31: JFK Disapproves the Somoza Plan Backed by Pawley

After Operation TILT, William Pawley turned his attention to General Luis Somoza's plan to invade Cuba from Nicaragua with hopes it would justify full U.S. intervention, while John Martino shifted his energy to a new project involving Rolando Masferrer Rojas and an invasion of Haiti in August 1963. The common goal was to eliminate Castro.

A CIA telegram stated, “According to Carlos Zayas Castro, a colleague of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, and several other unidentified persons in the Miami area, the recent Haitian activities were organized and supported by Masferrer, a Cuban exile who travels between New York and Miami. (Field comment: General Leon Cantave is generally credited with having organized the 5 August invasion of Haiti. Masferrer may have been seeking personal aggrandizement had the invasion been successful.)”

The telegram further noted that Masferrer “had Cubans in place in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti; he attempted to recruit 30 men from the Commandos L Group through Zayas.” Masferrer planned “to establish Carlos Marquez Sterling, a leading Cuban exile, as the figurehead or President.” Without addressing the source of his money, the telegram stated that “John Martino financed the travel of about 200 Cubans from New York to Miami” who as of August 8th were staying “in the Senate Hotel [probably the Art Deco Senator Hotel on Collins Avenue at 12th Street] and another hotel in Miami. Martino did not know what to do with his men following the collapse of the Haitian invasion.”1

Rolando’s brother, Raimundo Masferrer, who moved to Dallas in 1958 where he worked for the Parks Department as a mechanic, helped raise money for arms, believing the invasion would pave the way to overthrowing Castro who had imprisoned six of their family members and whose forces shot six others in 1959.2

In January 1960, William Pawley had advised the CIA that he had been contacted by Arthur Patton, a Commissioner from Dade County, Miami, Florida, who asserted that one of his police officers had been offered $200,000 to kidnap another of Rolando’s brothers, Rodolfo “Kiki” Masferrer.3

Rolando Masferrer had come to the attention of the intelligence agencies as early as 1948.4 He tried to endear himself to Trujillo in 1956.5 After arriving in the U.S., Rolando lead exile raids against Castro.6 Prior to the Bay of Pigs, the CIA tried to neutralize his activities against Castro7 and the Kennedy Justice Department later indicted Masferrer for plotting an invasion against Cuba.8 He then turned his attention to trying to overthrow Duvalier in Haiti, in the summer of 1963.9

A CIA Memorandum noted that “Rolando Arcadio Masferrer y Rojas, [was] a former Cuban Senator who was leader of the notorious ‘Los Tigers’, the dreaded army of enforcers under Batista.” The memo cautioned he should not be confused with Rolando Masferrer, Jr., an employee of Military Armament Corp. in Georgia run by Mitchell Livingston WerBell, the former member of the OSS in China and Burma during World War II, weapons and silencers expert and part of the U.S. forces who went into the Dominican Republic. The younger Masferrer was said to have a high level of integrity, spurning “lucrative cash offers” for him “to deal in illegal weapons trade in Latin America.”10 The older Rolando Masferrer’s adventurous career ended in a car bombing on October 31, 1975 in Miami.11

At an August 8, 1963 Special Group Meeting attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, and General Carter, Desmond FitzGerald (DAINOLD) reported that Luis Somoza told exile leaders that the aggressive harassment launched from Nicaragua could lead to Cuban retaliation necessitating U.S. intervention and this would be discussed when Manuel Artime of the MRR arrived back in the U.S.

Artime had his critics within the exile community. Joaquin Godoy y Solis (AMRAZZ-1), the MRP leader “in charge of Foreign Affairs and Public Relations” stated that on May 14, 1963 the Unidad Revolucionario (UR) invited MRP, Alpha 66, and the SNFE to a meeting with Manuel Artime and Cesar Baro of the (MRR). The anti-Castro organizations known as the 20th of May and (MDC) were also represented.

