by refusing to attend the Orange Bowl reception.”
According to an unnamed informant, the second in command of the Brigade 2506, Erneido Oliva, saw a dim future. He “‘said the members of the Brigade will be released from military duty, will try to find a solution to the Cuban situation, and concluded that clandestine organizations in Cuba are minimal and the leaders to help guerilla efforts in Cuba are non- existent.’”32
In January 1963, JFK’s Special Group took “the responsibility of continuing review of the program for infiltration of covert intelligence agents ... although the objective of ‘intensified covert collection’ is approved, nonetheless, CIA should not feel it is under pressure to ‘get good men killed’ in the process.” Attorney General Robert Kennedy expressed his desire to have “key members of the Brigade ... brought into planning and current operations.” Continuing “use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this time.”33
On February 10th, the U.S. prodded the Soviet Union to remove its combat troops from Cuba. The Russians immediately responded that they were only there on a training mission.34 Nine days later, CIA Director John McCone stated that at least 1,000 to 1,500 persons from Latin American countries went to Cuba in 1962 to receive training in guerrilla warfare and subversion and more are in training this year.35
Nine days later, Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona requested a new blockade of Cuba and other Congressmen, both Democratic and Republican, criticized the JFK Administration's softening Cuban policy. That evening President Kennedy called for an extraordinary meeting with congressional leaders of both parties.36
The New York Times on February 20, 1963, reported that President Kennedy received a promise from Moscow that the Soviet troops would be out of Cuba by mid-March. The article also mentioned that JFK had welcomed President Romulo Betancourt of Venezuela, a man Pawley had once described as “one of the most dangerous men in this hemisphere.”37 Unlike Pawley, Kennedy hailed Betancourt “as the symbol of democracy.” Betancourt appeared now to be more friend than enemy, encouraging the U.S. to limit Cuba’s attempts to export subversion to other countries. Separately the U.S. and Soviet Union planned talks on banning nuclear weapons and non-aggression agreements.38
On February 22nd it was reported that a MIG fighter out of Cuba launched a rocket near a shrimp boat, and in response, President Kennedy issued a warning not to do it again. The Soviets in return cautioned the President not to start a world war.39
During the month, Pawley traveled to Johannesburg, South Africa. While there he wrote to Generalissimo Francisco Franco at his palace in Madrid, Spain reminding the dictator of their earlier negotiations regarding military bases and calling to his attention the fact that “Mrs. Pawley and I are looking forward to visiting Spain later this winter.” In case Franco forgot the courtesies he afforded Pawleys, the letter continued that in 1948 “your car came to the hotel for me in the late afternoon and took me to your residence. The purpose of my visit was to ascertain from you if you would consider the idea of the United States establishing army, navy and air force bases in Spain.”
Pawley continued his recap, noting Franco “agreed to the establishment of military bases and said that if the railroads and highways were to be used for military purposes, the U.S. would have to finance their reconstruction. I was deeply gratified that your only request was [that the U.S. use its influence to get the U.N.] to rescind the resolution of 1946 (I believe a Polish resolution) declaring Spain to be an ‘enemy of world Peace’ and withdrawing diplomatic representation to Spain.”
Pawley apologized to Franco for not being able “to communicate with you upon my return to Paris” because General Marshall believed Governor Dewey would defeat Truman in the upcoming election and “suggested that I meet with him and John Foster Dulles (a member of our delegation and the probable Secretary of State if Dewey were elected) to brief them on my conversations with you.” After Truman won, “I have seen you only once since 1948 and that was on my way to India on Special Assignment for the Department of State in 1951.” His visit was authorized by Secretary of State Acheson “and Ambassador [Stanton] Griffis and I met with you.40
In the Spring of 1963, the FBI interviewed Pawley about his relationship with William Haydon Burns, the conservative Democratic, segregationist Mayor of Jacksonville who would soon be elected Florida Governor. “Pawley states he met Burns socially before but knows nothing of his activities.”41
Three weeks after Pawley’s letter to Franco, former President Harry S. Truman, wrote that the U.S. must find a way to liberate Cuba.42 Then in early March, Secretary of Defense McNamara indicated that the United States would not tolerate the use of Soviet troops to put down an insurgency in Cuba. Shortly thereafter Cuba complained to United Nations Secretary General U Thant that the U.S. was planning an attack on Cuba that would bring about a thermo- nuclear war engulfing the planet.43
On March 4, “Inside Labor” columnist Victor Riesel reported that former Vice President Richard Nixon had conferred with New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller at brother Laurence Rockefeller’s Fifth Avenue apartment about the upcoming Republican campaign to recapture the White House from President Kennedy. Nixon believed Kennedy could be defeated in the 1964 election based on issues of the economy and foreign policy—especially Cuba which Nixon favored blockading.44
Adding to the Cuban cacophony was Senator Kenneth Keating who praised the accuracy of the information produced by U.S. intelligence agencies while criticizing the Administration’s policy makers for not believing it. It was soon reported that back in October the missiles in Cuba had gone undetected for three weeks because the U.S. U-2 spy planes photographed the wrong end of the island, although ground-based intelligence reports (which may have been produced by Pawley’s contacts) had indicated the location of the missiles.45
As Kennedy’s critics became more vociferous,46 a medium-size Soviet ship sailed from Havana with several hundred “technicians” believed to be aboard, a sign that the island was becoming less of a danger to U.S. security.47
Fourteen years after warning President Truman not to get in a ground war in Asia, Pawley witnessed President Kennedy do exactly that—committing ground troops in March 1963 for combat in Viet Nam, where the French were failing to maintain stability after 80 years of control. In his autobiography, Pawley noted that the young President was willing to engage the enemy half-a-world away, but not shed a drop of American blood in Cuba, just 90 miles from US shores.48
But in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba and the United States were moving to prevent Caribbean incidents from getting out of control as almost occurred when shots were fired by two of Castro’s MIG fighter planes at a U.S. merchant ship in international waters. Castro apologized. “Simultaneously, the Kennedy Administration worked out a plan to dissuade and, if necessary, to prevent Cuban exiles from attacking Soviet and other shipping in open Caribbean waters.” The U.S. also restricted prominent Cuban exile leaders to Dade County, Florida.49
During the following week both the British and U.S. stopped armed exiles at sea.50 The clampdown made many of the refugee leaders and their followers angry and “determined to continue the attacks.”51
On April 5, 1963, nearly two years after the Bay of Pigs invasion, JMWAVE Station Chief Theodore Shackley was recommending that the AMTRUNK operation “be terminated at the earliest possible moment.” AMTRUNK was an interagency plan to promote military revolution within Cuba against Castro originally known as “Operation Leonardo.” It was developed in early 1963 by George Volsky of the United States Information Agency, Cuban exile Nestor Moreno, Tad Szulc of The New York Times who had access to the White House and Robert Hurwitch, the State Department Cuban Coordinator.52
JMWAVE’s team, comprised of many of the same CIA agents who had worked a decade earlier on the overthrow of Arbenz in Guatemala, had just witnessed another coup in that country; an anti-Communist military government had taken the reins of power from President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes who left for Nicaragua.53
President Kennedy offered some hopeful news to Americans in early April. He reported that about 4,000 Soviet troops left Cuba during the previous month for a total of 9,000 since the Cuban Missile Crisis—and that thousands more were expected to be withdrawn. Within days, there was also good news on the hostage front, as ten Americans who had been held in Cuba arrived back in the U.S.A. But counterbalancing this news was a report in the April 13th New York Times that communist Cuban agents were infiltrating the U.S.54
In mid-April JFK was also confronted a number of non-Cuban concerns: rising steel prices; Iraq’s rebuff of the Kurd demand for autonomy; President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam’s qualified offer of clemency for Communist guerrillas who were willing to disarm; the clubbing of Civil Rights protestors in Alabama; and the recommendations of the Civil Rights Commission to cut off Federal funds to Senator Eastland’s Mississippi if the State continued to subvert the Constitution by not complying with the order to integrate schools.55 But Cuba was always on the front burner.
As the second anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion arrived, the Kennedy Administration considered cutting off $2,000,000 in annual subsidies to the Cuban Revolutionary Council in Miami. A few days later, Attorney General Robert Kennedy urged the exiles to unite in a single organization56 while President Kennedy was denying that his Administration had ever pledged to mount another invasion of Cuba.
At the same time, some intelligence experts were questioning the President’s figures on Soviet troop strength in Cuba, claiming the number had changed little since last autumn’s 30,000 to 40,000 number. This gave credence to Senator Keating’s assertion that the Soviets were deceptively doing troop rotation, not withdrawal.57
On April 22, 1963, James B. Donovan announced he had secured the release of the last group of 21 Americans imprisoned in Cuba and they were expected to arrive in Miami that day. Included were three CIA agents.58
Following the final release, Cuban Premier Castro traveled to the Soviet Union for a meeting with Premier Khrushchev.59
On April 30, 1963, CIA-funding the anti-Castro activities of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) was cut off. This action came two weeks after Dr. Miro Cardona, the CRC's figurehead resigned, charging that JFK broke promises to the Cuban exiles in favor of peaceful coexistence with Castro.60 In early May, the CRC deplored the Kennedy administration’s decision to eliminate support.
Others also were not ready to be reined in by the Kennedys as exemplified by a declassified CIA dispatch titled “Agreement of Frank Fiorini to Participate in Air Strike on Cuba” (which is missing pages). “On 2 May 1963 Frank Fiorini [Frank Sturgis] said that Marcos Diaz Lanz approached him to patch up differences between Fiorini and Diaz’ brother, Pedro Diaz Lanz, and to enlist Fiorini’s cooperation in anti-Castro activity. Marcos said that he received a telegram from Pedro in Washington on 1 May which said financial assistance had been received, and which instructed Marcos to approach Fiorini. Marcos supposes that money was received from a Cuban in Washington who had supported the Diaz brothers in the past.”61
A follow-up document has a source comment. “This operation has no connection with the air strike being planned by Jose “Pepin” Bosch, head of Bacardi Rum Company.” A field comment in the same document indicates that Bosch felt that Lauereano Batista Palla of the Christian Democratic Movement and Alex Rorke “had stolen his thunder in their strike on Cuba, and that now Bosch’s only hope of raising money was from Batistiano channels.”62
Bacardi rum and Cuban freedom had been linked since the days of the Spanish-American War when in 1898 it was a key ingredient in. the “Cuba Libre” drink invented in Tampa where Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders cavalry was staging its invasion of Cuba to liberate it from Spain. The troops had just arrived there from Jacksonville, where my mother’s father contracted malaria and was too weak to continue on to Cuba where Pawley was a toddler at Guantanamo Bay when that U.S. invasion succeeded.
The effectiveness of the CIA was questioned on September 11, 1963, when high-ranking FBI official D.J. Brennan sent a document to one of the Sullivans in the Bureau to prepare FBI Director Hoover for a meeting with CIA Director John McCone. The document starts with a harsh overview. “To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences.” Brennan attributes the successes in working together to “several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.” Brennan turned his attention to two fissures. The first was the defection of a Cuban Intelligence Agent. “CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau.” The second event was when “a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the Bureau’s technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country.”
McCone asserted it contained “statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director.” FBI Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont refused to retract it and apologize. “The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.”
Brennan’s September 1963 backgrounder for Director Hoover contained a scathing assessment of the CIA’s head, “McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also ‘the Director of Central Intelligence’ ... we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became director of the agency.”63
FOOTNOTES:
1 3/13/1962 Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense. “Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS).” From: Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which responds to a request of that office for brief but precise description of pretexts which would provide justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case basis.
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be given the primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is recommended that this responsibility for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
[Signed "L.L. Lemnitzer" in cursive.] L.L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS) THE PROBLEM
1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise description of pretexts which they consider would provide justification for U.S. military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political decision which then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of action proposed** by the U.S. Navy relating to generated instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B. DISCUSSION
5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A are based on the premise that U.S. military intervention will result from a period of heightened U.S.-Cuban tensions which place the United States in the position of suffering justifiable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations forum should be favorably affected by developing the international image of the Cuban government as rash and irresponsible, and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the present time it will continue to hold good only as long as there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union ...
___________
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Instances to Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
>>Enclosure A explained the purpose of the pretexts.
Such a plan would enable a logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other countries as well as the United States. The plan would also properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western Hemisphere.
Time is an important factor in resolution of the Cuban problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time- phased that projects would be operable within the next few months.
Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
>> An Annex to Appendix to enclosure A contained the explosive recommendations to be considered for planning purposes.
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provocation as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c, could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence" to stage attack on base. (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cubans).
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. Some damage to installations. (8) capture assault teams approaching from the sea or vicinity of Guantanamo City. (9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires—napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals for mock-victims (may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The U.S. could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by U.S. fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arm which would be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by U..S pilots could provide additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modifying an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could be produced from U.S. resources in about three months.
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. The passengers could be a group of college students off on a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest to support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the international distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he is under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. The transmission will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to "sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft will be dispatched in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba. Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at frequent Intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would resume his proper identity and return to his normal place of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and parts of aircraft found.
>> The individuals on the Joint Chiefs of Staff were at least a decade older than President Kennedy who was born in 1917. Admiral George Whelan Anderson Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations) December 15, 1906—March 20, 1992; General George Henry Decker (Chief of Staff, US Army) February 16, 1902—February 6, 1980; General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer (JCS Chairman) August 29, 1899—November 12, 1988; General Curtis Emerson LeMay (Chief of Staff, US Air Force) November 15, 1906—October 1, 1990; General David Monroe Shoup (Commandant, US Marine Corps) December 30, 1904—January 13, 1983].
Lyman L. Lemnitzer, General United States Army, Arlington National Cemetery Website, http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/lemnitz.htm
Lemnitzer served as a Brigadier General under General Eisenhower in North Africa and Italy during World War II. He helped negotiate the surrender of Italy and Germany. After stints with the Joint Chief of Staff and the National War College, he learned how to parachute at age 51 and took command of airborne and infantry divisions during the Korean conflict. Lemnitzer was promoted to the rank of General and named Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East and of the 8th Army in March 1955. He was appointed as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September 1960. He testified before the Senate on the dismissal of Major General Edwin Walker who had been dismissed for promoting racism in the military. In 1975 he was appointed by President Gerald Ford to a blue-ribbon panel, the Rockefeller Commission, to investigate domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
“U.S. Military Wanted to Provoke War With Cuba—Book: U.S. Military Drafted Plans to Terrorize U.S. Cities to Provoke War With Cuba.” ABC News.
2 NARA 202-10001-10179 ~ 4/11/1962 OSD “Status of Operation Mongoose.” Prepared by: Brig. General Landsdale, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
3 NARA 178-10004-10259 ~ 9/14/1962 NSC “Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented), 14 Sept. 1962.” To: Record: From: Parrott, Thomas A.
4 4/30/2001 News release. “Pentagon Proposed Pretexts for Cuba Invasion.”
www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20010430
>> Attachment: https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20010430/northwoods.pdf
Bamford, William Bamford, Body of Secrets Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency From The Cold War through the Dawn of a New Century (Doubleday, New York). Pages 78-85.
At this point, nearly a year after the Bay of Pigs disaster, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara received a memo from Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the subject: “Justification for US Military Intervention in Cuba (TS).”
5 3/16/1962 CIA Memorandum. To: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. From Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security. Notation on sheet: Seen by DDP.
>> Combined from two versions of this declassified document which describes William Douglas Pawley.
- The following is a brief summary of pertinent information contained in Office of Security files concerning the subject. He was born in 1896 ... engaged in extensive business activities in the Far East, particularly China and India ... In approximately 1954, he was a member of the Doolittle Committee which conducted a survey of CIA.
-
In 1952 the Subject was approved for contact by CIA as a potential source of foreign intelligence information. A Covert Security Approval was also granted in October 1959 to enable the use of the Subject by WH Division in connection with his extensive contacts with individuals of Latin American countries.
-
Investigation of the Subject has consisted of a check of other National Agencies the most recent of which was conducted in 1960 ... including the FBI and State Department. Results of these investigations were substantially favorable and contained no derogatory information concerning subject’s loyalty. The only unfavorable information consists of certain allegations regarding sharp dealings and questionable ethics in connection with his private business activities.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “Pawley, William Douglas. (Bio).” Subjects: Pawley, William. To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “Pawley, William D. - Summary of pertinent info contained in OS files.” Subjects: OS files; Pawley, William. To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield, D/Security.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “Pawley, William Douglas - Summary of pertinent info contained in OS files.” Subjects: OS files. To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield, D/Security.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “William Douglas Pawley, A brief Summary of pertinent information contained in Office of Security files.” Subjects: Pawley, Wm; Doolittle Comm. From: S. Edwards, Dir of Security. To: Deputy Director of CIA.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “William Douglas Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley, William. To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield, Director of Security.
3/16/1962 Memorandum “re Pertinent info on William Douglas Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley, William; Doolittle Committee.” To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield, D/OS.
3/16/1962 Memorandum - Subject: William Douglas Pawley. Subjects: Pawley, William. To: Dep Dir of CIA. From: Dir of Security.
3/16/1962 “Summary of pertinent info contained in Office of Security on William Pawley.” Subjects: Pawley, William. To: DDCI. From: Edwards, Sheffield, D/OS.
6 1/26/1962 Memorandum “Subject: Freers, Edward Louis.” To: Chief, DPD-DD/P, Security Officer. From: Victor White, Deputy Director of Security (IOS).
-
“Request is made to your request for a Covert Security Clearance to allow Subject’s use under Project ROCK/IDEALIST/III/ (handwritten DEPT. OF STATE) ... In view of their [5] prior interests in the subject, you may wish to coordinate with the above components.”
-
This is to advise that a Covert Security Clearance is granted to use the Subject...
-
“...use under Project ROCK only...”
-
“Subjects of Covert Security Clearances are not to represent themselves as, nor are they to be represented as, employees of CIA.”
On 9/20/1956 John C. [Rich illegible] Chief, Security Officer, International Organization Division, wrote a memo noting that Cord Meyer, Stanley Richardson and [? Nelton] liaise with Freers along with 10 others.
7 NARA104-10122-10071 ~ “Title: Status of QDDALE Clearance 2/12/1964.” From: [CIA] COS, JMWAVE.
8 KUJUMP. Cryptonym Project. Mary Ferrell Foundation website: maryferrell.org
9 Ike Library Dedication To Draw A Big Crowd, Many Dignitaries Arriving Tonight, Salina Journal, April 30, 1962
10 NARA 104-10171-10041 ~ 10/9/1962 “AMSPELL Progress Report for 1962.” To: Chief, Task Force W. From: Chief of Station, JMWAVE.
David Corn, Blonde Ghost (Simon & Shuster: October 13, 1994)
11 NARA 104-10171-10041 ~ 10/9/1962 “AMSPELL Progress Report for 1962.” To: Chief, Task Force W. From: Chief of Station, JMWAVE.
>> With regard to DRE paramilitary activities, JMWAVE had “Stanley R. Zamka [David Morales] as ‘Dr. Meza’ meet AMHINT-2 [Juan Manuel Salvat Roque] for regular PM operational purposes. Bercabe Pena as his alternate. Zamka has also met with Jose Maria Lasa upon occasion concerning Lasa’s direct liaison with Headquarters through Fletcher Y. Knight [Richard Helms].”
For AMBARBS, “Robert Q. Nedlander as ‘Jesse Davega’ meets: AMBARB-84 as regular operational contact. AMBARB-16” and “AMBARB-53 as occasional/admin contact.” Emergency contacts for AMBARB were AMHINT-2 and Pedro Ynterian Garcia.
For AMSPELL, “Harold R. Noemayr [Ross Crozier] as ‘Roger Fox’ meets: Pedro Ynterian Garcia as regular PW operational Coordinator. AMHINT-2 as regular overall AMSPELL control. AMHINT-49 Radop [radio operator] for processing CEDAR team. AMHINT-52 Radop for processing DAMSON team. AMHINT-30 during processing AMHINT maritime. AMBARB-54 occasional legal/international.” DRE Radop teams were in Cuba.
JMWAVE Cables, WAVE 8600 -8699. “Typic Yobite AMWORLD Iden Members DRE Mil Section.’ To: Director. From: JMWAVE. Page 19 of 132 Mary Ferrell Foundation website.
>> The military section of the DRE included:
Bernabe Pena
Gilberto Aleman
Francisco Calvet
Carlos Duquense
Juan M. Fiol
Angel M. Fontanils
Carlos Obregon
Arnaldo Santa Cruz
Ernesto Fernandez John Koch
Lazaro Farinas
Juan Salvat [AMHINT-2]
A----- Ruiz
Luis Camps
--- Hernandez Rojo
Isidro ['Chilo'] Borja [AMHINT-5]
12 NARA 104-10170-10016 ~ 12/7/1962 CIA Cable “re Walter D. Newby Introduced as Rep to Handle AMSPELL Affairs.” To: Director. From: JMWAVE. Action: TFW 10.
13 NARA 104-10132-10236 ~ 11/22/1963 CIA Cable “Subjects: Arrest Oswald.” To: Director. From: JMWAVE. 14 Pawley, Russia Is Winning. Page 442.
15 Pawley, Russia Is Winning, Chapter 23.
>> Hidden nuclear missiles would become a rally cry to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq following the terrorist 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. None were found.
16 NARA 1993.08.09.17:07:29:370007. October 21, 1962. Cable Message. From: JMWAVE. To: Director. Unsanitized CIA File of William Pawley. Page 246 of 267. Mary Ferrell Foundation website
10/21/1962 Cable “List cited ref is group Cuban pilots, who being given additional training.” Subjects: Pawley, WM; Pawley, Anita; PBRUMEN pilots. To: Director. From: [CIA] JMWAVE.
10/21/1962 Cable “List cited ref is group Cuban pilots used during.” From: [CIA] JMWAVE. To: Director. Subjects: Pawley, W.
10/21/1962 Cable “Training Cuban pilots.” To: Director. From: [CIA] JMWAVE. Subjects: Pawley, William; Pilots.
10/21/1962 Cable – Additional training for pilots to attain proficiency. To: Director. From: [CIA] JMWAVE. Subjects: Pawley, W.
10/21/1962 Cable “re Additional training of pilots.” To: Director. From: [CIA] JMWAVE. Subjects: Pawley, W.
17 11/8/1962 FBI Distribution “Washington Capital News Service UPI - 89 Teletype November 3, 1962.” To: Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, and Sullivan and W. D. Pawley File (62-79985).
“Overthrow Castro—Pawley.” Miami Herald, November 4, 1962.
(CUBA-ENVOY)
Washington – William D. Pawley, former U.S. Ambassador to Peru and Brazil, has sent a telegram to President Kennedy protesting the Cuban Missile agreement with Soviet Nikita Khrushchev as “a devastating blow” to U.S. prestige.
Pawley, who served as envoy to the two Latin American countries during the Truman Administration, urged Kennedy to nullify the agreement with Khrushchev and work with other hemisphere governments to overthrow the Fidel Castro regime.
In his telegram sent Friday from Miami, he said: “An agreement to permit a communist state to remain in the hemisphere in exchange for removal of missiles will be a devastating blow to the prestige of the United States and set us back in the Cold War.”
11/8/1962 FBI Distribution “Washington Capital News Service UPI - 91 W. D. Pawley File (62-79985) Add 1 Cuba-envoy, Washington (UI-89).”
ADD 1 CUBA-ENVOY, WASHINGTON (UI-89)
Pawley said that under the agreement with Khrushchev “Cuba will continue to be a Communist base and will permit the subversion of other Latin American countries to communism.”
“The Alliance for Progress program will be destroyed as well as the Organization of American States,” Pawley told the President [Kennedy]. “We cannot deal with Khrushchev regarding Cuba without abandoning the Monroe Doctrine and the Rio Treaty and accepting the Khrushchev Doctrine in exchange for violation of the various treaties entered into by the United States.”
Pawley read the text of his telegram on the NBC program, “Three Star Extra,” with commentator Ray Henle.
“There is no substitute for the overthrow of the Castro regime in Cuba,” the former Ambassador said in his telegram. He added the prediction that when this is one, businessmen will return to Latin American economies $4 billion in investments they have withdrawn since Castro’s seizure of power.
In conclusion, he advised Kennedy: “I urge, Mr. President, that you take advantage of Castro’s refusal to permit inspection to cancel any implied agreement with the Russian regime regarding Cuba and leave yourself free to work this matter out in conjunction with the 20 Latin American countries and your many other allies....
“I pray that you will not dissipate this partial victory and will go forward in carrying out your promise that a communist base would not be permitted to remain in this hemisphere,” Pawley said.
[Undated] 1962 Press articles on Pawley activities. Subjects: Pawley; Press clipping.
“Pawley Hits U.S. Retreat.” Miami Herald, December 8, 1962. Newspaper Clipping. Subjects: Pawley-News clp.].
18 11/8/1962 FBI Distribution “Washington Capital News Service UPI - 89 Teletype November 3, 1962.” To: Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, and Sullivan and W. D. Pawley File (62-79985).
(RED BASES)
Miami – Former Ambassador William D. Pawley warned the U.S. not to rely too havily [sic] on aerial photographs to determine if Russia is dismantling its Cuban Missile bases.
“Is any man in his good sense willing to accept only a few photographs?” He asked. “We don’t know what they are doing at night. There are magnificent places in Cuba to stash away such arms,” he said.
The 66-year old former Ambassador to Peru and Brazil said he did not consider the International Red Cross competent to supervise the dismantling of Russian missile aimed at the U.S.
“This is something the United States Government should handle,” he said. “The U.S. cannot entrust its security to the Red Cross.”
19 “The Cuban Missile Crisis @ 60 Nuclear Crisis Lasted 59 Days, Not Just 13.” National Security Archive, October 5, 2022. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia-programs-cuba-cuban-missile-crisis/2022-10-04/cuban-missile- crisis-60-nuclear?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=a24af67b-92f7-4e4f-9a0e-73d94c183ac2
20 CIA-RPD80B01676R001200040058-3 ~10/29/1962 Memorandum for the Director. To: CIA Director John McCone. From: CIA Deputy Director Marshall S. Carter.
>> Handwritten note by W. Elder to Mr. McCone, “General Carter asked that the attached be brought to your attention.”
21 “Two National Figures Declare Cuban Threat Not Ended; Democratic Sen. Russell, William Pawley Flay ‘Victory’ Theme.” Associated Press dispatches, Jefferson City (Missouri) Post-Tribune, December 6, 1962. Pages 1 & 2.
22 12/12/1962 Letter. To: The Washington Post. From: William Pawley.
23 The National Security Archive release. October 28, 2022. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuba-cuban-missile-crisis/2022-10-28/cuban-missile-crisis-coverup- kennedy-adlai-stevenson?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=afd3ff3a-918e-4bf5-8edc-aa32a1b8fcad
Document 6 - White House, Tape recording, Kennedy telephone conversation with Dwight D. Eisenhower, October 28, 1962. Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Audio Visual Dept.
Document 7 - White House, Tape recording, Kennedy telephone conversation with Harry Truman, October 28, 1962. Source: John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Audio Visual Dept.
24 “Did Khrushchev Win Cuba? Looking Ahead: by Dr. George S. Benson, President – National Education Program,” Lockhart Post-Register, December 20, 1962. Page 2.
If an excuse is needed for reopening the discussion with the Soviet Union, we might use the approach suggested by Former Ambassador William D. Pawley, who knows Latin American problems. His suggestion was that Russian statements made in New York early in November by their Mr. Mikoyan supporting Castro's demand for withdrawal from Guantanamo has already justified cancellation of any implied agreement with the Soviets regarding Cuba. At that point, Mr. Pawley observed, the initiative could have been regained and our “backing away from victory” avoided. Perhaps this could still be done.
>> Dr. Benson's National Education Program and the American Citizenship Center ultimately gave rise to Enterprise Square, USA, and a host of national honors from the Freedoms Foundation at Valley Forge.
25 “President and Mrs. Kennedy with leaders of the Cuban Invasion Brigade, 29 December 1962. Miami, Florida, Orange Bowl Stadium.” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
Address to the 2506 Cuban Invasion Brigade at the Orange Bowl Stadium. Mrs. Kennedy spoke informally with Brigade leaders Eneido Oliva, Jose Perez San Roman, Manuel Artime, and former Cuban President Jose Miro Cardona after the ceremonies. Photograph by Cecil Stoughton, White House, in the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston.
26 NARA 104-10170-10022 ~ 11/13/1962 CIA Memorandum for the Record “Mr. Helms’ Conversation with Luis Fernandez Rocha and Jose Maria Lasa of the DRE Regarding their Organization’s Relationship with the Agency.” Released in 2022.
27 NARA 157-10014-10151 ~ “The Issue of Authority Outside the Agency ... Helms’ Testimony Concerning Authority.” 9/1/1975 Select Committee Assassination Report (Interim Report). Pages 163-174 of 569. Released April 28, 2018. Mary Ferrell Foundation website: MaryFerrell,org
28 NARA 104-10170-10022 ~ 11/15/1962 Memorandum for the Record. “Mr. Helms’ Conversation with Luis Fernandez Rocha and Jose Maria Lasa of the DRE Regarding their Organization’s Relationship with the Agency 1500 hours, 13 November 1962, Mr. Helms’ Office.”
29 NARA 104-10336-10020 ~ ARRB Request: CIA-IR-21: DRE: Monthly Operational Reports. Page 10 of 11. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.
3/3/1998 Memorandum “Subject: CIA-IR-21: DRE Case Officer for December 1962—April 1964.”
To Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director. Cc: Bob Skwirot, CIA Team Leader. From: Michelle Combs, Special
Assistant for Research and Review.
During the period December 1962 to April 1964, Mr. Joannides was assigned as a covert action officer at JMWAVE, serving as deputy and then chief of the station’ covert action branch. During this time period, Mr. Joannides was the case officer for the Cuban exile group Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE). The descriptions of his duties ... are very general ... no mention of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy ... no indication that Mr. Joannides may have used or been known by the name Howard ... although personnel files typically would not reveal this information one way or another.
During the period mid-May 1978-January 1979, Mr. Joannides was assigned to work for Scott Breckinridge, the CIA’s principal coordinator to the House Select Committee on Assassination (HSCA) as a focal person to keep track of the status of HSCA requests, particularly to the Directorate of Operations.
30 NARA 104-10331-10186 ~ 8/20/1998 Memorandum For: Chief, JFK Declassification Project/HRP/OIM/DA. From: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr., Chief, Information Management Staff, External Support Group. Subject: “(U) Status of Outstanding JFK Issues.”
31 Pawley, Russia Is Winning, Page 431.
32 MM 105-1742 p 14 (Report from Informant MM T-1).
[Llaca] charged that Manuel Artime and Miro Cardona are using the Brigade for their personal benefit. He continued that President Kennedy’s visit to Miami was for the good of President Kennedy’s internal policy in the United States, and for the personal advantage of Cuban politicians. Llaca charged that Brigade members were degraded by being given $250. Christmas bonus to each member, which money came from the Miami Beach home of Miro Cardona. Llaca said that about 100 members of the Brigade protested President Kennedy’s visit by refusing to attend the Orange Bowl reception....
MM T-4, another government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, on December 31, 1962 advise that Erneido Oliva, second in command of Brigade 2506, said that the Brigade served as a unifying force of political groups, and considers itself a military group rather than a political group, and continues as the military arm of the CRC [Cuban Revolutionary Council]. Oliva said the members of the Brigade will be released from military duty, will try to find a solution to the Cuban situation, and concluded that clandestine organizations in Cuba are minimal and the leaders to help guerilla efforts in Cuba are non- existent.
>> Bottom of memo references independent organizations: “Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo (Second National Front of Escambray) (SNFE) 115 S.W. 12th Avenue, Miami.”
>> He helped found ALPHA 66 and was captured by Castro’s troops in 1965 and held until 1986.
“Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, founder of Cambio Cubano, confronts a force as powerful as Castro: The exiles who condemn his moderate views,” Miami New Times News, August 4, 1993.
33 NARA 104-10306-10024 ~ 1/28/1963 Memorandum for Record ‘Special Group Executive Committee Meeting January 25th Subject: Cuba.” Page 1 of 71.
[PAGE 1 of 71] The Executive Committee “approved the new policy as outlined by the coordinator.”
[PAGE 61 of 71] At the November 6, 1963 Special Group meeting, Richard Helms briefed the Group on infiltration mission No. 3105 in October which Castro had foiled. “The subsequent press coverage of the affair renders the further operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in the immediate future.” At the same time, “Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111 against a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba.” Cheever mentioned that “British patrols have unwittingly exposed some of CIA’s operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow up on a service-to-service level.” (The CIA’s cryptonyms for domestic British Intelligence Service, MI-5, was JAGUAR, and its foreign intelligence, MI-6, was SMOTH. Interaction was usually with CIA’s Europe Division, KEYWAY.) “Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. These are No. 3112,” a sawmill sabotage, and “No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide communications for a ratline.” A ratline traditionally is an escape route, but it might also be considered a path for infiltration. “Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a ‘fail safe’ basis pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.” (It is unclear whether this is a reference to CIA Director McCone or President Kennedy.)
On November 6th, Bundy also brought up that the White House had learned Castro had extended “peace feelers” and suggested William Attwood would be a good person to follow up to learn “how badly Castro might want détente with the United States.” CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Helms suggested “that it might be profitable to ‘war game’ this problem and look at it from all possible angles before making any contacts.” Attorney General Kennedy wanted to see “some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion in Latin America and removing Soviet troop in Cuba” before détente could be achieved.
34 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: February 10, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website: jfklibray.org
35 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: March 2, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
36 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: February 19, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
37 9/16/1960 FBI Memorandum “Testimony of William D. Pawley Before Senate Internal Security Subcommittee September 2, 1960.” To: A. H. Belmont. From: S. B. Donahoe (seen by DeLoach and W.C. Sullivan).
Pawley expressed belief that Betancourt, President of Venezuela, is one of the most dangerous men in this hemisphere and predicted that what is happening in Cuba today is going to happen in Venezuela in three years unless something very drastic is done in the United States (apparently referring to change in State Department policy).
38 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: February 19, 20 and 21, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
39 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: February 22 and 23, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
40 2/1/1963 Letter. To: Generalissimo Francisco Franco, palace in Madrid. From: Pawley in Johannesburg, South Africa. Pawley Papers, Box #1, Folder 3. George C. Marshall Foundation Library.
[In 1948] your car came to the hotel for me in the late afternoon and took me to your residence. The purpose of my visit was to ascertain from you if you would consider the idea of the United States establishing army, navy and air force bases in Spain ... You agreed to the establishment of military bases and said that if the railroads and highways were to be used for military purposes, the U.S. would have to finance their reconstruction ... I was deeply gratified that your only request was [that the U.S. use its influence to get the U.N.] to rescind the resolution of 1946 (I believe a Polish resolution) declaring Spain to be an ‘enemy of world Peace’ and withdrawing diplomatic representation to Spain. I promised to communicate with you upon my return to Paris ... but as the Presidential election in the U.S. was imminent, General Marshall, thinking (as did most people) that Governor Dewey would be elected, suggested that I meet with him and John Foster Dulles (a member of our delegation and the probable Secretary of State if Dewey were elected) to brief them on my conversations with you ... Mr. Truman was elected and what transpired after that is recorded history.
I have seen you only once since 1948 and that was on my way to India on Special Assignment for the Department of State in 1951.... Secretary of State Acheson authorized my visit to Spain, and Ambassador [Stanton] Griffis and I met with you.
41 Staff memo House Select Committee on Assassinations.
March 29 [1963] – Ref. FBI Airtel regarding William Haydon Burns, Dominican Republic concerning leads; possible information sources including William Pawley; also FNU [First Name Unknown] Pawley, owner and President of Miami Transit Company and former Ambassadors to Brazil and Peru. Known to FBI Director personally; cordial relations.
Pawley had numerous commercial transactions with the Dominican Republic and was close personal acquaintance of Trujillo. Report suggests Pawley may have information on subject. (Burns)
April 3 [1963] – Pawley interviewed regarding William Haydon Burns, Mayor of Jacksonville, Fla., Pawley states he met Burns socially before but knows nothing of his activities.
April [1963] – Visa file for Flor de Oro Guerin or Flor de Oro Edesma Trujillo indicate personal references listed include Pawley.
42 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: February 24, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
43 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: March 1 and March 6, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
44 “Inside Labor, Nixon Confers with Rockefeller,” By Victor Riesel. San Antonio Light, March 4, 1963.
45 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: March 5 & 30, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
46 “Declaration of Purpose.” The Citizens Committee for a Free Cuba has been formed in a response to a statement issued by Freedom House, on March 25, 1963, calling upon Americans to unite in a movement for a Free Cuba.
47 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: March 24, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
48 Pawley, Russia Is Winning, Chapter 24.
49 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: March 30 and 31, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
50 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 2 and 3, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
51 “Cuban Refugees Restive Under U.S. Restrictions; Despite the U.S. Clampdown on Raids Against Castro, Many Refugee Leaders Are Determined to Continue the Attacks Emotions Evident Angry Protests Spokesman Caustic Increased Vigilance.” By R. Hart Phillips. The New York Times, April 7, 1963.
52 Peter Dale Scott, Deep Politics III, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), Chapter V. http://www.history-matters.com/pds/DP3_Chapter5.htm#_ftn54
53 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 1, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
54 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 4, 10, and 13, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
55 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 14-18, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
56 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 19 and 22, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
57 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 20, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
58 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 22 and 25, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
59 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 27, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
60 Historical Resources, A Chronology from The New York Times: April 17, 1963. John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum website.
61 5/5/1963 Telegram “Agreement of Frank Fiorini to Participate in Air Strike on Cuba.”
>> Pedro Diaz Lanz, the one-time head of Cuba's Air Force turned militant anti-Castro exile, died at age 81, of a self-inflicted gunshot wound in June 2008, according to the Miami Herald. Diaz Lanz left Cuba in June of 1959, then participated in leaflet drops and sabotage missions with Frank Sturgis and joined “Operation 40.” A fierce critic of the Kennedy’s Cuba policy, he was later accused by Marita Lorenz and others of being involved in JFK’s assassination. He died in poverty and poor health, according to www.maryfarrell.org, an archive for assassination related FBI and CIA files.
62 NARA 104-10138-10031 ~ 5/4/1963 CIA Message “Participate in an airstrike.”
63 NARA 124-10325-10318 ~ 9/11/1963 Untitled Document. To: Sullivan. From: Brennan. Subject: CIA Liaison File.
>> The document contains information on a number of successes and concerns to be discussed by Hoover and McCone.
Labels: CIA, Cuba, DRE, Franco, Helms, JMWAVE, Kennedy, Landsdale, LeMay, Lemnitzer, McCone, Mongoose, Morales, Newby, Northwoods, Pawley, QDDALE, Rocha, Salvat, Shackley
posted by David Price Cannon @ 2:14 PM
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