December 12, 2009

12: The Doolittle Report on CIA Covert Activities

Pawley’s participation in the Guatemala coup left him feeling satisfied in 1954 that “the Monroe Doctrine and the position adopted by the Organization of American States had been forthrightly reasserted.”1

But he had also experienced first-hand “an absolutely intolerable breach of security during the Guatemalan episode” which he detailed decades later in his autobiography. After playing tennis with The Washington Post publisher Phil Graham, Pawley was stunned to hear Graham “lob over my head” the news that the U.S. was going to help Castillo Armas overthrow the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. Graham gave him more details as if Pawley was “listening to a top secret briefing at State. All that was missing was my role in the affair.” Graham revealed the source of his knowledge as a CIA “high official in the covert operations arena.”

While indicating that he did not question Graham’s patriotism, Pawley noted that “Graham’s lapse underlines the axiom in delicate operations that a participant should be told only what he needs to know. No more. No less.”

Pawley immediately told President Eisenhower of the security breach, and Ike responded by telling Pawley “‘to conduct a thorough investigation of the covert side of CIA operations for me.’” Pawley was concerned that it would jeopardize his invaluable relationships with the Dulles brothers at State and CIA. As a result, Eisenhower then suggested that Lt. General Jimmy Doolittle, “a national symbol of competent fair mindedness,” head up the study group with Pawley assisting him.2

Pawley’s files were moved from covert to an overt file, and he was given cryptographic clearance in preparation for becoming a key member of Eisenhower’s Special Study Group. The Doolittle Committee was formed in the summer of 1954 to study the CIA’s successes and failures in Guatemala, Iran and Europe and make recommendations on how to improve the agency’s capabilities.

During the clearance process Pawley’s background information passed through many hands including CIA Director Allen Dulles and the Director of Security Sheffield Edwards3, who seven years later would play a role in a plot with members of the Mafia to assassinate Fidel Castro,4 something Pawley would advocate.5

The July 13, 1954, two recommendations were written concerning “Bill Pawley’s usefulness.” One was from Henry Holland. “In my opinion Pawley would perform outstandingly on almost any assignment. His abilities as a lone operator are generally recognized. On the Guatemalan assignment he functioned smoothly as a member of a team.”6

The second recommendation was in the form of a CIA memorandum for Director Allen Dulles from Director of Security Sheffield Edwards who had set up Project BLUEBIRD’s teams of psychiatrists, polygraphers, hypnotists and technicians to identify risky CIA personnel and defectors in 1950. (BLUEBIRD evolved into ARTICHOKE and then MKULTRA.)

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52: The Full Doolittle Committee Report (1954)

Report by the Special Study Group(1)

The Doolittle Committee’s Special Study Group forwarded the following report to the President under cover of a September 30 letter signed by J. H. Doolittle, Chairman, and members of the Special Study Group William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William D. Pawley.
Washington, undated.

REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. Introduction
The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and reliable intelligence on the capabilities and 
intentions of Soviet Russia is today’s most important military and political requirement. Several agencies of Government and many thousands of capable and dedicated people are engaged in the accomplishment of this task. Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

As long as it remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment of this mission.

In the carrying out of this policy and in order to reach minimal standards for national safety under present world conditions, two things must be done. First, the agencies charged by law with the collection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence must be strengthened and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree. This is a primary concern of the National Security Council and must be accomplished at the national policy level. Those elements of the problem that fall within the scope of our directive are dealt with in the report which follows. The second consideration is less tangible but equally important. It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered.

We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been established by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically secure by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up by constant surveillance. Once across borders—by parachute, or by any other means—escape from detection is extremely difficult because of constant checks on personnel activities and personal documentation. The information we have obtained by this method of acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.

The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a more profitable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing a great deal of its effort in this direction, [1 line not declassified]. The information obtained from this source has been of value but is sporadic and incomplete.

A still greater potential lies in communications intelligence. This leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively briefed by CIA personnel and by the Armed Services in the methods and equipment that are presently in use and under development in this area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civilian consultants who are working on such special projects. We are impressed by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet to be explored. We believe that every known technique should be intensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance, high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sources may come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.

In the short time that has been available to us we have been intensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the principal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with representatives of other interested Government agencies and with certain knowledgable [sic] individuals whose past experience and present thinking

The Intelligence Community have made their views of value. The procedures which have been followed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are detailed in Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations follow.

II. Conclusions and Recommendations

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general we conclude:
(a) that its placement in the overall organization of the Government is proper;
(b) that the laws under which it operates are adequate;
(c) that the established provisions for its financial support are sufficiently flexible to meet its current operational needs;
(d) that in spite of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid expansion it is doing a creditable job;
(e) that it is gradually improving its capabilities, and
(f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its personnel.

There are, however, important areas in which the CIA covert organization, administration and operations can and should be improved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in many cases steps are being taken toward their solution. While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive as possible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not complete. We are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director and staff of an organization such as CIA and appreciate the sincere efforts being made to solve them. In an attempt to be constructive and in the hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommendations:

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53: Doolittle Committee Bios (1954)

GENERAL JAMES H. DOOLITTLE



























































WILLIAM FRANKE  & WILLIAM DOUGLAS PAWLEY























    S. PAUL JOHNSTON

Subject was born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 3 August 1899, the son of James Irvin Johnston and Bertha Wilson Johnston, nee Gill. He was married 28 December 1923 to Carol Bates Rhodes, from whom he was later divorced. They had two children, Mary Carol and James Irvin, I. A second marriage occurred on 29 December 1945 when he married Cathryn U. Herron, who died on 29 August 1948. On 9 September 1949, he married his present wife, the former Claudine Lutz. They have one daughter, Pierrette.

Since 1945 the Subject has functioned as Managing Director of the Institute of Aeronautical Sciences, with Headquarters at 2 East 64th, New York City and devoted his major time to this enterprise. He entered business in 1921 as an apprentice in the Operating Department of the Aluminum Company of America and within a year made a new connection with the Pittsburgh Office of the New Kensington Works. During the next seven years, he remained identified with this organization and eventually became a Chief Engineer.

In 1930, he turned to writing and from 1931to 1934, he was the Assistant Editor of the publication, Aviation. Promotion followed and after serving as an Associate Editor and Acting Editor, he was its Editor from 1936 to 1940. From January 1940to February 1942, he was Coordinator of Research with the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. From February 1942 to 1943, he was Manager of the Curtiss-Wright Corporation in Washington, D.C.

During World War I, Subject served in the ROTC, From May to December 1918, he was in the Air Service of the U.S. Army. In 1944 he was a Captain in the W.S. Naval Air Transport Service in the Pacific. During 1945 and1946, he was attached to U.S. Strategic Bombing Service, ET and Japan and was awarded the Legion of Merit in1945.

The Subject served as Executive Director of the President's Air Policy Commission from August to December 1948 and also was a Consultant to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Lexington Project that same year.

In the years 1937, 1947 and1948 he was a member of the Committee on Awards for the Collier Trophy, He is an honorary member of the Maintenance and Engineering Committee of the Air Transport Association.

He was a student at the Carnegie Institute of Technology from 1917 to 1919 and received a B.S. Degree in mechanical engineering from MIT in 1921 following hie return to civilian life. He has been a member of the Aero Engineering Advisory Council at Princeton University and a Fellow at the Institute of Aeronautical Science.

His clubs are the Coemor Club, Army-Navy Club, Wings (New York), City Island Club and Yacht Club. 

He has authored several books dealing with aviation and has written graphic histories of the U.S. Navy and Army Air Forces.

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