During the meeting it was obvious that Artime was looking for weapons to use in connection with his own organization and was trying to build himself up as a leader.” Godoy wasn’t buying it and asserted that “Artime is regarded as ‘chicken’ due to his conduct while a prisoner in Cuba after being captured at the Bay of Pigs invasion attempt. Godoy said that his fellow prisoners lost all respect for him. Consequently, Godoy and the other representatives of the new unity group were not interested in cooperating with Artime.” Godoy felt more comfortable with the likes of Second Front of Escambray’s Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and the SNFE coordinator Armando Flieites, MRP’s Carlos Penin, and ALPHA-66’s Antonio Carlos Veciana (AMSHALE-1) who “‘favor a Second War of Independence’” and “‘declare ourselves belligerents, under international law.’”12 This assertion was probably an attempt to thwart prosecution based on President Kennedy’s March 31, 1963 ban on unauthorized exile raids.

In June 1963, MDC made a pact with Commandos L to provide training and military intelligence assistance. It also received $50,000 in military aid from Dr. Carlos Prio Socarras, Pawley’s ally in the Somoza Plan, in return for its promise of political support.” The FBI raided property owned by William J. McLaney near the training camp and seized ammunition in July1963. Rudolph Richard Davis, who served as an MDC coordinator from Cuba and received funding from the John Birch Society is said to have helped the Cuban trainees get back to Miami.13

“A Dallas unit of the SNFE was formed in June, 1963 ... with Manuel Rodriguez Orcarberro ... designated as President.” SNFE members in Texas were said to have grown more enthusiastic in 1964 following an “appearance in Dallas of Antonio Veciana, a national officer of SNFE.” Veciana was an accountant whom David Phillips trained in psychological warfare; he then founded the militant Alpha-66 group of exiles. Following JFK’s assassination, “a United States Government agency which conducts security-type investigations” reported “that a source had furnished information indicating Rodriguez was known to be violently anti-Kennedy.”14

At the August Special Group meeting, Desmond FitzGerald discussed 13 approved Cuban infiltration/exfiltration operations, two of which were mounted for sabotage and 11 designed to provide expand intelligence. He also noted that JFK’s brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, had sent Harry Ruiz Williams to the CIA with a plan to launch 4.2 mortar attacks against Cuba from Guatemala. The Group felt that this was logistically impractical and should be discouraged because it would give substance to the Luis “Somoza Plan” of arming and training Cuban exiles for an invasion from Nicaragua.15

General Carter noted that William D. Pawley was eager “to implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to create a situation which might ultimately require U.S. intervention. The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation, organized by Pawley, would not be desirable and he should be brought into the CIA’s current operational strategy.”16

The FBI had received information about a meeting Pawley had in New York City back in July, perhaps when Martino was recruiting exiles from there for the Haiti invasion. Pawley was also seen in the next months with those who may have been planning the invasion from Nicaragua.17

An FBI memorandum to William C. Sullivan from D.J. Brennan suggested that anti- Castro activities based in Nicaragua were in preparation of another invasion of the Cuban island. “We do know that Manuel Artime, a prominent Cuban exile, has been spending considerable time in Nicaragua organizing exiles.” The memo noted that “Somoza has been championing a plan, allegedly designed by him, which has its objective to overthrow the Castro Government ... The Kennedy administration has looked at this plan and has disapproved it ... Somoza has told people that President Kennedy approved the so-called ‘Somoza Plan’ ... Somoza allegedly left this meeting [with Secretary of State Rusk at an American Legion convention] in a rage because Rusk ‘chopped up’ the entire Somoza Plan.” Bold emphasis added by D.P. Cannon. 

Was JFK's disapproval of the Somoza Plan "strike three" in Pawley's mind after the failure of Operation TILT?

An individual whose name was redacted “stated that eventually, if Artime is successful in obtaining adequate support from exiles, CIA might assist him by furnishing arms and equipment. This will be a White House decision.” Regarding the plan, “[REDACTED] stated that Somoza has been in regular contact with Carlos Prio Socarrás, former Cuban President, and with William Pauley [sic], former U.S. Ambassador.” The information source “stated that CIA definitely is not utilizing Prio or Pauley in any capacity. The agency is most interested in any information the Bureau receives concerning the activities of these men.18 Bold emphasis added by D.P. Cannon.

A week after Pawley had been seen with Luis Somoza and freelance photographer Alexander Rorke, Jr., The Miami Herald published an September 14, 1963 article stating that Rorke and five other Americans had been warned by the U.S. government to cease conducting bombing raids on Cuba, as they had done in April. The others warned were Rorke’s partner in an air cargo business, Geoffrey Sullivan; Bill Johnson; Jack Griffin; Joseph Greisner; and the ubiquitous Frank Fiorini (aka Frank Sturgis).19

Fiorini/Sturgis, in sworn testimony in the next decade, would state that the CIA funded three major operations overseen by Frank Bender (aka Gerard Droller). Joaquin Sanjenis (aka Sam Jenis; AMOT-2) headed Operation 40 made up of some 200 American Army and CIA trained Cuban officers. Sanjenis was the CIA control officer for Fiorini throughout the 1960s,20 and chief of the AMOTs, a group organized at JMWAVE by David Morales “that spotted and recruited potential assets primarily in the PM field and maritime areas, but also for the FI, CI and PW areas of operation. They handled debriefings, investigations, surveillances and acquired intelligence through AMOT penetrations of Cuban exile groups."21

Fiorini also knew that Erneido Oliva, who was closely aligned with Manuel Artime, headed the 1200 Cuban exiles in the Brigade 2506 Bay of Pigs invasion. CIA had direct contact with the Cuban Revolutionary Council through “Howard Hunt as Eduardo ... a high-ranking political officer.” Sturgis then made a point that “Howard Hunt had nothing to do with the Brigade.”22

The effectiveness of the CIA was questioned on September 11, 1963, when high-ranking FBI official D.J. Brennan sent a document to one of the Sullivans in the Bureau to prepare FBI Director Hoover for a meeting with CIA Director John McCone. The document starts with a harsh overview. “To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences.” Brennan attributes the successes in working together to “several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.”

Brennan turned his attention to two fissures. The first was the defection of a Cuban Intelligence Agent. “CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau.” The second event was when “a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning the Bureau’s technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country.” McCone asserted it contained “statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director.” FBI Assistant Director Alan H. Belmont refused to retract it and apologize. “The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.”

Brennan’s document then contained a scathing assessment of the CIA’s head, “McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also ‘the Director of Central Intelligence’ ... we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became director of the agency.”23

On September 24, 1963, Rorke died in a plane crash on his way to Central America. Later some of his notes were found along with a photo of Rorke and Somoza in a bank vault by Rorke's wife, a daughter of Sherman Billingsley, owner of New York City's famed Stork Club and a friend of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.24 

The same day Rorke died, General Curtis LeMay, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a memo to the Secretary of the Army on the subject of “Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations Conducted by Central Intelligence Agency Against Cuba (TS).” The memo specifically mentioned that the Joint Chiefs “support any reasonable program of planned action which has as its objective the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and have approved request for support and assistance of these activities wherever it has been within their authority to do so” and “believe that the recent covert raiding activities sponsored by the CIA are a favorable beginning to such a program.”

The Joint Chiefs of Staff claimed to be unaware “of the full nature and scope of the over- all covert raiding program of which these specific raids are a part.” Among the concerns mentioned in the memo was if “it seriously endangers the ability of the United States to disclaim plausibility and credibly its involvement.” The memo advised that the Chiefs could “more effectively review the raid strategy “if they were provided with a presentation on the full scope of the CIA covert program.”25

The Kennedy Administration’s earlier warning to cease exile operations would seem to have indicated a change in U.S. policy toward Cuba; but apparently it was a matter of wanting to gain control over the disparate groups that were taking matters into their own hands rather than through a coordinated effort. At the end of September, Somoza told a gathering of Cuban exile leaders in Los Angeles “during a stopover on his flight to the orient” that the plan he proposed to Kennedy “was being developed” and that groups of exiles in Nicaragua were being “trained by the CIA and a group trained by Manuel Artime were already involved in the plan. Carlos Prio was selected to unite the various Cuban exile factions into a large group” despite the previous animosity that existed between Prio and Somoza. Somoza had vowed to unite “all the Latin American presidents” to support the effort “when the time for collective action arrives.”

The Defense Intelligence Agency memo stated that “Cuban commandos, controlled by CIA would carry-out 3 or 4 raids during the month of October 1963. Somoza would accept the blame for these raids to observe Castro’s reaction. During this time, Artime will continue to prepare his base of operations and move his people from Miami” and Castro will “be plagued by internal sabotage, guerilla bands, infiltrations, etc.” Somoza further detailed that infiltrations will continue to be run by “‘Commando L.’”

Somoza’s efforts took him to Taiwan to “meet with Chiang Kai-Shek, an old-friend, who has promised to contribute weapons and money to the effort” which he also hoped to get from Israel. Then he would head to India “to try to convince Nehru not to take part in future debates at the UN, if Castro should claim aggression against Cuba.” His final stop would be to establish “commercial relations between Nicaragua and Japan.” With regard to the Somoza Plan to defeat Castro, he intended to present the final plan to President Kennedy on November 18, 1963.26

On November 19th, CIA Deputy Director of Plans Richard Helms sent a note to the FBI liaison, Sam Papich about the recovery of Frank Fiorini’s lost brief case which contained “Air Navigational Charts” spanning the Bahamas to the Rio Grande to the Panama Canal and including Cuba, Haiti, Puerto Rica, Jamaica, Virgin Islands, and the Dominican Republic. Also inside was a June 1960 “letter from Robert K. Brown ... addressed to Pedro Diaz Lanz, in care of David Rosen, Biscayne Building, Miami. Florida. Brown claims to be a free lance journalist, who “was duped by Castro.”

The briefcase also held 1961 articles of incorporation of the Anti-Communist Crusade Foundation (President Fiorini, VP Janet Mann, Secretary-Treasurer Laura Norris); and an address list including columnist Jack Anderson and Marquez Carlos Sterling27 who had discussed organizing exiles with Pawley in January 1960. (In the 1970s Robert K. Brown would author the Soldier of Fortune account of the “Bayo-Pawley Affair.”)

Fiorini’s briefcase also contained three lists: “addresses and individuals” plus “military equipment for what appears to be a 196 man unit” and “miscellaneous weapons and purchase prices” available from “Loxco Incorporated, Lauchli Ordnance Experimental Company, 2010 Keebler Street, Collinsville, Illinois.”28 This may well have been in support of the Somoza invasion plan.

Lauchli told the FBI that “he severed relations with ‘Minutemen’ because he felt the National Office of the ‘Minutemen’ was doing an ineffective job in preparing for guerilla warfare in the event the United States should be invaded” by communist forces and “he had organized the Counter Insurgency Council.” The paranoid, gun lovers in the group sold gummed stickers: “A gun did NOT kill Kennedy—a communist did.”29

The following summer Lauchli was arrested following a 100-mph chase by United States Treasury Department agents after he sold an undercover agent $17,000 worth of submachine guns.30

In early December, following President Kennedy’s assassination, Prio was said to have “accused the U.S. Government of agreement with Russia to replace Castro with Tito-type government.” The CIA learned that the claim had “originated with Guillermo Alonso Pujol in Washington. It was received by Prio through Guillermo Belt. Pujol has friendly relations with certain members diplomatic circle Washington and thinks he is well informed although he lives in Europe. Guillermo Marquez, publisher of New York weekly Ahora and Carlos Marquez Sterling are both part of Prio's plan and allegedly have become associated with Richard Nixon in accordance with Republican Party plan to bring up Cuban case before the elections.”31

Marquez Carlos Sterling in January 1964 would translate a memo asserting that Jack Ruby, the assassin of Lee Harvey Oswald, had been in Havana a year earlier visiting Praskin, who was said to provide strippers to clubs and was said to be a Cuban communist because his novelty was permitted to remain open by Castro.32 This information, misinformation or disinformation spread quickly among the exile community with the help of Pawley's associates including as John Martino and Nathaniel Weyl who were eager to link Castro to the assassination of President Kennedy.33

The day after JFK’s assassination, “Veciana was approached by Cesar Diosdado, a customs agent in Key West. Diosdado informed Veciana that he had been given a list of people to interview about the assassination and that he, Veciana, was one of them but that he need not worry.”

According to Gaeton Fonzi, investigator for the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Veciana was asked by Maurice Bishop (CIA David Phillips) to infiltrate Cellula Fantasma and “was introduced to the group by Julio Lobo.” Lobo had been "the richest man in Cuba." The group’s “military coordinator was Pedro Diaz Lanz and the group’s advisor was Frank Sturgis.” 

Despite having a “reputation as a known terrorist,” Veciana was later “hired by the State Department to work for the Agency for International Development in Bolivia ... a base to conduct covert action operations against Chile. The necessary arms and money were provided by Maurice Bishop” who in 1971 “directed Veciana to kill Castro in Chile ... aided by Luis Posada. The attempt was not successful, and Posada was indicted in Caracas in 1976, along with Orlando Bosch, for the bombing of a Cubana Airlines plane.” After severing ties with Bishop and receiving $250,000 Veciana in 1973 was convicted on drug dealings. Four years later he told the HSCA that if the U.S. government was unwilling “to liberate Cuba he was not willing to help them find whoever really killed Kennedy.”34

Cesar Diosdado, the Key West Customs Agent who spoke to Veciana was also being paid by JMWAVE where he “was doing an excellent job.” In 1967, there was concern that Diosdado testifying as a prosecution witness at the trial of Rolando Masferrer could be harmful to the CIA for a number of reasons. It could bring to the surface “the JMOCEAN complex as successor to the ‘notorious Zenith Technical Enterprises, Inc.’” which could force the University of Miami “to reexamine its relationship to the U.S. Government concerning the South Campus area” where JMOCEAN is located.

Moreover, because of Diosdado’s “encyclopedic knowledge of Cuba and the Florida Keys area and because of his long involvement in ‘operational activities’ by the Agency and ACSI [Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence] on occasion, Diosdado is considered by many exiles—and some officials—as being ‘a Company (Agency) man.’” He ‘played a leading role in the investigation of the Masferrer affair, including previous abortive attempts by the Masferrer and Haitian exiles to launch operations from Florida, and ... [he] led the raid against the house at which the exiles were arrested and arms confiscated.” Also, “it should be noted that historically the similarity of this operation and the ‘Bay of Pigs’ could reopen the whole question and offer a new discussion of the prisoner exchange question. The racial issue also might arise because many of the persons involved with Masferrer and potential defendants are of the Negro race.” The jury may “view Masferrer’s activities as efforts to rid the Western Hemisphere of an abominable black dictator with the further intention of using Haitian territory as a base to remove” Castro, concluded Jacob D. Esterline, Acting Chief, CIA Western Hemisphere Division.35 

Masferrer was found guilty of trying to invade Haiti; Judge Cabot said there was no evidence he worked for the CIA. This despite his training under David Phillips.

FOOTNOTES:

1 8/8/1963 CIA Telegram “Involvement of Cuban Exile Rolando Masferrer Rojas and John Martino in 5 August Invasion of Haiti.”

According to Carlos Zayas Castro, a colleague of Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas, and several other unidentified persons in the Miami area, the recent Haitian activities were organized and supported by Masferrer, a Cuban exile who travels between New York and Miami. (Field comment: General Leon Cantave is generally credited with having organized the 5 August invasion of Haiti. Masferrer may have been seeking personal aggrandizement had the invasion been successful.)

[Masferrer] had Cubans in place in the Dominican Republic and in Haiti; he attempted to recruit 30 men from the Commandos L Group through Zayas ... Masferrer planned ... to establish Carlos Marquez Sterling, a leading Cuban exile, as the figurehead or President ... John Martino financed the travel of about 200 Cubans from New York to Miami ... as of 8 August most or all of them were in the Senate Hotel and another hotel in Miami. Martino did not know what to do with his men following the collapse of the Haitian invasion ...”

2 Title: “FBI File 2-1622 on Rolando Masferrer, Vol. 91, Section 373-409.” AARC Masferrer Gary Shaw FOIA. Page 30 of 172.

>> Reprint of undated article “Cuban Refugee Saves for Guns,” Dallas News.

3 FBI 105-84265-34, 36. January 1960. Police Report. http:// www.ajweberman.com/nodules/nodule7.htm

4 NARA 104-10176-10193 ~ January 28, 1948. Report from Habana, Cuba Subject: Political Activities, Second Internationale (Socialist).

5 NARA 104-10176-10030 ~ August 26, 1956. Dispatch. Subject: Operational, Cuban – Dominican Relations: Rolando Masferrer. From: Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo. To: Chief WHD.

6 “Cuba: Toward D-Day,” Time, April 21, 1961. 

>> President Kennedy “pointed out that the Justice Department had just indicted Rolando Masferrer, onetime hoodlum leader of a pro-Batista strong-arm squad, for ‘plotting an invasion of Cuba from Florida in order to establish a Batista-like regime.’”

7 NARA 104-10176-10217 ~ January 3, 1961. Cable. Subject: As you aware HQS working on neutralizing Masferrer for some time. From: Bell. To: JMWAVE.

8 “Cuba: Toward D-Day,” Time, April 21, 1961.

9 NARA 104-10071-10042 ~ August 24, 1963. Memo. Subject: Information Report of Rolando Entitled “Remarks of Rolando Arcadio (Masferrer) Rojas on His Plans to Support Overthrow President Francois Duvalier. From: JMWAVE. To: The Director.

10 NARA1993.07.31.10:11:01:500032. June 28, 1972. Memorandum. Subject: Rolando Masferrer Jr., Possible Source Lead. From: Chief, Washington Field Office. To: Director, Domestic Contact Service.

11 Jim McGee, “Crime is Luring Terrorist from Anti-Fidel Ranks,” The Miami Herald, December 30, 1983. 

Growing evidence has linked many reputed anti-Castro terrorists to Mafia-like criminal groups that deal in drugs, extortion and murder, a Herald investigation has found. Instead of fighting Castro, some terrorists have turned to crime. Recent court statements and a wiretap transcript indicate members of the Omega 7 terrorist group served as strong-arm debt collectors for Miami-based drug smugglers.

12 NARA 104-10271-10096 ~ “MPR Relations with Other Anti-Castro Organizations.” From: Miami. Subjects: MPR, Joaquin Godoy. June 00, 1963. Pages 5-8.

13 “Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC).” HSCA Report, Volume X, Section: VII. Page 77 & 78 of 210. Mary Ferrell Foundation website.

NARA 124-10369-10045 ~ Admin Folder-09: HSCA Administrative Folder, LHO Incoming Communications 6/21/67 – 7/19/67. Page 36 of 262.

14 NARA 124-90120-10007 ~ 5/28/1964 FBI Internal Report. To: HQ. From DL.

Appendix to the Hearings before the Select Committee on Assassinations of the United States House of Representatives, Volume X, 1979. Pages 37-56.

15 NARA 124-10306-10071 ~ 1/9/1964 No Title. To: Director, FBI. From: FBI Dwyer, Robert James. Subjects:SAF, MAB, MRR, MIL Training, Finances, TRA, ACA, Plan, Organizations. Page 48 of 71.

16 NARA 104-1036-10024 ~ Memorandum For Record “Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963.”

>> Present: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter, Mr. Fitzgerald was present for Item 1. 

17 180-10113-10416 ~ “William Pawley.” Subjects: Nicaragua; Anti-Castro Activities; Schick, Rene; Dominican Republic; Trujillok (sic), Rafael; Burns, William Haydon; Pawley, William D. Pages 3 & 4 of 6.

>>Staff memo House Select Committee on Assassinations covering dates July 1963, September 8 and September 27, 1963.

July 1963 – Information indicating a meeting of high level Cuban exiles in New York City involving American and Cuban businessmen. One man identified as the Commercial Attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Australia. Bureau source suggested that this person might be identical to a CIA intelligence officer who had been assigned Cuba at one time. (Agency said it knew nothing of the meeting and the person in question had been stationed in <code 10> for the past two years. He was in U.S. for a few days in mid-August but was not involved in any Cuban matters since assignment to <code 10>).

September 8 [1963] – Miami Herald article reports Luis Somoza giving assistance in Nicaragua (Rene Schick, President of Nicaragua, against sanctuary for Cubans except if done “individually” on case by case basis. Somoza expressed approval of Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime, Civilian leader for Bay of Pigs and Cuban Committee for Liberation (Prío also a member of this group). Somoza had some criticism for Manola Ray of the Junt Revolucionara.

Article reports that Somoza accompanied by local counsel Luis Debayle Somoza, William Pawley, Alexander Roorke, Jr. [sic]

September 27 (1963) – Ref FBI memo regarding Cuban exiles in Nicaragua Artime organizing exiles there; getting support from CIA. Also mentions meeting in July 1963 of high level Cuban exiles. File reference lists Somoza, Prío, Pauley [sic], Artime.

George Volsky, “Manuel Artime 45 dies of cancer, led Invasion of Cuba; Castro Foe, 45, Had Close ties to C.I.A. – Recruited Exiles for Bay of Pigs Operation,” The New York Times, November 19, 1977.

“Died,” Time, November 28, 1977.

>> Manuel Artime was captured “in a swamp two weeks after” the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ransomed for $500,000 in 1962, Artime “later led several commando raids on radar stations, sugar mills and other Cuban targets.” He died of cancer.

18 NARA 124-10201-10416 ~ 9/27/1963. FBI Memorandum “Subject Anti-Castro Activities, Internal Security Cuba.” To: W.C. Sullivan. From: D. J. Brennan.

>> For distribution to DeLoach and placement in files of Pawley, Prío, Artime and Somoza., Jr.

During the past few weeks the Bureau has received information from time to time concerning anti-Castro activities based in Nicaragua. This information has suggested that Cuban exiles probably were in the process of organizing another invasion force. We do know that Manuel Artime, a prominent Cuban exile, has been spending considerable time in Nicaragua allegedly organizing exiles [OVER 2 PARAGRAPHS REDACTED].

10/9/1963 Stamped Memorandum “Anti-Castro Activities, Internal Security—Cuba”. From: Mr. D. J. Brennan. To: Mr. W. C. Sullivan.

>> This is a less redacted version of NARA 124-10201-10416 written September 27, 1963 for distribution to DeLoach and placement in files of Pawley, Prío, Artime and Somoza. CIA involvement with AMBIDDY-1 (Artime) became known as AMWORLD, according the Mary Ferrell Foundation cryptonym guide. http://www.MaryFerrell.org

19 “Americans Warned on Cuba Raids,” The Miami Herald, September 14, 1963.

20 NARA 1993.08.05.10:15:50:750052 ~ 5/12/1977 “Various Materials On Frank Sturgis Aka Frank Fiorini.” Chronology of Residences and Employments. Page 201 of 214.

>> He names his code names as "Federini, Barbarosa, Samson", as well as a number of his aliases--curiously he does not mention Frank Attila or Fred Attila.

21 NARA 104-10222-10019 ~ 1/11/1963 CIA David S. Morales Personnel File. Memorandum for: Secretary, Agent Panel. David S. Morales Promotion. From: Chief, Task Force W.

NARA 104-10308-10209 ~ Memorandum “AMOT Project.”

22 NARA 157-10005-10125 ~ 4/7/1975 SSCIA “Testimony of Frank Sturgis.” Page 114 & 115 of 156.

23 NARA 124-10325-10318 ~ 9/11/1963 Untitled Document. To: Sullivan. From: Brennan. Subject: CIA Liaison File.

>> The document contains information on a number of successes and concerns to be discussed by Hoover and McCone.

24 NARA 124-10306-10071 ~ No Title. To: Director, FBI. From: FBI Dwyer, Robert James. Subjects: SAF, MAB, MRR, MIL Training, Finances, TRA, ACA, Plan, Organizations. January 9, 1964. Page 10 of 31.

NARA 104-10255-10139 ~ 1/22/1964 "Memo: Douglas K. Gentzkow." To: Chief, Contact Division. From: Jay B.L. Reeves.

>> Gentzkow was a West Point Cadet dating Sherman Billingsley's other daughter.

