We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us. It may become necessary that the American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this fundamentally repugnant philosophy.
Because of the tight security controls that have been established by the U.S.S.R. and its satellites, the problem of infiltration by human agents is extremely difficult. Most borders are made physically secure by elaborate systems of fencing, lights, mines, etc., backed up by constant surveillance. Once across borders—by parachute, or by any other means—escape from detection is extremely difficult because of constant checks on personnel activities and personal documentation. The information we have obtained by this method of acquisition has been negligible and the cost in effort, dollars and human lives prohibitive.
The defection of Soviet and satellite personnel offers a more profitable field for exploitation. The Agency is properly focusing a great deal of its effort in this direction, [1 line not declassified]. The information obtained from this source has been of value but is sporadic and incomplete.
A still greater potential lies in communications intelligence. This leads to the conviction that much more effort should be expended in exploring every possible scientific and technical avenue of approach to the intelligence problem. The study group has been extensively briefed by CIA personnel and by the Armed Services in the methods and equipment that are presently in use and under development in this area. We have also had the benefit of advice from certain civilian consultants who are working on such special projects. We are impressed by what has been done, but feel that there is an immense potential yet to be explored. We believe that every known technique should be intensively applied and new ones should be developed to increase our intelligence acquisition by communications and electronic surveillance, high altitude visual, photographic and radar reconnaissance with manned or unmanned vehicles, upper atmosphere and oceanographic studies, physical and chemical research, etc. From such sources may come early warning of impending attack. No price is too high to pay for this knowledge.
In the short time that has been available to us we have been intensively briefed by the Director and staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, by the rest of the intelligence community, and by the principal users of the intelligence product. We have conferred with representatives of other interested Government agencies and with certain knowledgable [sic] individuals whose past experience and present thinking
The Intelligence Community have made their views of value. The procedures which have been followed, and the list of witnesses who have been heard are detailed in Appendix B, attached. Our findings and recommendations follow.
II. Conclusions and Recommendations
With respect to the Central Intelligence Agency in general we conclude:
(a) that its placement in the overall organization of the Government is proper;
(b) that the laws under which it operates are adequate;
(c) that the established provisions for its financial support are sufficiently flexible to meet its current operational needs;
(d) that in spite of the limitations imposed by its relatively short life and rapid expansion it is doing a creditable job;
(e) that it is gradually improving its capabilities, and
(f) that it is exercising care to insure the loyalty of its personnel.
There are, however, important areas in which the CIA covert organization, administration and operations can and should be improved. The Agency is aware of these deficiencies and in many cases steps are being taken toward their solution. While we believe our study to have been as comprehensive as possible in the time available to us, we realize that it is not complete. We are well aware of the tremendous problems facing the Director and staff of an organization such as CIA and appreciate the sincere efforts being made to solve them. In an attempt to be constructive and in the hope that we may be helpful, we make the following recommendations: