December 12, 2009

13: CIA Director Allen Dulles Survives the Doolittle Critique

Following Ike's meeting with the Doolittle Committee, a memorandum was written. When it was finally declassified, it confirmed the criticism of CIA Director Allen Dulles that I had heard in my phone conversations with Morris Hadley and William Franke.  

Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 19, 1954.
The President saw General Doolittle and other members of the Committee appointed to investigate the activities of the CIA.
The report was presented by General Doolittle, who said they had gone over it with Allen Dulles for three reasons:

  1. (1)  to be absolutely fair;

  2. (2)  to study Mr. Dulles better to watch for his reactions to a report not wholly favorable;

  3. (3)  and their hope that the maximum good would come out of the report.

Mr. Dulles made several recommendations that were incorporated in the report. The President prefaced his remarks by saying that of course Mr. Dulles knew, as does everyone, that no two men would have the same judgments about certain things. That what we wanted to know was did we have a good man for the CIA head, and was he being selective and skillful in getting his assistants, and was his team working together in the best interests of the United States.

General Doolittle emphasized that the report was constructive criticism and in no sense a white wash. Some of the recommendations were very technical.

About Dulles: his principal strength is his unique knowledge of his subject; he has his whole heart in it, his life, he is a man of great honesty, integrity, loyally supported by his staff. His weakness, or the weakness of the CIA is in the organization—it grew like topsy, sloppy organization. Mr. Dulles surrounds himself with people in whom he has loyalty but not competence. There is a lack of discipline in the organization. There is a complete lack of security consciousness throughout organization. Too much information is leaked at cocktail party.

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52: The Full Doolittle Committee Report (1954)

Report by the Special Study Group(1)

The Doolittle Committee’s Special Study Group forwarded the following report to the President under cover of a September 30 letter signed by J. H. Doolittle, Chairman, and members of the Special Study Group William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William D. Pawley.
Washington, undated.

REPORT ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

I. Introduction
The acquisition and proper evaluation of adequate and reliable intelligence on the capabilities and 
intentions of Soviet Russia is today’s most important military and political requirement. Several agencies of Government and many thousands of capable and dedicated people are engaged in the accomplishment of this task. Because the United States is relatively new at the game, and because we are opposed by a police state enemy whose social discipline and whose security measures have been built up and maintained at a high level for many years, the usable information we are obtaining is still far short of our needs.

As long as it remains national policy, another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more effective, more unique and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient and secure accomplishment of this mission.

In the carrying out of this policy and in order to reach minimal standards for national safety under present world conditions, two things must be done. First, the agencies charged by law with the collection, evaluation and distribution of intelligence must be strengthened and coordinated to the greatest practicable degree. This is a primary concern of the National Security Council and must be accomplished at the national policy level. Those elements of the problem that fall within the scope of our directive are dealt with in the report which follows. The second consideration is less tangible but equally important. It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, long-standing American concepts of “fair play” must be reconsidered.

We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.

Because of the tight security controls that have been established by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically secure by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up by constant surveillance. Once across borders—by parachute, or by any other means—escape from detection is extremely difficult because of constant checks on personnel activities and personal documentation. The information we have obtained by this method of acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.

The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a more profitable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing a great deal of its effort in this direction, [1 line not declassified]. The information obtained from this source has been of value but is sporadic and incomplete.

A still greater potential lies in communications intelligence. This leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively briefed by CIA personnel and by the Armed Services in the methods and equipment that are presently in use and under development in this area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civilian consultants who are working on such special projects. We are impressed by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet to be explored. We believe that every known technique should be intensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance, high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sources may come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.

In the short time that has been available to us we have been intensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the principal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with representatives of other interested Government agencies and with certain knowledgable [sic] individuals whose past experience and present thinking

The Intelligence Community have made their views of value. The procedures which have been followed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are detailed in Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations follow.

II. Conclusions and Recommendations

With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general we conclude:
(a) that its placement in the overall organization of the Government is proper;
(b) that the laws under which it operates are adequate;
(c) that the established provisions for its financial support are sufficiently flexible to meet its current operational needs;
(d) that in spite of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid expansion it is doing a creditable job;
(e) that it is gradually improving its capabilities, and
(f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its personnel.

There are, however, important areas in which the CIA covert organization, administration and operations can and should be improved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in many cases steps are being taken toward their solution. While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive as possible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not complete. We are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director and staff of an organization such as CIA and appreciate the sincere efforts being made to solve them. In an attempt to be constructive and in the hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommendations:

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