25 9/24/1963 Memorandum “Subject: Department of Defense Support of Covert Operations Conducted by Central Intelligence Agency Against Cuba (TS).” To: The Secretary of the Army. From: Curtis E. LeMay, Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff support any reasonable program of planned action which has as its objective the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime in Cuba and have approved request for support and assistance of these activities wherever it has been within their authority to do so ... They believe that the recent covert raiding activities sponsored by the CIA are a favorable beginning to such a program.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are not aware of the full nature and scope of the over-all covert raiding program of which these specific raids are a part. Hence, they are unable to assess the relative importance of any individual raid to the program as a whole ... a. Its importance ... b. Whether it seriously endangers the ability of the United States to disclaim plausibility and credibly its involvement ... c. Whether the presence of U.S. military covering forces in the area could jeopardize appreciably or compromise the success of the operation.

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the relatively minor importance of the individual raids which have taken place to date or which are contemplated within the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff does not warrant either prearrangement of supporting forces or the recommendation of current policy be sought at this time. This view applies both of the questions posed in your memorandum, dated 23 September 1963, whether such CIA raiding craft are of U.S. registry or of foreign registry.

4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff could review more effectively...if they were provided with a presentation on the full scope of the CIA covert program ...

26 NARA 111-10004-10011 ~ 10/22/1963 Defense Intelligence Agency Memo “Anti-Castro Activity.” From: Boyt, J.E. Subjects: Anti-Castro Activity; Somoza, Luis; Kennedy, John; Luis Somoza’s Conversation with Commando L.

27 NARA 104-10221-10112 ~ 11/19/1963 Letter “Frank Fiorini Documents Correspondence and Maps.” To: Director FBI Attention Sam Papich. From: [CIA] Deputy Director of Plans. Subjects: LOXCO Inc. Brown Robt. 

28 NARA 1993.08.05.10:15:50:750052 Memo to: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. From: Deputy Director (Plans). Subject: Frank FIORINI – Documents, Correspondence and Maps which were observed in a Briefcase.” Various Materials On Frank Sturgis Aka Frank Fiorini—10 January 19.” Page 115 of 214.

>> Fiorini’s briefcase also contained three lists: “addresses and individuals” plus “military equipment for what appears to be a 196 man unit” and “miscellaneous weapons and purchase prices” available from “Loxco Incorporated, Lauchi Ordnance Experimental Company, 2010 Keebler Street, Collinsville, Illinois.”28

29 NARA 124-90109-10080 No Title. From: [FBI] SI. To: HQ. Subject: Richard Lauchli. May, 4, 1964

NARA 124-9011-10011 No Title. From: [FBI] SI. To: HQ. Subject: Richard Lauchli Minutemen. April 20, 1964.

>> Lauchli had told the FBI that “he severed relations with ‘Minutemen’ because he felt the National Office of the ‘Minutemen’ was doing an ineffective job in preparing for guerilla warfare in the event the United States should be invaded” by communist forces and “he had organized the Counter Insurgency Council.” These paranoid, gun lovers sold gummed stickers that said “A gun did NOT kill Kennedy—a communist did.”

30 NARA 124-90111-10006 No Title. From: [FBI] SI. To: HQ. Subject: Richard Lauchli. June 26, 1964

>> The following summer Lauchli was arrested following a 100-mph chase by United States Treasury Department agents after he sold an undercover agent $17,000 worth of submachine guns.

31 NARA 104-10506-10028 ~ Title: Memo: Latin America Division Task Force Report Of Possible Cuban Complicity In The John F. Kennedy Assassination.” Page 130 of 158.

32 NARA 104-10180-10020 – 1/9/1964 CIA “Routing Sheet and Memorandum: Memo Received from AMTOUT-1” From C/SAS/EDE. To Chief CI/Staff [James Angleton].

33 NARA 104-10121-10377 ~ 2/12/1964 Memorandum “Debriefing Prisbeck 6 or 7 February 1964.”

34 NARA 180-10141-10365 ~ 12/8/1977 HSCA Document

>> This 78-page document provides the HSCA’s overview of the anti-Castro groups existing in 1963 that were active, militant, motivated to assassinate John F. Kennedy, had the capability and possessed the resources to do it.

"The Sugar King of Cuba." By John Paul Rathbone. The New York Times, August 12, 2010.

35 NARA 104-10310-10250 ~ 2/4/1967 CIA Memorandum For: Deputy Director of Plans “Subject: Masferrer Prosecution, Miami, Florida.” Signed by: Jacob Esterline, Acting Chief, Western Hemisphere Division. Released December 2022.